In a region already fraught with tension and shifting alliances, the role of Iran has once again come to the forefront of international discourse. Over the past week, a series of developments involving Israel, Iran, Russia, and the United States has underscored just how pivotal Tehran remains in the complex chessboard of West Asian geopolitics.
On October 26, 2025, Israeli officials confirmed to ABC News that they were actively engaged with mediators and the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding the return of the remaining deceased hostages still held by Hamas. Brigadier General Gal Hirsch, the Israeli government’s liaison to hostage families, emphasized in a statement that, “the issue is at the center of the agenda,” and that negotiations were ongoing. This effort follows the return of four deceased hostages to Israel on October 20, 2025, as part of the first phase of a ceasefire deal. Under the terms of that agreement, all 28 deceased hostages were to be returned, but so far, only a portion of the remains have made their way home.
The families of the hostages, desperate for closure, sent a letter to U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff urging him to “pull out every stop and leave no stone unturned in demanding that Hamas fulfill their end of the agreement and bring all the remaining hostages home.” Their plea highlights the ongoing pain and uncertainty faced by those left behind, as well as the international dimensions of the crisis.
Meanwhile, the broader strategic landscape is shifting, with Iran’s growing military capabilities and its deepening ties to Russia raising alarm bells in Western capitals. According to reports published on October 27, 2025, by multiple outlets, Iran has openly claimed that Russia now relies on its missiles and drones—a development that signals not only an escalation in military cooperation but also a rebalancing of power, especially amid rising tensions with the United States. Former IRGC chief Mohammad-Ali Jafari declared that Iran’s domestically developed drones and missiles are “the country’s strength,” and Tehran has long touted its decades of indigenous defense development, including the ability to export missiles, drones, and vessels.
Leaked Russian defense documents, cited by Western analysts, reveal that Iran is also seeking to import Russian fighter jets, having signed a €6 billion deal for 48 SU-35 aircraft to modernize its aging air fleet. However, deliveries have reportedly been delayed due to Russia’s own military needs in Ukraine. This intertwining of Russian and Iranian defense interests has not gone unnoticed, with analysts warning that Iran’s expanded capabilities—combined with its potential support for Russia—could further destabilize an already volatile region.
Against this backdrop, U.S. political leaders are reflecting on the shifting sands of Middle Eastern diplomacy. Senator Tuberville, speaking on Capitol Hill on October 26, 2025, argued that during Donald Trump’s presidency, “Iran had little sway over events in Gaza,” and credited U.S. diplomacy for being more effective by avoiding direct engagement with Tehran. “Iran is non-relevant right now,” he said, adding, “As President Trump said – they weren’t. There was no negotiation.” Tuberville also praised Qatar and Turkey for their roles in brokering the recent Gaza peace agreement but cautioned that efforts to end the Israel-Palestine conflict should not rely on temporary truces. “In the Middle East, between Hamas and Israel -- obviously we’ve fought for 2,000 years,” he remarked. “We’re not going to solve it in a week with just one ceasefire and a peace deal.”
The senator’s comments referenced the latest U.S.-brokered truce, under which Hamas was required to release the final 20 living Israeli hostages within 72 hours of Israel’s withdrawal on October 10, 2025—a condition it met. However, Hamas failed to provide the remains or details of all those killed, handing over only 15 of 28 deceased hostages, a shortfall that has fueled Israeli accusations that the group is deliberately withholding the remains of others believed to be in its custody. The situation illustrates the persistent mistrust and the challenges inherent in negotiating with non-state actors in such an emotionally charged conflict.
Iran’s involvement in the region is hardly new. As reported by ABC News and other sources, Tehran has long supported Hamas with funding, weapons, and training, positioning the group as part of what it calls its “axis of resistance” against Israel and Western influence. This network of alliances, stretching from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Ansarullah in Yemen, forms what many in Tehran view as a containment belt against existential threats—a defensive strategy forged in the crucible of decades of sanctions and military encirclement.
The Abraham Accords, brokered during Trump’s tenure, are frequently cited as a diplomatic breakthrough that normalized relations between Israel and several Arab countries. Tuberville and Trump himself have both pointed to these agreements as evidence of effective U.S. leadership. In late September 2025, Trump even expressed hope that Iran might eventually join the Abraham Accords, telling reporters, “Who knows maybe even Iran can get in there, we expect, we hope we are going to be able to get along with Iran. I think they're going to be open to it, I really believe that.” He added, “I long ago said at one point Iran would be a member of the accords. And little did I realize it was going to take this turn. It was some turn we did with the B-2s. I think they might very well be there, it would be a great thing for them economically.”
Yet, as the Tehran Times analysis published on October 26, 2025, makes clear, this vision is not universally shared. The article describes Trump’s Middle East policy as a “theology of power,” in which order and chaos are determined by the will of the president. In this narrative, peace is achieved by weakening Iran, and the complexities of the region are reduced to a binary contest between good and bad actors. The killing of General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 is held up as a defining moment—a symbolic act intended to restore balance through force. “We hit them back,” Trump asserted, convinced that such actions could remake the region.
However, the Tehran Times argues that this approach overlooks the defensive logic guiding Iranian foreign policy. Surrounded by U.S. military bases and armed rivals, Iran’s strategy is seen as a rational response to existential threats. The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA nuclear agreement in 2018, under Trump’s leadership, only reinforced Tehran’s sense of siege, crystallizing a resistance ideology that prizes self-sufficiency in technology, energy, and military capabilities.
Critics contend that this cycle—punishing Iran under the pretext of threat, only to see Tehran bolster its defenses in response—has made Iran an even more indispensable player in regional security conversations. The Abraham Accords, while lauded by some as a diplomatic coup, are seen by others as having marginalized the Palestinian cause, reducing peace to an elite pact built on economic interests and a shared adversary. The ongoing war in Gaza, the article notes, is a stark reminder that unresolved conflicts cannot be wished away; they merely mutate and resurface.
In the end, Trump’s vision of peace imposed from above, with the U.S. as moral arbiter, is criticized as simplistic and ultimately self-defeating. As the Tehran Times concludes, “No durable order can be based on obedience; only on mutual recognition.” The region’s future, it suggests, will be determined not by superpower decrees, but by the shifting equilibrium among its own actors—each with their own histories, grievances, and ambitions.
As events continue to unfold, one thing is clear: Iran remains not just a subject of Western policy, but a central actor whose choices and alliances will shape the fate of the region for years to come.
