Iraq stands at a crossroads after its recent parliamentary elections, with the country’s political fate—and its relationship with neighboring Iran—hanging in the balance. On November 11, 2025, the coalition led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani emerged victorious, securing 1.317 million votes, according to the Independent High Electoral Commission. This win reinforces Sudani’s leadership, but the path forward is anything but straightforward for Iraq’s embattled democracy.
Despite the electoral success, Sudani and his coalition now face a daunting reality: Iraq’s 329-member parliament is deeply fragmented, with no single party wielding a majority. The system demands coalition-building, a process that’s historically fraught with tension, backroom deals, and, sometimes, outright paralysis. As Sudani seeks a second term, he’s presenting himself as a transformative force—someone who can steer Iraq toward stability and prosperity. Yet, for many, especially the country’s younger voters, the election feels like more of the same. Disillusionment runs deep, with many perceiving the vote as merely a continuation of entrenched party politics that have long stymied progress.
Voter turnout clocked in at 56.11%, a figure Sudani praised as a sign of renewed confidence in Iraq’s political system. But beneath the surface, the mood is far more complicated. According to reporting from the Atlantic Council, most analysts agree that Iran’s regional influence has waned in the wake of Israel’s fierce response to the October 7 attacks. Iran has lost key allies: Syria has shifted allegiances to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa—a group Tehran once fought against to defend the Assad regime. Hezbollah, Iran’s most loyal and effective regional partner, suffered a military defeat at the hands of Israel and now faces the real prospect of being forced to disarm. The Houthis, another Iranian ally, continue to absorb painful Israeli strikes.
Yet, in Iraq, Iran’s grip appears undiminished. Pro-Iranian armed factions and political groups—especially those within the so-called Coordination Framework—still maintain a firm hold on power. These groups, both armed and political, have long served as Tehran’s proxies, defending Iran’s interests even when those interests run counter to Iraq’s own needs. During the 12-day war on Iran in June 2025, these factions carefully avoided any military or political escalation against U.S. forces in Iraq or attacks on Israel. Some observers have described this as pragmatism or even loyalty to Iraq, but, as Akeel Abbas of the Atlantic Council argues, the more plausible explanation is that these groups had little room to maneuver without risking severe consequences.
There is, however, a growing desire within Iraq to dismantle these armed factions—whether they operate inside or outside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This sentiment is reflected in both official government decrees and popular discourse. During the tenures of Haider al-Abadi and Adel Abdul Mahdi, the government issued orders to institutionalize the PMF, stripping it of factional, political, and party affiliations and transforming it into a professional military force. The United States supported these decisions, but, crucially, did not push the Iraqi government hard enough to enforce them or help it overcome the pressures that ultimately derailed the effort.
Since 2010, Iran has played a decisive role in shaping the post-election political coalitions that determine Iraq’s prime minister and cabinet. The process is complicated by Iraq’s political structure: unlike many parliamentary democracies where a clear winner emerges, Iraq’s elections produce multiple “winners”—parties that then jockey to form the largest parliamentary bloc, which is authorized to choose the prime minister. This competition is often marred by bribery and judicial intimidation, and over the past two decades, the outcome has consistently favored the ruling coalition, often with Tehran’s blessing.
The 2010 Erbil Agreement stands as a stark example. It resolved a dangerous deadlock by allowing the election loser, Nouri al-Maliki, to retain power in exchange for key Iranian gains, including Maliki’s pledge to expel all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. (Ironically, U.S. troops returned just three years later at Baghdad’s request, after the fall of Mosul.) Since then, Washington has largely avoided using its influence to address these structural flaws, leaving Tehran free to shape successive Iraqi governments.
Now, with Iran’s influence in the region visibly diminished, Iraq’s political actors face a critical test: Can they form a governing coalition and select a prime minister without relying on Iran’s mediation? According to Abbas, “Iraqi factions have never achieved this independently; Iran, accepted by Shiite parties as mediator and empowered by its institutional and shadow influence in Iraq, has always been the only player capable of brokering these complex arrangements.” But the current moment is different. U.S. pressure on Baghdad to distance itself from Tehran is mounting, and some factions within the Coordination Framework itself favor a genuine institutionalization of the PMF. These factions may use the external pressure to strengthen their position, pushing for reforms that would reduce Iran’s sway.
The Shiite religious authority in Najaf has also become increasingly vocal, supporting the principle of keeping arms solely in the hands of the state—a stance that, in practice, calls for the dismantling of all armed factions. This shift in religious sentiment could provide crucial support for those seeking to curb the influence of pro-Iranian militias.
The stakes could hardly be higher. Failure to curb the power of these militias and reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iran could trigger American financial and economic sanctions—an outcome that would be disastrous for a nation that counts the United States as a key ally. Iraq’s leading politicians are acutely aware of what’s at stake. The question, according to Abbas, is whether they can “transform this awareness into concrete, credible steps reflected in the formation of the next government and its priorities.”
For now, the coming weeks will reveal whether Iraq’s leaders choose the familiar, destructive path of relying on Tehran or embrace a new approach that puts national interests first. Such a shift would require moral courage and political boldness—qualities that, as history has shown, are all too rare among Iraq’s ruling class. If they fail, the cost will likely be severe, not just for Iraq’s politicians, but for the country as a whole.
As the dust settles on the latest election, Iraq stands at a pivotal moment. The choices its leaders make now will shape the country’s future—and its place in a rapidly changing Middle East.
