The shifting tides in global security strategy have sent ripples across Asia, as the United States recalibrates its defense priorities and regional partners scramble to adapt. In late October 2025, as reported by The Hindu and Organiser, two major developments underscored the uncertainty facing key American allies and partners: the Trump administration’s proposed National Defense Strategy (NDS) signaled a retreat from countering China in the Indo-Pacific, and a high-profile summit in Tokyo saw US President Donald J. Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi forging new economic and technological alliances.
For India, the implications of Washington’s evolving stance are profound. The NDS, still awaiting public release, pivots away from the traditional US focus on containing Chinese influence in Asia, instead prioritizing the security of America’s southern border against perceived threats from Latin America. According to The Hindu, this shift has caused considerable unease in New Delhi, Tokyo, and Seoul—nations that have long relied on the US security umbrella to balance China’s growing assertiveness.
India’s predicament is especially acute. The country recently emerged from a tense military conflict with Pakistan and a border disengagement with China in October 2024. The sudden prospect of an American retrenchment leaves India exposed at a time of heightened regional volatility. As The Hindu notes, New Delhi’s trust in the US, built painstakingly over decades, now wavers under the weight of the Trump administration’s “makeover.”
In response, India is weighing a mix of strategic options. These include ramping up investment in its domestic defense industry, diversifying strategic partnerships, working to stabilize ties with China, and maintaining limited cooperation with the US. The uncertainty generated by Washington’s policy shift, however, only reinforces India’s long-standing drive toward defense indigenization—a goal that has been championed by Indian strategists since the Nehru era, but one that has often faltered in practice due to bureaucratic inefficiencies, funding shortfalls, and a persistent preference for foreign acquisitions.
Yet, there have been bright spots. India’s indigenous missile programs, artillery guns, radars, and armored vehicles have met critical battlefield needs. Recent reforms—such as the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020, Defence Procurement Manual 2025, Positive Indigenisation Lists, streamlined certification processes, ambitious defense export targets, the iDEX innovation initiative, and the creation of two defense corridors—are promising steps forward. The opening of missile and artillery manufacturing to private sector entities marks a significant milestone, although the proposal to treat local subsidiaries of foreign defense contractors as Indian vendors risks perpetuating reliance on outside suppliers.
India’s foreign policy, shaped by a tradition of non-alignment and strategic autonomy, is now being put to the test. While New Delhi has historically avoided binding alliances, it has not shied away from selective partnerships to bolster its security. The Indo-US strategic partnership, deepened by shared concerns over China, has included landmark civil nuclear deals, advanced weapons sales, joint military exercises, and intelligence cooperation. However, as The Hindu points out, President Trump’s “tantrums and tariffs” have complicated this relationship, making it clear that India cannot take US support for granted—regardless of which party holds power in Washington.
In this environment, India is likely to double down on its strategy of multi-alignment. Russia remains a reliable supplier of advanced weaponry, including long-range air defense systems, aircraft, submarines, and tanks. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile stands as a testament to successful co-development with foreign partners. France continues to be a key source of advanced jet fighters, and defense collaboration with Israel—particularly in missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles—is on the rise. India is also exploring deeper defense ties with South Korea and Japan, aiming for joint production and maintenance facilities. These efforts are complemented by a broader diplomatic engagement with like-minded regional and extra-regional powers to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Japan, meanwhile, is moving in parallel but distinct directions. The October 2025 summit in Tokyo between President Trump and Prime Minister Takaichi produced significant agreements on rare-earth and critical minerals, as well as a deal on new-generation nuclear power reactors. As Organiser reports, these moves are designed to reduce Japanese and American dependence on China, which currently processes more than 90% of the world’s rare earths. The US, by comparison, controls just 12%. The nuclear agreement is particularly significant for Japan, which has struggled to restore its nuclear energy capacity since the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in 2011.
Prime Minister Takaichi has made clear her ambition to increase Japan’s defense spending to 2 percent of GDP within the current fiscal year, signaling a push for greater autonomy in Japanese security policy. While Japan has long benefited from the US defense umbrella, there is a growing recognition in Tokyo that the country must develop its own strategic capabilities. Observers, as cited by Organiser, note that Japan is expected to pursue multilateral diplomacy centered on shared democratic values, deepen cooperation with partners like South Korea, and expand its role in economic and humanitarian relief—especially in light of the Trump administration’s dismantling of the US Agency for International Development.
Despite these efforts, both India and Japan face an uncertain future. China remains a formidable challenge. The recent Sino-Indian border standoff was resolved with a disengagement agreement and cautious improvement in bilateral ties, but the underlying power imbalance and trust deficit persist. As The Hindu observes, India is pursuing a strategy of engagement to avoid unnecessary confrontation with China while quietly building up its own capabilities. At the same time, China’s actions in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific continue to test the resolve and unity of regional powers.
For its part, the US is far from irrelevant. Even as the Trump administration shifts its focus, America’s military and technological heft remains an asset that India and Japan will continue to leverage where possible. The ongoing delivery of GE’s F404-IN20 jet engines for India’s Tejas LCA MK1-A fighter aircraft, for example, underscores the enduring value of Indo-US defense cooperation. And while the current NDS may prioritize hemispheric defense, the structural imperative of countering China still binds Washington to its Asian partners—at least for now.
As the global order lurches through another period of flux, India and Japan are recalibrating their strategies, seeking both autonomy and partnership in equal measure. The coming years will test their ability to navigate uncertainty, balance competing interests, and shape a regional equilibrium that serves their national interests in an era of unpredictable American leadership.
