In the decades since the end of the Cold War, the world has largely taken the threat of nuclear war for granted, relying on a fragile web of treaties and diplomatic traditions to keep catastrophe at bay. But as 2026 approaches, the international arms control architecture is showing deep cracks, and recent developments suggest that the nuclear risk landscape is shifting rapidly—especially toward the Asia-Pacific region.
On November 13, 2025, the United States made headlines by casting the sole vote against a United Nations draft resolution calling for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to an IPS UN Bureau Report, the resolution was overwhelmingly supported by 168 member states, with only three abstentions—India, Mauritius, and Syria. The U.S. decision marked a dramatic departure from previous years, when it either abstained or voted in favor. This time, the U.S. stood alone.
This vote came on the heels of President Trump’s October 2025 announcement that the U.S. would resume nuclear testing after a 33-year hiatus. The statement, delivered via social media, was ambiguous: “Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis.” As Jackie Cabasso of the Western States Legal Foundation told IPS, confusion swirled over whether Trump meant explosive nuclear tests, missile tests, or something else entirely. The ambiguity was compounded by Energy Secretary Chris Wright, who clarified on Fox News that the administration was referring to “system tests” or “non-critical explosions,” not nuclear detonations. Still, the uncertainty rattled observers worldwide.
The U.S. government’s written explanation for its General Assembly vote stated, “The United States voted No… because several paragraphs are inconsistent with U.S. policy or are undergoing policy review… The United States is not currently pursuing CTBT ratification and therefore cannot support calls for ratification and entry into force.” This stance was in stark contrast to other nuclear-armed states: Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Pakistan all voted in favor of the resolution. India abstained, and North Korea did not vote.
Meanwhile, President Trump’s statements included unsubstantiated allegations that Russia and China were secretly conducting explosive nuclear tests underground. According to IPS, both Russia and China have not conducted such tests, and Russia’s response was swift. President Vladimir Putin ordered officials to draft proposals for possible nuclear weapons tests, signaling that the U.S. move could trigger a dangerous tit-for-tat escalation.
Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute, told IPS that resuming nuclear weapons testing “would be contrary to promises made to induce indefinite extension of the NPT, justify further more sophisticated weapons developments in violation of the good faith duties to pursue disarmament under the NPT, end the US advantage of knowing more because it has tested more, upgrade the salience of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons as legitimate tools of communication amongst nations, lead to increased spending on developing weapons which destroy the user as well as adversaries if used, and stimulate greater international fear and instability.”
The New START Treaty—the last major bilateral arms control agreement between the U.S. and Russia—will lapse in February 2026, as reported by Pearls and Irritations. President Putin has proposed maintaining the New START limits informally for a year and possibly resuming arms control dialogue. President Trump, for his part, has declared an interest in “denuclearisation.” Both leaders, experts suggest, should be encouraged to revive nuclear arms control diplomacy before the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals are left without verifiable limits.
But the nuclear risk is no longer merely a transatlantic concern. China’s rapid nuclear expansion and rising regional tensions—particularly in South Asia—have shifted the epicenter of nuclear risk to the Asia-Pacific. Eight of the world’s nine nuclear-armed countries have strategic interests in the region, and several Asia-Pacific nations are covered by extended nuclear deterrence arrangements, also known as “nuclear umbrellas.”
The global arms control framework is anchored by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which recognizes five nuclear-weapon states: the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France, and China. Four other nuclear-armed countries—India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea—remain outside the NPT. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), while not yet in force, operates an international monitoring system that remains active. Notably, the U.S., Russia, and China have signed but not ratified the CTBT, and Russia withdrew its ratification in 2023. Their self-imposed moratoria on nuclear explosive testing had, until recently, aligned with the treaty’s intent. Now, that commitment is in question.
In response to the U.S. actions, American lawmakers have introduced legislation to prohibit explosive nuclear testing and block funding for any such efforts. Representative Dina Titus (Democrat-Nevada) introduced the Renewing Efforts to Suspend Testing and Reinforce Arms Control Initiatives Now (RESTRAIN) Act (H.R. 5894), while Senator Ed Markey (Democrat-Massachusetts) put forward the No Nuclear Testing Act (S. 3090). Both bills aim to ensure that nuclear explosive testing remains off the table. The Arms Control Association, a Washington-based advocacy group, warns that if the U.S. resumes testing, other countries—including Russia, North Korea, and perhaps China—may follow suit, escalating the nuclear arms race and increasing global tensions.
Key elements of effective arms control, as outlined by Pearls and Irritations, include doctrine (such as a “no first use” policy), deployment reduction, de-alerting (removing weapons from high-alert status), and decreasing arsenal numbers. Equally vital are communication channels among nuclear-armed states, transparency, confidence-building, and robust verification measures. These steps require a return to diplomacy and a departure from political posturing.
Given the Asia-Pacific’s centrality to today’s nuclear risks, regional leadership is urgently needed. China, as the region’s emerging nuclear giant, has much to gain from risk reduction measures, and its no-first-use policy offers a foundation for dialogue—though Beijing remains reluctant to engage. India and Pakistan, both outside the NPT, would benefit from bilateral risk reduction steps, while efforts to curb nuclear threats on the Korean Peninsula must be revived.
Non-nuclear-weapon countries such as Indonesia (with its strong non-aligned credentials), South Korea, Japan, and Australia are well-positioned to champion regional arms control initiatives. Regional forums like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit could serve as platforms for cooperation, bridging official and non-official channels. Lessons from the Euro-Atlantic experience—such as the confidence-building measures of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe—could inform new approaches, but fresh thinking and regional leadership are essential.
With the 2026 NPT Review Conference on the horizon and global arms control at risk of unraveling, the world faces a pivotal moment. The Asia-Pacific region, home to both rising nuclear powers and potential diplomatic champions, could play a decisive role in stemming the drift toward nuclear catastrophe. Whether its leaders will rise to the challenge remains to be seen, but the urgency has never been clearer.
