In a dramatic escalation of its long-running anti-corruption campaign, China has expelled two of its most senior generals—He Weidong and Miao Hua—from both the military and the Communist Party, along with seven other high-ranking officers. The move, announced on October 18, 2025, has sent shockwaves through China’s political and military elite, just days before the Communist Party’s critical Fourth Plenum in Beijing—a meeting set to chart the nation’s economic and strategic direction through 2030.
He Weidong, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and China’s second-highest-ranking general, is the most senior officer to be purged from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in decades. As reported by multiple outlets, including The Morning News and Reuters, He’s removal is the first such case for a sitting member of the Politburo—the Communist Party’s second-highest echelon of power—since the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution. Miao Hua, the former head of the CMC’s Political Work Department, was also expelled, having already been formally removed from his post earlier in the year.
The Ministry of Defense, through spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang, stated that He, Miao, and the other seven generals were expelled for “serious violations of discipline” and are suspected of “serious duty-related crimes involving an extremely large amount of money.” Zhang described their offenses as “of a grave nature, with extremely detrimental consequences,” and confirmed that the cases have been transferred to military prosecutors. The ministry did not disclose the current whereabouts of He Weidong, who has not been seen in public since March 2025, fueling speculation about the circumstances of his detention and the scope of the investigation.
The list of purged officers reads like a who’s who of the PLA’s upper ranks: He Hongjun, former deputy head of the Political Work Department; Wang Xiubin, former deputy chief of the CMC Joint Operations Command Center; Lin Xiangyang, former commander of the PLA Eastern Theater Command; Qin Shutong, former political commissar of the PLA Ground Force; Yuan Huazhi, former political commissar of the PLA Navy; Wang Houbin, former commander of the Rocket Force; and Wang Chunning, former commander of the People’s Armed Police Force. According to South China Morning Post, several of these officers share deep ties to President Xi Jinping’s own power base in Fujian Province and the PLA’s 31st Army Group, a unit known as Xi’s “home-base army.”
He Weidong, in particular, was widely viewed as one of Xi’s protégés. His rapid ascent to the CMC vice chairmanship in 2022 broke precedent, as he was elevated despite never having served as a full Central Committee member—a move interpreted by many as a sign of Xi’s personal trust. He’s operational experience included command of the PLA’s Eastern Theater, the region facing Taiwan, and he reportedly played a key role in orchestrating the large-scale live-fire drills around the island following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August 2022. The Pentagon had singled out He’s involvement in those exercises, which were the most aggressive military maneuvers Beijing had undertaken against Taiwan in recent memory.
The timing of the expulsions is striking. The announcement came just days before the Communist Party’s Central Committee—an elite body of over 200 senior officials—was set to convene its Fourth Plenum in Beijing. The meeting is expected to formalize further personnel changes, including the expulsion and replacement of Central Committee members. As Wen-Ti Sung, a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, told Reuters, “Xi is cleaning house for sure. The formal removal of He and Miao means he will get to appoint new members of the Central Military Commission—which has been virtually half empty since March—at the Plenum.”
President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, which began in earnest more than a decade ago, has targeted officials across the party, government, and armed forces. Xi has repeatedly described corruption as “the greatest threat” to the party’s survival, emphasizing that the campaign remains “grave and complex.” Defense ministry spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang echoed this sentiment, stating, “The strict punishment of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others shows the Party Central Committee’s firm determination to continue the fight against corruption.” He added that the crackdown has helped build a “more unified and combat-ready People’s Liberation Army.”
Yet, while the campaign is praised by some as a necessary step toward cleaner governance, critics and analysts see a deeper political motive. According to Neil Thomas of the Asia Society Policy Institute, “Xi’s purges are meant to project strength. He wants a loyal, disciplined system—but that also makes it more rigid and brittle.” Observers note that many of the expelled generals were not only close to Xi but also instrumental in implementing his military modernization agenda, particularly regarding Taiwan and technological independence. Their sudden downfall raises questions about the stability and morale of the armed forces at a time when Beijing faces escalating tensions with the United States and its allies.
This is not the first time senior military leaders have been swept up in Xi’s anti-graft drive. Former Defence Minister Li Shangfu was removed from office in 2023 after just seven months and later expelled for alleged bribery. The frequency and depth of recent purges have led some to question whether Xi’s efforts to consolidate control may be exposing deeper fissures within the military’s upper echelons—especially as China ramps up its military pressure on Taiwan and navigates an increasingly fraught geopolitical environment.
The official statement from the CMC emphasized the “firm resolve” of the Party to root out corruption, framing the purge as a “significant achievement in the Party and military’s anti-corruption campaign.” However, the removal of officers personally promoted by Xi, many with shared histories in Fujian and the 31st Army Group, suggests that even those within the leader’s inner circle are not immune to the shifting tides of political fortune.
As the Fourth Plenum unfolds in Beijing, all eyes will be on who fills the now-vacant seats at the top of the military hierarchy and whether Xi can maintain the delicate balance between loyalty, competence, and stability in the PLA. One thing is clear: in Xi’s China, not even the most powerful uniforms are safe from the next round of “self-revolution.”
The sweeping purge of China’s top generals marks a pivotal moment for both the Party and the military, underscoring the high stakes of Xi Jinping’s campaign for absolute control and clean governance at a time of mounting domestic and international challenges.
