Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, two West African nations with intertwined histories and persistent political turbulence, are both poised for pivotal elections in late 2025. While the world’s attention often drifts to larger African states, the political dramas unfolding in these neighboring countries have far-reaching implications for regional stability, foreign influence, and the prospects for democratic governance in West Africa.
In Guinea-Bissau, voters will head to the polls on November 23, 2025, for simultaneous presidential and legislative elections. If no presidential candidate secures a majority, a second round is scheduled for November 30. But this is no ordinary contest. The main opposition force, PAIGC/Pai Terra Ranka—long the dominant party and a fixture of the country’s post-independence politics—has been barred from participating by a series of court rulings. According to reporting from the Lansing Institute, this exclusion sets the stage for a contest with reduced competition and raises the specter of post-election legitimacy disputes.
President Umaro Sissoco Embaló, who dissolved the opposition-led parliament in December 2023, has consolidated his grip on power in the lead-up to these elections. In early 2025, Embaló escalated tensions with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by expelling or pressuring mediators, signaling a growing willingness to sideline external oversight. In August, he appointed Braima Camará—a longtime ally and power broker—as Prime Minister, further centralizing control over the election process. This move, analysts say, effectively places the electoral machinery in the hands of the presidency.
Meanwhile, the country’s security elites remain a powerful wildcard. Guinea-Bissau’s military has a storied history of coups and mutinies, and the current political climate leaves many observers wary of their potential to tip the scales if results are disputed. As the Lansing Institute notes, "Factionalized military and security services retain outsized veto power given repeated coup/putsch episodes and are pivotal in a disputed-result scenario."
International actors are watching closely. Russia has made overtures to Bissau, signing resource and port deals in February 2025 that include bauxite, phosphate, hydrocarbons, and a deep-water port project in Buba. These moves give Moscow a strategic foothold in a region where Western influence is waning, especially as ECOWAS and the European Union express growing concern about democratic backsliding. The EU, along with Portugal, has focused its attention on media expulsions, rule-of-law issues, and the integrity of the electoral process, threatening to condition budgetary support and visas on improvements. Yet, as the Lansing Institute points out, "ECOWAS withdrawal signals shrinking guardrails; Bissau’s latitude to manage results domestically has grown."
The risks surrounding the election are manifold. Operationally, there are concerns over voter roll disputes, last-minute court decisions, local intimidation, and logistical hurdles outside the capital. Politically, calls for boycotts, mass protests around certification, and selective enforcement against opposition figures could undermine the legitimacy of the vote. Security risks include waves of arrests, narratives of coup plots, and selective deployments of security forces that could chill turnout, particularly near key tally centers. Externally, diplomatic pressure from ECOWAS and the EU is likely to be limited, especially after recent standoffs and the withdrawal of mediation missions in March 2025.
Four scenarios have been outlined for Guinea-Bissau’s post-election landscape. The most probable is "managed continuity," where Embaló’s incumbent advantage and a fragmented opposition deliver him a second term and a friendly legislature. International partners might issue cautious statements, but are unlikely to intervene directly. However, this scenario carries the risk of a "legitimacy deficit" and later instability if economic or donor conditions deteriorate. Other possibilities include a disputed outcome with coercive stabilization, a shock opposition performance via allied lists, or—at the extreme—a rupture involving a failed putsch or mutiny, which could trigger a prolonged crisis and humanitarian fallout.
Underlying these scenarios is the persistent influence of the so-called "narco-corridor"—transnational criminal networks that have long exploited Guinea-Bissau’s permissive governance for cocaine transshipment and money laundering. As the Lansing Institute notes, "Transnational crime networks seek permissive governance regardless of winner; instability windows are exploited for cocaine transshipment and money flows." The interplay between criminal interests, security elites, and political actors adds another layer of complexity to an already volatile environment.
Turning eastward, Guinea is also preparing for a consequential presidential election in December 2025. The country’s Supreme Court recently released a provisional list of nine candidates, but the spotlight is firmly on General Mamady Doumbouya, the junta leader who seized power in 2021 after ousting former president Alpha Conde. Doumbouya had originally promised to relinquish power after the coup, but last month, voters gave him the green light to stand in the upcoming race—a move widely seen as an attempt to legitimize his military rule.
Not everyone made the cut. Former prime minister Lansana Kouyaté and former government minister Ousmane Kaba have been barred from standing on technical grounds, though Kouyaté has announced plans to appeal. Opposition leader Faya Millimono and former minister Aboulaye Yero Balde have been cleared to run, providing at least some semblance of competition. However, the credibility of the election has already been called into question. As reported by BBC and other outlets, the military dissolved many of the country’s political parties last year and suspended the three main opposition parties ahead of a recent referendum. This erosion of pluralism has prompted opposition groups to boycott the national legislature and cast doubt on the fairness of the process.
Guinea’s upcoming vote is taking place a year after the date agreed with ECOWAS for the restoration of civilian rule, further straining relations with the regional bloc. The situation in Guinea mirrors broader trends across West Africa, where military takeovers in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have become alarmingly common. The region’s democratic backsliding has left ECOWAS struggling to maintain its credibility as a guardian of constitutional order, and its leverage over transitional authorities appears to be waning.
Both Guinea-Bissau and Guinea now find themselves at crossroads. In Bissau, the likely outcome is a consolidation of executive dominance, with Embaló and his allies tightening their grip on power while balancing the competing interests of foreign investors, security elites, and criminal networks. In Guinea, Doumbouya’s run for president marks yet another chapter in the region’s cycle of coups and contested transitions, with the promise of civilian rule giving way to the realities of entrenched military influence.
For ordinary citizens in both countries, these elections are about more than just who occupies the presidential palace. They are a test of whether democratic institutions can withstand the pressures of executive overreach, judicial exclusion, and foreign meddling. The risks are real: legitimacy deficits, potential unrest, and the entrenchment of systems that prioritize elite interests over popular will. As the world watches, the outcomes in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea will reverberate far beyond their borders, shaping the trajectory of democracy and stability in West Africa for years to come.
