The waters of the Indus River have long been the lifeblood of Pakistan’s agriculture and a delicate thread binding uneasy neighbors. But in 2025, that thread has frayed dramatically, leaving Pakistan facing a water crisis with consequences that ripple far beyond its borders. According to the Ecological Threat Report 2025, released by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus basin—already a strategic vulnerability—has reached a dangerous tipping point after India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) earlier this year.
The IWT, signed in 1960 with World Bank mediation, had served as a rare example of cooperation between India and Pakistan, governing the use of the Indus River and its six major tributaries. For decades, it provided a framework for water sharing and conflict resolution, even as the two countries clashed over other issues. But that stability was shattered in April 2025, when India placed the treaty in abeyance as a punitive response to the Pakistan-sponsored Pahalgam terror attack. As reported by the IEP, this move freed New Delhi from its treaty-bound obligation to share the waters of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers with Pakistan.
The consequences for Pakistan have been swift and severe. The IEP report states bluntly, “Pakistan’s storage capacity is limited to roughly 30 days of river flow, making it vulnerable to seasonal shortages.” This means that any disruption—however brief—in upstream flows can quickly translate into acute water shortages for Pakistan’s densely populated plains. The country’s agricultural sector, which accounts for a staggering 80 percent of its irrigation needs, is especially exposed.
May 2025 offered a stark preview of what’s at stake. India conducted reservoir flushing operations at the Salal and Baglihar dams on the Chenab River without notifying Pakistan—a step previously restricted under the IWT due to the risks of sudden downstream changes. The result? According to the IEP, “sections of the Chenab in Pakistan’s Punjab ran dry for a few days, as India’s dam gates were shut, then released sediment-laden torrents when opened.” For local farmers, the impact was immediate and devastating: crops withered, irrigation channels emptied, and livelihoods hung in the balance.
While India’s dams on the western rivers are primarily run-of-the-river projects with limited storage capacity, the timing of gate operations provides significant leverage. The IEP warns, “Even minor adjustments in dam operations at critical times, like summers, could significantly impact Pakistan’s densely populated plains, which rely on the Indus basin for 80% of irrigated agriculture.” In other words, India doesn’t need to completely block the rivers to inflict pain—small, well-timed disruptions can have outsized effects, especially during crucial growing seasons.
The report also highlights that Pakistan’s failure to invest in adequate water storage and dam infrastructure has left it dangerously exposed. “Pakistan lacks sufficient storage to buffer variations,” the IEP cautions. Chronic underinvestment in reservoirs, mismanagement of irrigation systems, and political instability have all contributed to the crisis. As the report puts it, “Even small disruptions, if timed poorly, can severely affect agriculture.”
India’s shift in water policy has been years in the making. For decades, New Delhi underutilized its share of water under the IWT, allowing significant volumes from the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—to flow into Pakistan unused. But under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, this approach has changed decisively. Projects like the Shahpurkandi Dam on the Ravi, completed in 2024, and the Ujh Dam on a Ravi tributary, have been designed to ensure India uses its full share of water. Hydropower projects such as Kishanganga and Ramganga have also been expanded within permissible limits, further bolstering India’s upstream control.
The IEP report observes, “The IWT has shifted from a framework of cooperation to a source of growing contention, reflecting the deterioration in India-Pakistan relations.” With the treaty suspended and Islamabad’s infrastructure lagging, Pakistan’s food and water security now hang by a thread—one held firmly in India’s hands. “Pakistan’s water security is increasingly at the mercy of India’s decisions. With limited storage and rising tensions, even small changes in river flows could have catastrophic effects on its agriculture and food supply,” the report warns.
Pakistan’s water woes don’t end at its eastern border. In late October 2025, Afghanistan announced plans to build a dam on the Kunar River, which will further restrict Pakistan’s cross-border water access. This announcement came on the heels of weeks of armed clashes between Afghan Taliban forces and the Pakistani military, which left hundreds dead. The Taliban’s Supreme Leader declared that the project to dam the Kunar River would begin “as soon as possible,” signaling yet another front in Pakistan’s water insecurity.
Geopolitics has only complicated matters further. The IEP report notes that India’s suspension of the IWT coincided with Pakistan’s recent defense agreement with Saudi Arabia. “India’s suspension of the IWT is closely linked to Pakistan’s defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, as the treaty would likely make India more cautious in using water as a pretext for conflict,” the report states. Riyadh’s backing is seen as an attempt to bolster Pakistan amid growing regional isolation, but it does little to address the underlying vulnerabilities.
Despite the rising tensions, the report emphasizes that “India’s unilateral actions” on water have not triggered “armed conflict” between the two countries. Instead, the battle is being waged through infrastructure, policy, and strategic maneuvering—what some analysts have dubbed the “weaponization of water.” For Islamabad, this is a crisis partly of its own making. Years of governance failures, underinvestment, and mismanagement have left Pakistan ill-equipped to cope with even moderate changes in river inflows. As climate change intensifies and India strengthens its upstream control, Pakistan’s agricultural heartland faces an existential threat—not from war, but from water scarcity.
The IEP’s findings leave little room for optimism. With the Indus Waters Treaty in limbo, India’s water infrastructure expanding, and regional pressures mounting, Pakistan’s future looks increasingly uncertain. The fate of millions now depends not just on rainfall or diplomacy, but on the turn of a valve hundreds of miles upstream.
As Pakistan’s farmers watch the riverbanks in hope and anxiety, one thing is clear: the era of easy water is over. What comes next may well define the region’s stability, prosperity, and peace for decades to come.
