Political intrigue and constitutional debate are once again at the forefront in South Asia, as both India and Pakistan grapple with contentious amendments and the processes by which they are scrutinized. With the calendar flipping to late September 2025, the spotlight falls on New Delhi and Islamabad, where the fates of high-profile legislative changes—and the very nature of parliamentary oversight—hang in the balance.
In India, the government’s recent push for a constitutional amendment bill—one that could dramatically reshape the political landscape by introducing automatic disqualification for Prime Ministers, Chief Ministers, and ministers who spend 30 days in custody—has set off a firestorm of debate. According to The Times of India, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Rijiju announced on September 24, 2025, that the Congress party and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) would participate in the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) tasked with examining the bill. "I've had discussions with representatives of Congress and they have said they will send names for JPC soon," Rijiju told the newspaper, signaling a potential break in opposition ranks.
Supriya Sule of the NCP confirmed her party’s participation, and other members of the INDIA bloc have reportedly shown willingness to join the scrutiny process. However, unity among opposition parties remains elusive. The Trinamool Congress (TMC), Samajwadi Party (SP), Shiv Sena (Uddhav Balasaheb Thackeray faction), and Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) have all decided to boycott the JPC, dismissing it as a mere formality that the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) would bulldoze through regardless of dissent.
Congress itself has not yet formally announced its decision, with internal disagreements coming to the fore. General Secretary KC Venugopal echoed the stance of the boycott bloc, asserting that the government was using parliamentary panels to push its legislative agenda. Yet, he hinted at a possible tilt toward staying out of the JPC, leaving other opposition parties—including the NCP, Communist Party of India (Marxist), and Rashtriya Janata Dal—to look to Congress for cues. The stakes are high: participation could be seen as legitimizing a process many opposition figures view as flawed, while abstention risks ceding the field to the government entirely.
Meanwhile, across the border in Islamabad, a different but equally high-stakes constitutional drama is unfolding. The Supreme Court of Pakistan is set to resume proceedings on October 7, 2025, on a series of petitions challenging the 26th Constitution Amendment. The eight-judge Constitutional Bench, headed by Justice Aminuddin Khan and comprising Justices Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Ayesha A. Malik, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, Musarrat Hilali, Naeem Akhtar Afghan, and Shahid Bilal Hassan, will hear arguments that could have far-reaching implications for the country’s legal and political order.
According to Dawn, petitioners argue that the 26th Amendment was passed without a fully constituted parliament and relied heavily on the votes of defecting members, a process they claim contravened Articles 63A, 238, and 239 of the Constitution. They seek to have Sections 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 21, and 27 of the amendment declared unconstitutional, ultra vires, and void from the outset. The petitions also call for appointments made under the amendment and its related legislation to be set aside as unlawful, and for the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act 2024 and the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) (Amendment) Act 2024 to be declared unconstitutional, as they allegedly stem from an illegitimate amendment.
The controversy has not been confined to the courtroom. On August 20, 2025, Justices Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Munib Akhtar penned a joint letter after the Supreme Court decided to make public the October 31, 2024, committee minutes, which called for a full court meeting to deliberate on the amendment’s constitutionality. Their letter lamented the missed opportunity for the institution as a whole to resolve the matter, stating, "The challenges to the 26th Amendment continue to remain pending and a golden opportunity to decide them at the earliest instance before the institution as a whole — i.e. the full court as it then stood — has been lost, perhaps irretrievably."
Chief Justice of Pakistan Yahya Afridi responded on August 14, 2025, explaining his opposition to convening a full court. He argued that such a move would undermine the spirit of collegiality among judges and expose the Supreme Court to public comment, which, he noted, had regrettably occurred in the recent past. The last hearing on the challenges took place on January 27, 2025, when the bench suggested that the existing eight-judge panel could be considered a full court for the purposes of the case. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar clarified, "This is not the domain of the CB to constitute the Full Court or refer the matter to the Chief Justice of Pakistan after Article 191A of the Constitution," emphasizing that a full court cannot be formed simply on the wishes of lawyers.
Justice Aminuddin Khan, however, issued notices to respondents on key points raised by counsel, including whether the matter should be referred to the full court, the amendment’s impact on judicial independence, and arrangements for live streaming the proceedings. The Supreme Court is now seized with multiple petitions from political parties, individuals, and high court bar associations, all urging that the matter be heard by the full court rather than the current bench.
The legal and political arguments swirling around both the Indian and Pakistani amendments have striking parallels. In both countries, opposition parties and civil society groups have raised alarms about the methods by which constitutional changes are being advanced—whether through parliamentary committees in India or through allegedly incomplete parliamentary processes in Pakistan. The debates have also underscored the delicate balance between majoritarian rule and minority rights, and the crucial role of independent institutions in safeguarding constitutional norms.
For India, the question is whether opposition participation in the JPC will lend legitimacy to a process they have repeatedly criticized, or whether a boycott will ultimately weaken their ability to influence the bill’s outcome. For Pakistan, the Supreme Court’s decision on whether to expand the bench—or even overturn the 26th Amendment—could set precedents for how future constitutional disputes are resolved, and how the boundaries between legislative and judicial authority are drawn.
As both nations watch these developments unfold, the outcomes will likely resonate far beyond the immediate political actors. They will shape public perceptions of transparency, accountability, and the rule of law at a time when democratic institutions are under intense scrutiny. The coming weeks promise to be pivotal, with the decisions made in New Delhi and Islamabad reverberating through the corridors of power—and the wider public consciousness—for years to come.
