In a year marked by diplomatic spectacle and shifting alliances, China’s unveiling of the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin has sent ripples through the international order. The move, presented by President Xi Jinping from August 31 to September 1, 2025, represents what many analysts consider the boldest challenge to the U.S.-led global system since the end of the Cold War, according to recent coverage by major international outlets.
The summit itself was historic, not just in the grandeur of its proceedings but in the sheer breadth of its participation. The 25th annual Heads of State Council meeting drew together the SCO’s largest-ever gathering of senior leaders, with full members now including Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Reflecting the group’s swelling ranks and ambitions, the summit reorganized its membership structure, merging former “observer states” and “dialogue partners” into a single, more inclusive “SCO partners” category. This move, as reported by international media, signaled a new era of expansion and engagement for the organization.
Perhaps the most consequential outcome of the summit was the approval of the “Tianjin Declaration.” While echoing familiar themes—such as mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and the principle of non-use or threat of force—the declaration included several notable additions. For the first time, it endorsed the Hindu concept of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (“One Earth, One Family, One Future”), a nod to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s presence at his first trip to China in seven years. The document also condemned the April 2025 terrorist attack against Indian nationals in Pahalgam, an incident that tragically sparked a recent conflict between India and Pakistan, both SCO members. In a further sign of the group’s growing willingness to wade into thorny international disputes, the declaration addressed the ongoing crisis in Gaza and strongly criticized the Israeli-U.S. attack against Iran, another SCO member.
Technology and economic cooperation were also front and center. The declaration called for greater collaboration in high-tech sectors, with a particular emphasis on artificial intelligence. It reaffirmed the group’s support for an “open, transparent, fair, inclusive, and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system,” drawing a sharp contrast with what many SCO members view as Western protectionism and double standards, especially on issues like human rights and counterterrorism. As the declaration put it, “double standards” have no place in the new international order the SCO seeks to build.
Yet the SCO is not alone in its ambitions. The BRICS group—comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has also been rapidly expanding, with Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Ethiopia, and the UAE joining as full members in the past two years. Nine other nations have become official “partner countries.” According to international reports, China, backed by Russia, has thrown its weight behind both organizations, providing financial support and high-level diplomatic engagement. President Xi himself has become a fixture at major summits, underscoring Beijing’s commitment to using these platforms to promote its vision of a new world order.
The differences between the two organizations are subtle but significant. The SCO boasts a permanent secretariat, a formal charter, and a defined geographic focus on Eurasia. BRICS, meanwhile, operates more flexibly, with periodic meetings, ad-hoc working groups, and intergovernmental financial mechanisms. Its ambitions are global, its membership more diverse, and its initiatives better resourced. BRICS members, in particular, have made no secret of their desire to transform the very foundations of global economic governance.
At the heart of China’s diplomatic push is the Global Governance Initiative. According to the Foreign Ministry’s Concept Paper, the GGI seeks to build “a more just multipolar world order” grounded in sovereign equality, international law, multilateralism, and a people-centered approach. Foreign Minister Wang Yi was even more direct, stating that a core goal of the GGI is to end “the monopoly of global governance by some countries.” The message was clear: China sees itself as the vanguard of the so-called “Global South,” rallying developing nations behind an alternative to what it perceives as a decaying and increasingly unjust U.S.-led system.
Chinese statements have not shied away from criticizing the United States. They call for opposition to all forms of protectionism and insist that “development must be at the heart of our international agenda.” The GGI’s emphasis on “an equal and orderly multipolar world” is, in many ways, a direct rebuke to Washington’s perceived efforts to maintain global inequality and disorder. The initiative also stresses the importance of multilateralism, the United Nations, and “greater democracy in international relations”—themes that resonate with many countries in the Global South who feel underrepresented in current global governance structures.
President Xi, in his speeches to both the SCO and BRICS, highlighted the collective strength of these organizations. He argued that, together, their members represent substantial shares of the world’s population, resources, and economic output. “We should leverage our respective strengths,” Xi urged, “to coordinate global actions and induce others to address our demands.” It’s a call not just for cooperation, but for a fundamental reshaping of the rules that govern international relations.
The United States, for its part, has been urged to strengthen its counter-messaging and diplomatic efforts. As one recent analysis put it, “the United States needs strong diplomatic and informational countermeasures to parry the campaign to redefine global principles to its detriment.” The competition for influence, especially in the Global South, is heating up, with both sides vying to shape the future of international order.
Meanwhile, outside the grand halls of summitry, quieter but no less significant diplomatic overtures are underway. On September 25, 2025, Argentina’s Ambassador to India, Mariano Agustín Caucino, offered warm congratulations to Prime Minister Narendra Modi on his 75th birthday. In his statement, the ambassador noted that India is now Argentina’s sixth-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade approaching $5 billion. In a move designed to foster even closer ties, Argentina recently allowed Indian citizens holding a U.S. visa to enter the country without a separate visa—a decision expected to boost tourism and deepen people-to-people contact.
Caucino praised India’s growing influence on the world stage under Modi’s leadership and expressed optimism about the potential for even deeper economic cooperation. “We are celebrating 75 years of friendship between Argentina and India,” he remarked, “and the future looks bright for our partnership.” It’s a reminder that while the headlines may be dominated by superpower rivalry, the fabric of international relations is woven from countless bilateral threads—each one contributing to the evolving tapestry of global governance.
As China’s GGI continues to gain traction and the United States recalibrates its diplomatic strategy, the world finds itself at a crossroads. The coming years will test whether the principles outlined in Tianjin and echoed in capitals from New Delhi to Buenos Aires can truly reshape the international order—or whether old patterns will persist, despite the rhetoric of change.
