On November 26, 2025, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys took to the airwaves on LRT radio with a candid warning: Belarus is making a concerted push to break free from the European Union’s policy of isolation, seeking to ease the weighty sanctions that have battered its economy and financial system. Budrys, whose remarks were widely reported by Radio LRT and Ukrinform, described a calculated diplomatic campaign by Minsk—one that stretches far beyond Lithuania’s borders and strikes at the heart of the EU’s stance toward Belarus and Russia.
“Belarus’s aspirations are discernible; some are very concrete and well known, because we have seen these aspirations voiced in negotiations with the United States,” Budrys explained, highlighting that Minsk’s first objective is to change, or as he put it bluntly, “break the European Union’s policy toward Belarus and Russia, which is a policy of international isolation and refusal to talk to the regime.” According to Budrys, these efforts have been made explicit in recent discussions between Belarus and the United States, with Minsk hoping to shift the EU’s approach from one of ostracism to one of engagement at the political-diplomatic level.
This push for a thaw in relations comes at a time of heightened tensions between Belarus and its EU neighbors. The EU’s hardline stance, Budrys noted, is rooted in the aftermath of the 2020 Belarusian presidential election, which was marred by widespread allegations of fraud and followed by a brutal crackdown on protesters. The regime’s ongoing, systematic human rights violations and its steadfast support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine have only deepened the rift. “The EU adheres to this line because of the events of 2020 in Belarus, systematic human rights violations, and support for Russia in its aggression against Ukraine,” Budrys told Ukrinform.
But Belarus, led by self-proclaimed president Alexander Lukashenko, seems undeterred. According to Budrys, Lukashenko is “successfully using the ongoing talks with the U.S. administration” to pave the way for loosening sanctions and ending international isolation. The foreign minister stressed that the very act of engaging at a political-diplomatic level is a significant step for Minsk. “The very fact that you move to a political and diplomatic level of communication means that this step has already been taken, and all the subsequent steps will follow—regarding Belarus’s place in international organizations, as well as the future of various agreements and Belarus’s place in the world,” Budrys observed in an interview with LRT.
The stakes are high. Belarus is not simply seeking a seat at the table; it is angling for the lifting of EU sanctions that have proven, in Budrys’s words, “very painful for them economically and financially.” These sanctions, first imposed in response to the regime’s crackdown and later tightened over its support for Moscow, have crippled Belarus’s access to international markets and investment. “Belarus is pushing to lift European sanctions, which are very painful for them economically and financially,” Budrys reiterated.
Recent months have seen this diplomatic wrangling play out in concrete—and sometimes bizarre—ways along the Lithuania-Belarus border. At the end of October 2025, Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Rugienė announced plans to close the border with Belarus in response to repeated violations of Lithuanian airspace by balloons carrying contraband. According to Ukrinform, these incursions were part of a broader pattern of provocative actions by Minsk, which has included the launching of weather balloons into Lithuanian territory. In retaliation, Belarus banned the movement of Polish and Lithuanian trucks, resulting in thousands of vehicles stranded at the border.
On November 19, 2025, the Lithuanian government approved the reopening of two border checkpoints to allow the return of these stranded trucks. Yet, as of late November, Minsk had refused to let the trucks return to Lithuania. State Secretary of the Belarusian Security Council, Alyaksandr Valfovich, openly admitted that the vehicles were being held back due to Vilnius’s unwillingness to engage in political dialogue. Lukashenko himself declared that the situation should be resolved by the foreign ministries of both countries, rather than at the technical level of border agencies.
This, Budrys argued, is no coincidence. “That is why they chose Lithuania as the target, but I do not think this is only about Lithuania, it is an EU issue,” he emphasized. Lithuania, for its part, remains determined to protect its companies and property from economic blackmail. Budrys has said that, after the return of the trucks, Lithuania will consider how to reduce the risk of economic pressure from Belarus in the future.
The timing of these maneuvers is also notable. In February 2026, the EU is set to decide whether to extend sanctions against Belarus. Budrys expressed concern that Minsk might seize property or escalate tensions in an attempt to pressure Lithuania or other EU states into vetoing the extension of sanctions. “February is approaching, when sanctions against Belarus will need to be extended—perhaps they will seize some property again and say: ‘maybe you should veto the extension of sanctions,’ and so on,” Budrys speculated on LRT.
Despite the ongoing border standoff, communication channels between Vilnius and Minsk remain open. Budrys revealed that Lithuania has “more than one, two or three” channels for exchanging positions with Belarus, and that several other EU countries also maintain dialogue with Minsk. However, he noted that these countries’ visions for European security do not always align with Lithuania’s own priorities.
Within Lithuania, the government appears united in its refusal to elevate the border dispute to the political level. President Gitanas Nauseda has insisted that the issue should be resolved by the countries’ border agencies, not through political negotiations. This position stands in sharp contrast to Lukashenko’s calls for foreign ministry-level engagement—a move many see as a calculated attempt to force the EU into dialogue and, ultimately, to relax its isolation policy.
As the EU prepares for its February decision on sanctions, the situation remains fraught. On one side, Belarus is leveraging every available diplomatic and economic tool to break out of its international isolation and secure relief from sanctions. On the other, Lithuania and its EU partners are striving to maintain a united front, wary of setting a precedent that could undermine the bloc’s approach to authoritarian regimes.
It’s a high-stakes chess match on the EU’s eastern border, with the outcome likely to reverberate far beyond Vilnius or Minsk. For now, the trucks remain stuck, the sanctions remain in place, and the diplomatic dance continues—each side maneuvering for advantage, with the future of EU-Belarus relations hanging in the balance.