Nigel Farage and his Reform UK party have stormed into the center of British politics, capturing headlines and, according to recent polls, the public’s attention. Their latest proposal—to abolish indefinite leave to remain (ILR) for migrants and require all settled non-citizens to reapply for their visas every five years—has ignited a fierce debate, not only about migration but also about the very fabric of British society and its economy.
Framing immigration as a crisis has long been a potent political strategy in the UK, and Farage has seized this narrative with renewed energy. As The Conversation reports, Reform UK claims that “uncontrolled immigration has pushed Britain to breaking point,” vowing that, if given the chance to “secure Britain’s borders,” they would “protect wages, our public services and British culture and values.” The party’s promise to scrap ILR is part of a broader suite of policies—including detaining and deporting Channel-crossing migrants, leaving the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and establishing a new immigration department—designed to prioritize UK citizens above all else.
But how realistic are these promises, and what would they mean for the hundreds of thousands of people who have already built lives in the UK? The answer, it seems, is complicated—and fraught with human and economic risks.
Under Reform UK’s plan, even those already granted indefinite leave to remain would have to reapply every five years, creating deep insecurity for thousands who have come to call Britain home. According to The Conversation, this proposal “creates insecurity for thousands of people who have come to call the UK home,” highlighting the human costs of such a sweeping change. Zia Yusuf, Reform’s Head of Policy, stated that “many of those who will lose their leave to remain are entirely dependent on the welfare state and will leave voluntarily upon losing access to benefits.” For those who do not, Yusuf promised, “they would be subject to immigration enforcement as part of our mass deportation program.”
Reform UK claims that these measures could save billions—specifically, 234 billion pounds over several decades, or between 5 and 10 billion pounds annually. They argue that requiring migrants to reapply for visas would ensure only those in full employment, with high English proficiency and above-threshold salaries, could stay. Farage has said, “Britain should not be the world’s food bank,” and that “it is not for us to provide welfare for people coming in from all over the world.”
However, these claims have been met with sharp skepticism. The BBC reports that the financial figures cited by Reform UK originated from a Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) report, which was later withdrawn after being challenged by the Office for Budget Responsibility. Ben Chu of BBC Verify cautioned, “I would be very very wary of the figures claimed by Farage,” noting that the estimates were based on uncertain projections of what recent migrants might earn or cost over their lifetimes. Chancellor Rachel Reeves declared, “Farage’s claims have no basis in reality,” and pointed out that the Labour government is already considering doubling the waiting period for ILR from five to ten years.
The economic implications extend far beyond disputed savings. As The Conversation explains, the uncertainty created by ending ILR could dampen investment in skills and job creation, especially in sectors heavily reliant on migrant workers. Employers may hesitate to invest in training if they fear that valued staff could be forced to leave. This insecurity could make the UK a less attractive destination for skilled migrants, just as employers in healthcare, hospitality, education, and other industries express concern about skills shortages.
There’s also the question of consultation. Reform UK has positioned itself as a champion of British business, but, as The Conversation asks, did Farage consult the Confederation of British Industry, the Federation of Small Businesses, or trade unions before making these proposals? The lack of clear engagement with key stakeholders raises doubts about how these policies would be implemented—or whether they’re even workable.
On the legislative front, the challenges are formidable. As InfoMigrants points out, many of Reform’s migration policies would require sweeping changes to UK law and international treaties, including the ECHR. With only five MPs in Parliament compared to Labour’s 399, Reform UK would face an uphill battle even to introduce such legislation, let alone see it passed. The UK’s parliamentary process is slow and subject to multiple rounds of debate and amendment, often resulting in major modifications to controversial bills. Past efforts to introduce alternative bills of rights or restrict access to the ECHR have repeatedly stalled or failed, even when advanced by larger parties.
Leaving the ECHR would have far-reaching consequences. According to the UK in a Changing Europe think tank, withdrawal would affect the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, strain UK-EU relations, and require repealing the Human Rights Act of 1998, with all the attendant legal and diplomatic fallout. Membership in the Council of Europe would also be at risk, further isolating the UK on the international stage.
Reform UK’s broader migration platform includes a raft of measures: detaining and deporting all migrants arriving via small boats, processing asylum seekers offshore, barring student dependents, imposing a five-year residency and employment requirement for benefits, and levying an “immigration tax” that would raise national insurance contributions for foreign workers to 20 percent (compared to 13.8 percent for British citizens). The party claims this would incentivize employers to hire British workers and raise more than 20 billion pounds over five years to fund apprenticeships for young Britons.
Yet, as InfoMigrants and the BBC highlight, many of these proposals are legally and practically unworkable. Returning migrants to France or removing them from boats mid-Channel would violate international maritime law and depend on French cooperation, which has not been forthcoming. Offshore processing schemes have failed in the UK and elsewhere, often running into legal challenges and ballooning costs. Even the current government’s Rwanda plan was scrapped after costing billions.
Who would be affected? The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford estimates that, at the end of 2024, about 430,000 non-EU citizens in the UK had ILR. These individuals—along with up to 2.1 million temporary visa holders who might eventually qualify for settlement—could face loss of status or forced reapplication under Reform’s proposals. EU nationals granted ILR under the Withdrawal Agreement would be exempt, but others would not. The BBC reports that, in the year ending June 2025, 163,000 grants of ILR were made to non-EU citizens, and over 213,000 ILR holders were claiming Universal Credit. Families could be split, and many long-term residents could face deportation or be driven to leave voluntarily.
Despite the backlash, Farage insists that his policies will force other parties to adopt tougher stances on migration to stay competitive. The Labour government, meanwhile, touts its own efforts to reduce migration and speed up deportations, including new legislation to allow earlier removal of foreign criminals and increased returns of foreign national offenders since July 2024.
With Reform UK leading in the polls, scrutiny of its proposals has never been more urgent. The party’s migration plans, if implemented, would mark a seismic shift in British policy, with profound consequences for migrants, the economy, and the country’s international standing. For now, the debate rages on—underscoring just how high the stakes have become in the run-up to the next general election.
