On November 20, 2025, Brazil’s political and legal landscape experienced a seismic shift as two major developments unfolded. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva nominated Jorge Messias, the country’s current Solicitor General, to the Supreme Court—a move that could shape the nation’s highest judicial body for years to come. On the same day, the Supreme Court itself delivered a landmark opinion redefining the liability of online platforms for third-party content, upending the legal status quo that had governed Brazil’s digital sphere since 2014.
Jorge Messias, age 45, is no stranger to the halls of government. As reported by the Associated Press, he has worked across various federal branches before being appointed Solicitor General in 2023. Now, as Lula’s third Supreme Court nominee during his current term, Messias is poised to fill the vacancy left by former Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, who retired in October—remarkably, eight years before reaching the mandatory retirement age.
Lula made his recommendation public with a confident endorsement, stating via Instagram, “I make this recommendation confident that Messias will continue fulfilling his role in defending the Constitution and the rule of law in the Supreme Court, as he has done throughout his public life.” The nomination, however, is not a done deal; it must first pass a Senate vote before Messias can don the robes of a Supreme Court justice.
Support for Messias has already begun to crystallize within the judiciary. Justice André Mendonça, himself appointed by former President Jair Bolsonaro in 2021, offered public praise for the nominee. “He is a qualified candidate from the Solicitor General’s Office and meets the constitutional requirements. I also commend the president for his choice. Messias will have my full support in a republican dialogue with the senators,” Mendonça remarked, according to the AP.
Beneath the surface of these appointments, the Supreme Court has been navigating turbulent waters. Since 2023, it has faced heavy pressure, not least due to the shocking events of January 8, when supporters of former President Bolsonaro stormed the court’s building in Brasília. The aftermath of the attack saw Bolsonaro himself put under investigation and, in September 2025, sentenced by a Supreme Court panel to 27 years and three months in prison for his role in a coup attempt plot tied to the riots. The court’s credibility, independence, and very physical security have all been tested in these times of political upheaval.
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated opinion on two pivotal cases—known as Themes 533 and 987—concerning the liability of internet platforms for content posted by their users. This decision, as detailed by Tech Policy Press, marks a turning point in Brazil’s approach to digital governance, freedom of expression, and platform responsibility.
For over a decade, the Marco Civil da Internet (MCI) has served as the backbone of Brazil’s digital legal framework. Article 19 of the MCI limited the liability of internet providers, stating they would only be held responsible for third-party content if they failed to remove it after a specific court order. The Supreme Court’s new opinion declares Article 19 unconstitutional, replacing it with a fault-based liability model. Now, platforms can be held civilly liable if they have “unequivocal knowledge” of illicit content and negligently fail to remove it.
The court’s ruling introduces a nuanced, tiered system of duties for platforms. In cases of “evidently illicit content”—such as hate speech, pedophilia, racism, incitement to violence, or glorification of a coup—platforms are required to proactively detect and remove such content without waiting for notification. For “individually harmful content,” like violations of privacy or honor, platforms’ liability depends on prior, substantiated notification by affected parties. The third tier, “paid or boosted content,” presumes unequivocal knowledge by the platform, requiring verification and removal if necessary.
Justice Luiz Fux, presenting the Court’s position, described the approach as “minimalist”—setting out fundamental constitutional criteria and inviting Brazil’s legislature to craft more detailed regulations. The Court explicitly called for a “fruitful institutional dialogue” between the judiciary and the legislative branch, recognizing the ongoing and sometimes contentious debates about how to balance freedom of expression with the need to curb online harms.
This decision, however, is not without controversy. The Court’s opinion reflects a wider constitutional doctrine in Brazil, rooted in German and Spanish legal traditions, where fundamental rights are seen not only as protections for individuals but as objective principles that demand active state intervention. The Court cited its earlier “Ellwanger” case, warning against what it termed “hypocritical libertarianism”—the idea that unlimited speech protections can undermine democracy itself.
Yet, as Tech Policy Press points out, the ruling’s practical implications are complex. By shifting some responsibility for content moderation onto private platforms, the Court risks incentivizing over-removal of content—what some critics call “private censorship.” The expectation that platforms can accurately and fairly assess vast amounts of content, especially in sensitive areas like political speech or the glorification of coups, may be optimistic at best. The Court’s presumption that platforms’ moderation efforts are driven more by commercial interests than by a genuine commitment to protecting rights adds another layer of skepticism.
Despite emphasizing the need for transparency, fairness, and accountability in content moderation, the Court stopped short of providing detailed guidance on what due diligence obligations should look like. Many observers, drawing comparisons to the European Union’s Digital Services Act or the United Kingdom’s Online Safety Act, argue that Brazil needs independent regulatory bodies—free from government or industry capture—to oversee these complex issues. Without such institutions, the risk remains that neither freedom of expression nor protection from harm will be adequately safeguarded.
Moreover, the challenges of regulating Brazil’s digital public sphere do not exist in a vacuum. Social media content often mirrors broader societal realities—polarization, misinformation, youth disengagement, and more. As Tech Policy Press notes, expeditious and restrictive measures may provide the illusion of decisive action, but long-term solutions require comprehensive social policies, digital literacy efforts, and a commitment to democratic quality.
Brazil has long been seen as a model for balanced digital regulation, with a strong human rights focus. The new Supreme Court ruling, combined with the pending appointment of Jorge Messias, signals both an evolution and a test: Can the country maintain this balance amid political turbulence, technological change, and global pressures?
As the Senate prepares to deliberate on Messias’ nomination and lawmakers digest the court’s new constitutional framework, Brazil stands at a crossroads. The decisions made now will reverberate through its legal system, digital economy, and democratic institutions for years to come.
