Washington’s corridors of power have always been a magnet for lobbyists, but the months leading up to the passage of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) saw an especially intense campaign—one that crisscrossed continents, spanned business interests, and exposed the tangled web of influence foreign governments and American business figures can wield on Capitol Hill.
At the heart of the story is a confluence of lobbying efforts: those by American business leaders with foreign stakes, and those by foreign governments themselves, all aiming to shape U.S. policy to their advantage. The result? A defense bill reflecting not just American strategic priorities, but also the fingerprints of powerful interests from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf.
One of the most striking examples comes from Georgia, where the ruling Georgian Dream party has faced mounting criticism from U.S. lawmakers for what many see as democratic backsliding and a tilt toward Moscow. According to Reuters, bipartisan frustration in Congress has boiled over as efforts to sanction the Georgian Dream government repeatedly stalled. The party’s expanding trade with Russia since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has only heightened suspicions, with Georgia now serving as a vital conduit for Russian exports.
Against this backdrop, Republican Representative Joe Wilson sponsored a measure that would largely prohibit the U.S. government from recognizing Georgia’s current government, a move designed to pressure Tbilisi’s leadership. But not everyone in Washington was on board. Steve Nicandros, a Texas-based oil executive and longtime Republican donor, quietly lobbied against the legislation. In a letter dated September 30, 2025, seen by Reuters, Nicandros thanked Republican members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee for opposing the measure and urged them to continue their resistance.
Nicandros, whose TXN Energy has operated in Georgia since 1997, argued in his letter that "for companies like ours that employ people and invest in Georgia, stable bilateral relations are critical." He insisted that the Georgian Dream was democratically elected and warned that the legislation could push Georgia further into Russia’s orbit, harming both U.S. business interests and regional stability. His lobbying, however, drew the ire of Rep. Wilson, who told Reuters he was concerned by efforts to thwart the bill and planned to investigate further as co-chair of the U.S. Helsinki Commission. "As Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, a body with subpoena power, I will endeavor to learn more about the operations of this individual," Wilson wrote in an email.
Nicandros’ influence is not merely rhetorical. According to Open Secrets, he has donated over $200,000 to Republican lawmakers and affiliated committees, a fact that has raised eyebrows but, as Reuters notes, there is no evidence the donations affected specific votes. The Georgian ambassador in Washington, Tamar Taliashvili, described Nicandros as a "trailblazer" for U.S. business in the region but insisted her government has no lobbying ties in the U.S. She also pointed out that bilateral relations had deteriorated under former President Joe Biden but suggested they could improve under President Donald Trump.
While the fate of the Wilson measure remains uncertain—it awaits a floor vote and lacks a Senate companion—another bill sanctioning the Georgian Dream party passed the House by a wide margin in May 2025 but has since stalled in the Senate. At a September hearing, Rep. Steve Cohen, a Democrat, expressed disbelief at the lack of progress, saying, "It's amazing that it's happened, and why it's happened, I do not understand it."
The saga in Georgia is just one example of how foreign interests and American business figures intersect with U.S. policy. If Georgia’s story is about a single donor’s quiet campaign, the NDAA’s journey through Congress has been shaped by a veritable army of foreign agents representing Middle Eastern powers—each wielding a checkbook and a Rolodex filled with congressional contacts.
Between February and August 2025, according to Department of Justice (DOJ) records cited by the Washington Examiner, foreign agents representing Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, and the Kurdistan Regional Government reported dozens of meetings, calls, and emails with congressional staff about the NDAA. These contacts often coincided with amendments and provisions in the defense bill favorable to their clients.
Take Bahrain, for instance. Ed Royce, the former House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman turned lobbyist, contacted Rep. Rich McCormick’s office five times in late August 2025, advocating on Bahrain’s behalf. Shortly after these meetings, McCormick proposed—and won approval for—an amendment requiring a report on the strategic importance and potential expansion of the U.S.-Bahrain Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement. The congressman’s office acknowledged to the Washington Examiner that these discussions directly involved the agreement. "Rep. McCormick will continue to support the United States’ alliances and national security interests abroad," his office said.
Rep. Joe Wilson also played a role, with his office confirming he led a provision related to joint cybersecurity efforts with Bahrain. A spokesman noted Wilson’s longstanding relationship with the Gulf country, which hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet and is a signatory to the Abraham Accords.
Bahrain’s lobbying muscle comes at a price: Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Royce’s firm, receives $65,000 a month for lobbying and another $15,000 for public relations. It’s a hefty investment, but one that appears to pay dividends.
The United Arab Emirates also engaged heavily, with foreign agents from American Defense International meeting with staff from the House Armed Services Committee to discuss amendments that would restrict arms transfers to the UAE. These talks occurred amid concerns that the UAE was supporting the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, a group accused by the U.S. of committing atrocities. Despite the lobbying, language restricting UAE arms transfers was left out of the final NDAA text.
Qatar, too, saw success. Agents working for the Gulf state held a series of calls and emails with staffers on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and soon after, amendments that would have blocked funding to retrofit a Qatari plane for Air Force One were voted down. The NDAA also included a provision requiring a report on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, potentially paving the way for more U.S. missile and air defense resources in the country.
Egypt, with its own robust lobbying presence, secured possible increases to U.S. counterterrorism and border security funding in the NDAA. As the Senate passed its version of the defense bill on October 9, following the House’s approval in September, the stage is now set for a conference committee to reconcile differences—a process sure to attract even more behind-the-scenes maneuvering.
Not every lobbying effort succeeds, of course. Some offices, like that of Rep. Dina Titus, simply ignored outreach from foreign agents. Others disputed lobbyists’ descriptions of their conversations, underscoring the often-murky nature of Washington influence.
Still, as the 2026 NDAA moves toward final passage, one thing is clear: the intersection of foreign lobbying, business interests, and U.S. policymaking is as lively—and as consequential—as ever. Whether it’s a Texas oilman defending his interests in Georgia or Gulf monarchies investing millions to sway defense policy, the battle for influence in Washington shows no sign of slowing down.
