The United States’ intensifying posture toward Venezuela has reached a fever pitch, with a dramatic military buildup, a controversial terrorist designation, and widespread public skepticism at home. As President Donald Trump’s administration rallies warships and troops near Venezuelan shores, experts, lawmakers, and ordinary Americans are voicing deep concerns about the rationale, legality, and potential fallout of any military intervention.
According to a CBS/YouGov poll released on November 24, 2025, a staggering 70 percent of Americans oppose U.S. military action in Venezuela, while only 30 percent support it. The survey also revealed that 76 percent of respondents believe the Trump administration has failed to clearly explain its position on possible strikes, with an overwhelming majority—97 percent of Democrats, 86 percent of independents, and even 64 percent of Republicans—insisting that President Trump owes the public a full explanation before any escalation. The data reflects a profound disconnect between the administration’s aggressive approach and the mood of the American populace.
Despite this public opposition, the U.S. has amassed its largest military presence in Latin America in decades. As of late November 2025, approximately 15,000 troops and an armada of military vessels, including the USS Gravely, have been deployed to the Caribbean Sea near Venezuela. The buildup coincides with a series of at least 21 strikes on vessels allegedly involved in drug trafficking since September, resulting in at least 83 deaths, as reported by Truthout and confirmed by multiple outlets. The Trump administration has further authorized the CIA to conduct covert lethal operations in the country, raising the stakes and the risks of escalation.
On the legal front, the administration’s actions have triggered sharp debate. NBC reported that the senior military lawyer responsible for overseeing these strikes has declared them illegal, contradicting official claims. Nevertheless, his objections were overruled by higher-ranking officials, and the operations have continued. Meanwhile, a top Department of Justice lawyer has asserted that Trump does not need congressional approval for the so-called “boat strikes,” arguing they do not amount to “hostilities” under the War Powers Resolution. Yet, three-quarters of Americans believe that any such action requires explicit congressional authorization, a sentiment echoed by many legal scholars and members of Congress who worry about executive overreach and the erosion of democratic checks and balances.
The administration’s rationale for escalation has centered in part on the newly announced designation of the so-called “Cartel de los Soles” as a foreign terrorist organization. Published in the Federal Register on November 24, 2025, this move links the alleged cartel directly to Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. The Trump administration claims the group, whose name refers to the sun insignia worn by high-ranking military officers, is deeply involved in drug trafficking and corruption. However, as Al Jazeera notes, the term “Cartel de los Soles” is more of a colloquialism in Venezuela, referring to a loosely defined network of military and government officials implicated in illicit activities, rather than a formal cartel. Venezuela’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs blasted the U.S. action as a “ridiculous lie” and accused Washington of seeking a pretext for “illegitimate and illegal intervention.”
This designation has real-world consequences. It provides the U.S. with additional legal cover for direct military action and has already contributed to a climate of heightened tension. The U.S. military’s presence in the region has prompted six major airlines, including Spain’s Iberia, Portugal’s TAP, Chile’s LATAM, Colombia’s Avianca, Brazil’s GOL, and Turkish Airlines, to cancel flights to Venezuela following warnings from U.S. aviation regulators about increased military activity. The move has further isolated Venezuela, raising fears among ordinary citizens about what may come next.
Behind the scenes, unnamed U.S. officials told Reuters that a new phase of operations against Venezuela could begin imminently, though the precise timing and scope remain unclear. Covert actions, they suggested, would likely precede any overt military moves, with regime change—specifically the overthrow of Maduro—openly discussed as a possible objective. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign has thus entered a volatile new stage, with all eyes on what the next move will be.
Yet, as experts have pointed out in Foreign Affairs and other outlets, the prospect of regime change in Venezuela is fraught with peril. Alexander Downes and Lindsey O’Rourke argue that such operations fail more often than they succeed, citing historical debacles in Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, Haiti, Libya, and South Sudan. Even if the U.S. were to succeed in removing Maduro, the path to stability would be anything but clear. According to The New York Times, “far more planning has gone into striking at the Maduro government than on what it would take to govern Venezuela should the operations succeed.” Politico echoed this uncertainty, quoting a U.S. official: “We have the concepts of a plan.”
The challenges of post-conflict stabilization are immense. Nobel laureate María Corina Machado and other opposition figures, while enjoying some domestic legitimacy, could quickly find themselves labeled as collaborators by Maduro loyalists if installed with U.S. support. The Chavista remnants, corrupt elites, and armed groups benefiting from Maduro’s patronage networks—especially those entrenched in illegal gold mining and other illicit activities—would have strong incentives to resist any transition. The risk of economic collapse, security vacuums, and violent spoilers is high. Lessons from past U.S. interventions underline the need for strategic clarity, interagency coordination, and robust planning for stabilization—qualities that, according to the International Crisis Group and U.S. special inspectors general, have often been lacking in recent years.
Regional dynamics further complicate the picture. Brazil and Colombia, while quietly sympathetic to some opposition figures, are wary of publicly supporting a U.S. invasion given Latin America’s long history of resisting external interventions. Colombia, in particular, fears a massive influx of refugees—Venezuela has already produced nearly 7.9 million displaced people—and an unstable border region ripe for exploitation by criminal groups. Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has invested political capital in regional mediation but risks being sidelined by unilateral U.S. action. Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum faces domestic opposition to any perceived support of American military moves in the region. Without active cooperation from these key neighbors, any stabilization effort is likely to falter.
Meanwhile, Trump continues to make the case for a hard line. In a November 2 interview with 60 Minutes, he insisted, “I don’t think that the U.S. is going to war with Venezuela,” but accused the country of “treating us very badly” and repeated unverified claims, such as Venezuela “emptying their prisons” into the U.S.—a charge widely debunked by watchdogs and critics. The CBS/YouGov poll also found that 55 percent of Americans disapprove of Trump’s handling of immigration, with 54 percent believing ICE is detaining more people than necessary, a sign of broader unease with the administration’s approach to Latin American affairs.
As Washington weighs its next steps, the risks of miscalculation are growing. Military action intended to “secure the border” could unleash a humanitarian crisis and regional instability on a scale not seen in decades. The lessons of past interventions loom large, and the stakes—for Venezuela, the hemisphere, and the U.S. itself—could hardly be higher.
