China’s Communist Party is once again in the international spotlight as it embarks on a sweeping purge of top military brass, just as the country’s leadership gathers for a critical meeting in Beijing. The Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee, taking place from October 20 to 23, 2025, is set against a dramatic backdrop: the expulsion of nine high-ranking military officials, including General He Weidong, the number two general and a key figure in the nation’s military hierarchy. The move underscores President Xi Jinping’s relentless campaign against corruption within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), a campaign that has already sent shockwaves through China’s political and military elite.
On October 18, 2025, China’s Defense Ministry announced the removal of General He Weidong—formerly vice-chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and a member of the 24-strong Politburo—along with Navy Admiral Miao Hua, the military’s former top political officer, and seven other senior officials. According to the Defense Ministry, these men had “seriously violated Party discipline and are suspected of serious duty-related crimes involving an extremely large amount of money.” Ministry spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang described the offences as “of a grave nature, with extremely detrimental consequences.” The announcement, delivered just days before the Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum, was described by Zhang as a “significant achievement in the Party and military’s anti-corruption campaign.”
The Liberation Army Daily, a military newspaper, echoed these sentiments in a commentary published on October 18, calling corruption “the biggest threat our party faces” and vowing to “pursue the military anti-corruption fight to the end.” The newspaper framed the campaign as a “thorough self-revolution,” emphasizing that the current crackdown is a continuation of efforts that began with the 18th Party Congress and marks a deepening of reforms within the PLA. “We will firmly obey the command of the party’s central, central military committee, and President Xi,” the commentary stated, pledging to defend the decisions of the party’s leadership.
He Weidong’s fall from grace is particularly noteworthy, not only because of his seniority but also due to his close ties with President Xi Jinping. Their relationship dates back to the late 1990s, when both served in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces—Xi as deputy party secretary and governor, He as a rising military officer. He’s meteoric rise saw him command the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command, the unit responsible for operations against Taiwan, before being promoted directly to vice-chair of the CMC in 2022, skipping the usual step of serving on the broader Central Committee. The Pentagon has noted that He played a pivotal role in planning the PLA’s live-fire drills around Taiwan in August 2022, following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei—a move that marked one of Beijing’s most aggressive military postures toward the self-governing island in recent years.
Observers have pointed out that He Weidong’s removal is the first time a sitting general on the Central Military Commission has been purged since the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). He had not been seen in public since March 2025, and the investigation into his activities had not been previously disclosed, adding an element of intrigue and uncertainty to the proceedings. The expulsion of He and Miao leaves only four members remaining on the seven-member Central Military Commission, including President Xi Jinping himself and Vice President Jiang Yu-shia. The Defense Minister’s seat on the commission remains vacant following the purge of former Minister Li Sang-fu on similar charges.
Other officials named in the latest round of expulsions include He Hongjun, a former senior official at the PLA Political Work Department; Wang Xiubin of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Centre; former Eastern Theatre Command commander Lin Xiangyang; and two former political commissars of the PLA Army and Navy. Former People’s Armed Police commander Wang Chunning, also implicated, was removed from the national legislature in September along with three other PLA generals. Many of these figures had been conspicuously absent from public view for months, fueling speculation about the scope and targets of the anti-corruption drive.
Analysts say the timing of these expulsions is no coincidence. “Xi is cleaning house for sure. The formal removal of He and Miao means he will get to appoint new members of the Central Military Commission—which has been virtually half empty since March—at the Plenum,” Wen-Ti Sung, a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, told reporters. The Fourth Plenum, an elite gathering of over 200 senior officials, is expected to formalize further personnel changes, including the expulsion and replacement of Central Committee members. Historically, plenary sessions of this kind focus on major party matters, including the reorganization of ideology, organization, and the personnel system. This year’s meeting will also discuss the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), which is expected to prioritize investment in high-tech industries amid intensifying technological competition with the United States.
The current campaign is not without precedent. The Liberation Army Daily’s commentary referenced the downfall of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, both former vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission, who were toppled in 2014 and 2015 as President Xi began his high-profile anti-corruption drive. The newspaper described the corruption issues involving He Weidong and Miao Hua as “the fermentation and transformation of the detoxification of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou,” suggesting that the current purges are part of a broader, ongoing effort to root out entrenched corruption within the PLA.
For President Xi, the anti-corruption campaign serves multiple purposes: consolidating his control over the military, sending a warning to potential rivals, and burnishing his image as a leader intolerant of graft. However, the campaign also points to deeper challenges within China’s military and political system. The repeated need for purges at the highest levels raises questions about the effectiveness of previous reforms and the resilience of patronage networks. Some observers worry that the instability at the top of the military could have implications for China’s readiness and strategic planning, particularly at a time of heightened tensions with the United States and concerns over Taiwan’s security.
The Fourth Plenum’s agenda, which includes the reorganization of the party’s leadership and the drafting of the next five-year national development strategy, will be closely watched both within China and abroad. As the Communist Party seeks to present a unified front and chart a course for the country’s future, the shadow of corruption—and the dramatic downfall of some of its most powerful generals—serves as a stark reminder of the challenges facing China’s leadership.
Amid the drama and uncertainty, one thing is clear: President Xi Jinping’s campaign to root out corruption in the military is far from over, and the reverberations from this latest purge will be felt for years to come—both inside the Great Hall of the People and far beyond China’s borders.
