Hungary’s steadfast reliance on Russian oil and gas is putting it at the center of a fierce debate within the European Union and NATO, exposing deep rifts in the Western alliance as the bloc pushes to sever its energy ties with Moscow. While much of Europe has moved swiftly to slash Russian imports following the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government has not only maintained but increased its consumption of Russian energy, insisting that no viable alternative exists for the landlocked nation.
According to The Livingston Enterprise, as of October 4, 2025, Hungary continues to depend heavily on Russian oil and gas, even as EU and NATO leaders intensify efforts to cut off supplies that help finance Russia’s war effort. Daryo, also reporting on October 4, highlighted Hungary’s recent overtures to Turkmenistan for gas imports, a move that signals Budapest’s search for new options but does little to mask its overwhelming reliance on Russian energy.
The EU’s campaign to end its dependence on Russian fossil fuels has gathered pace in recent weeks. As outlined by Bloomberg on October 3, the European Parliament is weighing amendments to the RePowerEU regulation, aiming to halt imports of Russian oil and petroleum products starting in early 2026 and to ban Russian gas supplies a year later. The Parliament’s industry committee is set to vote on these changes, which would align the cutoff of pipeline gas with the already scheduled end of seaborne deliveries under EU sanctions. The plan, however, requires unanimous approval from all 27 EU member states—a tall order given Hungary’s entrenched opposition.
Hungary’s government, led by Orbán, has long argued that Russian energy imports are indispensable for the nation’s economic survival. "If Hungary is cut off from Russian oil and natural gas, then immediately, within a minute, Hungarian economic performance will drop by 4%," Orbán said in a September interview with state radio, as reported by the Associated Press. "This would be catastrophic, the Hungarian economy would be on its knees."
Orbán’s warnings are echoed by other officials in Budapest, who cite Hungary’s geography and legacy infrastructure as limiting factors. The country receives most of its crude oil through the Druzhba pipeline from Russia and the Adria pipeline from Croatia. Officials claim that without Russian supplies, Hungary’s economy would collapse, and household utility bills would soar. In May 2025, Orbán asserted that eliminating Russian energy would double electricity bills and nearly triple gas prices for Hungarian families.
But not everyone buys the government’s argument. László Miklós, a chemical engineer and former director of corporate relations at the national oil company MOL, told the Associated Press there is "no rational explanation" for Hungary’s reluctance to seek alternatives. He argues that ample infrastructure already exists to supply Hungary with affordable, non-Russian oil and gas. "People think that Hungary purchases Russian energy for economic benefit. This is wrong," Miklós said. "Hungary buys Russian energy because the Hungarian government wants to help Russia arm itself ... MOL and the Hungarian government’s significant profits are a side effect of that."
In fact, the EU granted temporary exemptions to Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—three landlocked countries—allowing them to continue receiving Russian oil by pipeline even as the rest of the bloc imposed an embargo. This carve-out has enabled Hungary and its oil conglomerate, MOL, to reap major windfall profits while still funneling billions to Russia’s budget.
Yet critics point out that other landlocked countries have found ways to break their dependence. The Czech Republic, for example, recently celebrated its "oil independence day" after expanding an Italian pipeline, thereby ending Russian oil imports. The Croatian oil transport company Janaf has disputed Hungarian claims that the Adria pipeline cannot meet demand, stating it is ready to cover both Hungary’s and Slovakia’s annual crude needs.
Energy analysts also challenge the government’s dire forecasts about skyrocketing utility bills. Borbála Takácsné Tóth, a gas industry research analyst at the Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research, said that Hungary pays market prices for Russian gas, similar to what other countries pay for non-Russian supplies. According to her, breaking with Russian gas would likely cause only a "temporary increase of 1.5 to 2 euros per megawatt hour," or less than 5%—a far cry from the government’s warnings of economic catastrophe.
Despite the government’s rhetoric, MOL has been investing in diversification. The company confirmed it is spending $500 million over several years to outfit its refineries for non-Russian crude, aiming for more diverse sourcing by the end of 2026. "We will be (in) a much better position to have a more diverse crude oil sourcing capability," MOL stated in an email.
According to Times Now News on October 5, Hungary’s resistance is not an isolated case. Other NATO members, including Türkiye and Slovakia, have also balked at abandoning Russian energy, arguing that survival trumps ideological alignment with NATO or the EU. Slovak President Peter Pellegrini was quoted as saying, "Slovakia needs three, four, five different sources of gas and energy. We cannot replace dependence on Russia with dependence on the United States." Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar likewise contended that buying Russian oil is a commercial, not political, decision, and that his country’s refineries are technically geared for Russian crude.
The standoff has drawn criticism from Western leaders. On September 4, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that U.S. President Donald Trump was dissatisfied with Hungary and Slovakia for continuing to buy Russian oil, calling on Europe to stop funding Moscow’s war machine. An anonymous EU diplomat told Politico that Trump could, in theory, halt Russian oil imports to the EU "with one phone call" to Orbán and Slovak leaders. European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas has consistently advocated for a full end to Russian oil and gas purchases by EU countries.
Still, the EU’s push to accelerate its energy divorce from Russia is gaining momentum. Under the proposed RePowerEU amendments, new Russian gas purchases would be banned from January 1, 2026, with existing contracts allowed to run until mid-2026 or, for long-term deals, until January 1, 2027. The global gas market is expected to enter a surplus phase in the second half of 2026, which could ease concerns about shortages and price spikes as Russian supplies are phased out.
Looking ahead, energy experts say that, with political will, Hungary could transition away from Russian energy just as its neighbors have done. Miklós summed up the situation bluntly: "Things will clearly never be the same again, because the European Union has learned that, to put it simply, Russia cannot be trusted. It is a matter of political will to break away from Russian energy sources. There is a small price to pay for this, which every other European country is paying."
As EU regulations tighten and investments in alternative infrastructure ramp up, Hungary faces mounting pressure to choose between its longstanding economic ties to Russia and its obligations as a member of the European Union and NATO. The coming months will reveal whether Orbán’s government can continue to defy Brussels—or whether the tide is finally turning on Hungary’s Russian energy lifeline.
