On September 28, 2025, China’s nonferrous metals industry found itself at the center of a sweeping new plan unveiled by eight central government departments, a move that underscores the sector’s growing importance in the global race for critical materials. Just weeks prior, on September 8, Pakistan’s Frontier Works Organization (FWO) inked a $500 million deal with Missouri-based US Strategic Metals (USSM) for the export of rare earths, signaling that the international contest for these vital resources is heating up across continents.
The plan laid out by Chinese authorities is ambitious, aiming for an average annual growth rate of about 5 percent in the sector’s value-added output from 2025 to 2026. Notably, it targets a 1.5 percent annual increase in the output of 10 major nonferrous metals, including copper, aluminum, lithium, nickel, cobalt, and tin—materials essential for electric vehicles, integrated circuits, the burgeoning low-altitude economy, humanoid robots, and artificial intelligence. According to China Daily, the plan also calls for raising the annual output of recycled metals to over 20 million tonnes, a clear nod to sustainability and the circular economy.
“This plan can help enhance the resource efficiency of nonferrous metals, and standardize as well as promote the sector’s development,” said Mei Xinyu, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce, in an interview with China Daily. The new measures are designed not just to boost output but also to address structural challenges. China, despite its massive reserves and production capacity, remains dependent on overseas sources for many raw materials—a vulnerability that has become more pronounced as protectionism and unilateralism rise globally.
Indeed, the world’s appetite for nonferrous metals has never been greater, and China’s comparative advantages in reserves and output have given it a formidable position. Yet, as the plan points out, the sector’s reliance on foreign suppliers and customers leaves it exposed to supply chain disruptions. The government’s response is twofold: intensify mineral exploration both at home and abroad, and bolster domestic mining intensity. The plan specifically mentions a new strategy for breakthroughs in mineral exploration and enhanced prospecting, reflecting a desire to secure long-term resource security.
Meanwhile, across the border in Pakistan, the FWO’s recent deal with USSM throws a spotlight on the geopolitical chess game unfolding around rare earths and strategic minerals. The $500 million agreement, signed in early September, is not merely a business deal—it is seen as a political signal, especially considering FWO’s deep roots in the Pakistan-China strategic partnership. Established in 1966 to build the 1,300-kilometer Karakoram Highway with China, FWO has long operated at the intersection of infrastructure, military engineering, and geopolitics. As reported by The Economic Times, FWO was also instrumental in tunneling work for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program sites in Baluchistan, underlining its strategic credentials.
The FWO remains closely tied to the Pakistan military, despite branching into other areas such as motorway construction and mega-projects like the $14 billion Diamer Bhasha dam—a joint effort with China in the contested region of Gilgit, to which India has raised objections since its launch in 2020. The recent handover of a site in Islamabad for the Marka-i-Haq memorial, dedicated to those killed during responses to Indian attacks on Pakistan-based terror infrastructure, adds another layer of political symbolism to FWO’s activities.
Interestingly, FWO’s connections to the United States are not new. Within the first month of the Trump administration, the organization secured approvals for a $400 million loan from the US Exim Bank and another $100 million under the EB5 program, which grants permanent residency to foreign investors in qualifying projects. Yet, as The Economic Times notes, neither FWO nor USSM have mined significant quantities of rare earths so far. The deal is widely viewed as laying the groundwork for future collaboration—and as a message to regional rivals, particularly India, about shifting alliances and access to strategic resources.
Back in China, policymakers are acutely aware that their nonferrous metals sector is a linchpin not just for domestic industry but for global supply chains. As the plan emphasizes, the sector is one area where some developed economies remain reliant on Chinese supply. “At a time when the export controls of some developed economies are restricting China’s access to critical strategic components and there are attempts to ‘decouple’ from the country, a stable nonferrous metals sector is crucial for China to leverage its strategic advantage, safeguard its legitimate rights and interests and maintain the normal order of international trade,” said Peng Bo, another researcher at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, in comments to China Daily.
The plan’s focus on green and low-carbon development is another key pillar, as China seeks to align its industrial growth with climate goals and international expectations. By promoting the use of recycled metals and setting ambitious targets for output, the government aims to reduce the sector’s environmental footprint while maintaining competitiveness. The plan also calls for close collaboration among government, market forces, and enterprises—a “collaborative development” model where each plays an indispensable role in driving high-quality growth.
All this comes at a time when global supply chains are under strain, and the scramble for critical minerals is reshaping international relations. The rise of protectionist policies in some developed nations has led to new export controls and trade barriers, making resource security a top priority for countries heavily invested in advanced manufacturing and green technologies. For China, the new plan is as much about future-proofing its own economy as it is about maintaining leverage in a world where access to nonferrous metals can determine the fate of entire industries.
As for the FWO-USSM deal, while the ink is dry, the real test lies ahead. Neither party has yet to mine significant rare earths, and the venture is seen by some as more of a political maneuver than an immediate commercial breakthrough. Still, the agreement signals a willingness by both Pakistan and the US to explore new partnerships in a field traditionally dominated by China, potentially setting the stage for a more competitive—and complicated—global market.
Ultimately, the race for nonferrous metals and rare earths is about far more than economics. It’s a contest shaped by geopolitics, national security, and the shifting tides of international cooperation and rivalry. As China shores up its domestic industry and Pakistan positions itself as a new player in the rare earths game, the world will be watching closely to see who controls the materials that power the technologies of tomorrow.
