In a week that underscored the shifting tides of global influence, China has made headlines on two very different fronts: the recalibration of its soft power campaigns in Western nations and the deepening of its strategic energy partnership with Russia. These parallel developments reveal the evolving nature of China’s international strategy as it repositions itself in response to new challenges and opportunities across the world.
On September 12, 2025, Russia and China inked a legally binding agreement to construct the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, a landmark deal that could reshape global energy flows and challenge the dominance of Western markets. According to BRICS+ Consulting Group, the pipeline will transport up to 50 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually from Russia’s West Siberia to northern China, traversing eastern Mongolia along a 2,600-kilometre route. When combined with the existing Power of Siberia pipeline, which already supplies 38 billion cubic metres each year, Russia will redirect over 100 billion cubic metres of gas eastward—essentially matching the volume once earmarked for Europe through the now-abandoned Nord Stream 2 project.
This agreement is more than just an energy deal. As Europe scrambles to reduce its reliance on Russian gas and the United States maintains restrictions on Russian fossil fuel imports, the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline marks a pivotal moment in global energy geopolitics. For Russia, the pipeline secures a long-term market for its gas exports and helps mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. For China, it means a more diversified energy supply, reduced dependence on maritime imports, and further support for its ongoing coal-to-gas transition. The deal also fits neatly into the Belt and Road Initiative, expanding infrastructure connectivity and economic ties between the two powers.
Christopher Granville of TS Lombard emphasized that while the agreement is not yet a Final Investment Decision, it demonstrates China’s strategic support for Russia amid ongoing tensions over Ukraine and the broader reordering of global energy politics. The deal is part of a sweeping package of 22 cooperation agreements between Russia and China, which also cover military collaboration, trade expansion, technological cooperation, and the development of financial systems outside of Western frameworks.
Yet the pipeline’s construction is not without hurdles. The project faces technical challenges posed by Siberia’s harsh climate, the need to maintain gas pressure across vast distances, and the complexity of regulatory approvals in three countries. Financing and final pricing arrangements also remain to be clarified, and both nations’ climate commitments—China’s 2060 carbon neutrality target and Russia’s pressure to diversify beyond fossil fuels—add a layer of long-term uncertainty.
While these developments highlight China’s growing clout in the Global South and its deepening ties with Russia, the picture looks quite different in the West. According to Jocelyn Chey, Visiting Professor at the University of Sydney and former Australian Consul-General to Hong Kong, Beijing’s state-sponsored Confucius Institutes—once a key pillar of its soft power strategy—have been in decline in countries like Australia. The program, which began in 2004, saw hundreds of institutes established worldwide to promote Chinese language and culture. But in recent years, many Western iterations have closed or become dormant, a trend exacerbated by concerns over academic freedom and the impact of legislation such as Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act of 2018.
“The language and culture programs delivered through the Confucius Institutes have not disappeared in the West—but their proliferation is no longer a key element of China’s soft power activities in those countries,” Chey noted. The Ministry of Education in Beijing has shifted its focus, dividing soft power work between the Chinese International Education Foundation and the China Cultural Centres of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. This realignment follows significant leadership changes and a modification of national priorities under the 14th Five-Year Plan adopted in 2021. In fact, international education and the Confucius Institutes now rank second last among the Ministry’s ten ‘key tasks’ under the Education Modernisation 2035 Plan.
The Ministry of Culture and Tourism, formed in 2018, has taken the lead in promoting socialist culture and cultural tourism abroad. A recent example is the Guangxi Tea Culture exhibition and performance held in Sydney in July 2025, which combined cultural showcases with tourism promotion, offering tour packages to tea plantations in Guangxi Province. These efforts are part of a broader campaign to “tell China’s story well,” as President Xi Jinping has instructed, and to present China in a positive light internationally.
However, the appeal of Chinese language study is waning in Australia, except among students from Chinese-language backgrounds. Many Australian graduates in Chinese studies report difficulty finding employers interested in their language skills, and universities have grown cautious about developing or renewing ties with Chinese institutions. The government’s New Colombo Plan encourages Asian language proficiency, with China as an eligible destination, but official travel advisories and rising anti-China sentiment have dampened enthusiasm among students.
In contrast, China’s soft power efforts have found more fertile ground in the Global South. International student numbers in China exceeded 200,000 in 2023, though they remain below pre-pandemic peaks. Many of these students hail from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, drawn by scholarships, relatively low tuition, and the prospect of employment with Chinese companies or on aid projects. In Latin America alone, there are 44 Confucius Institutes, with another 61 in Africa, providing language training and scholarships for further study in China. These programs are closely linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, reinforcing China’s narrative of a “community of shared destiny” and offering support for other countries’ development—an approach that has resonated less in Western nations.
As the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline moves from blueprint to reality, it stands as a symbol of China’s shifting global strategy: strengthening ties with non-Western partners while recalibrating its approach in the West. The pipeline is expected to drive regional realignments in energy flows, accelerate Europe’s adoption of renewable energy, and encourage the emergence of new regional energy blocs with distinct pricing and regulatory frameworks. Meanwhile, China’s cultural diplomacy continues to evolve, focusing on regions more receptive to its message and values.
Whether these twin tracks—energy partnership with Russia and targeted soft power outreach—will be enough to secure China’s global ambitions remains an open question. But one thing is clear: the world is watching as China adapts, innovates, and asserts its influence in a rapidly changing international landscape.
