On August 31, 2025, as the sun set over southern Bulgaria, a diplomatic mission that was meant to highlight European unity and resolve against Russian aggression took an unexpected—and unsettling—turn. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s chartered plane, en route to Plovdiv International Airport, found itself in the crosshairs of what authorities now suspect was a deliberate act of GPS jamming. The incident, which left the aircraft circling for nearly an hour and forced the crew to land using paper maps and ground-based navigation aids, has since sparked a flurry of questions about aviation safety, geopolitics, and the vulnerabilities of modern navigation systems.
According to Sky News, the European Commission president’s aircraft was deprived of electronic navigational aids as it approached Plovdiv. The plane circled the airport for an hour before the pilot, faced with non-functioning GPS, decided to land manually. The European Union reported that Bulgarian authorities suspect Russia was behind the interference. “We have received information from Bulgarian authorities that they suspect this blatant interference was carried out by Russia,” the EU stated. However, the Kremlin was quick to deny any involvement. Dmitry Peskov, spokesperson for the Russian government, told The Financial Times that the information was incorrect.
While the plane landed safely, the implications of the incident have reverberated far beyond the tarmac in Plovdiv. Von der Leyen was on a high-stakes, seven-country tour of the European Union’s eastern frontier, rallying support for Ukraine and inspecting the region’s readiness to confront Russian threats. Her itinerary included stops in Poland, Bulgaria, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania—countries that have all found themselves at the epicenter of escalating GPS interference since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
“We are well aware that threats and intimidation are a regular component of Russia’s hostile actions,” a European Commission spokesperson told Bloomberg, underscoring the political undertones of the episode. The spokesperson added that the incident only highlighted the urgency of von der Leyen’s mission, particularly as the EU rolls out a €150 billion loan mechanism designed to finance defense expenditures and shore up military infrastructure across the bloc.
Bulgarian authorities, for their part, confirmed that the GPS signal disappeared as the commission-chartered plane approached Plovdiv. The country’s civil aviation authority quickly proposed an alternative approach using ground navigation aids independent of GPS, allowing the pilot to perform a safe landing without the need to divert the flight. According to a source familiar with the situation, pilots resorted to using paper maps—a throwback to a bygone era of aviation, but a testament to the professionalism and adaptability of the crew.
The incident is far from isolated. As GPS World reported, GPS jamming and spoofing attacks have surged across the region since the onset of the war in Ukraine. These attacks create a challenging environment for critical navigation systems, affecting not only aviation but also maritime and land-based infrastructure. Estonia’s aviation regulator recently revealed that 85% of flights in the country now experience some form of GPS disruption, with the Baltic Sea region experiencing particularly acute interference. There has also been a rapid increase in intentional transmission of faulty coordinates—a practice known as spoofing.
Sean Fitzpatrick, an experienced pilot who flew within 40 miles of Plovdiv airport on the same day as von der Leyen’s flight, told Sky News that the area is notorious for GPS interference. “That airport is in a known GPS interference area. Anyone flying in there would know that there’s a high probability of having GPS issues,” he explained. Fitzpatrick suggested that while GPS jamming is a nuisance, pilots are trained to switch off affected receivers and rely on alternative aids like the instrument landing system. “When I heard they were pulling out paper charts to navigate, I’m like, why didn’t they just have an iPad?” he quipped, highlighting both the routine nature of such disruptions and the adaptability required of modern pilots.
But why did this particular incident make headlines now? With a crucial summit of European leaders on the horizon to discuss peacekeeping troops for Ukraine, some observers have questioned the timing of the public revelation. Fitzpatrick himself commented, “Based on the information I have, that’s what it looks like… I think there’s a bit of politics and sensationalism.”
Dr. Thomas Withington, an electronic warfare expert at the RUSI think tank, echoed the notion that political motives may be at play. “I think it’s quite hard to say with any degree of certainty whether her aircraft was deliberately targeted,” he told Sky News, noting that jamming signals are often broadcast over wide areas. “But I’m sure that for Mr. Putin it’s a very happy coincidence.” Withington warned of the broader dangers posed by such interference. “Politically, what you’re saying is ‘we’re here, we can make your life difficult’,” he said. He also referenced a tragic incident in December, when an Azerbaijan Airlines flight reportedly lost GPS and was mistakenly shot down by Russian air defenses, killing 38 people. “If those [Russian] actions cause loss of life, particularly in a NATO nation, I think it should be made very clear that a military response would be considered for that.”
At the highest levels, the response has been swift. NATO chief Mark Rutte declared on September 2 that the alliance is taking the jamming of GPS signals “very seriously” and is working “day and night” to prevent further incidents. “We will ensure they will not do it again,” Rutte asserted, signaling the alliance’s resolve to protect its members and their critical infrastructure.
Beyond the immediate political and security concerns, the incident has reignited a longstanding debate about the resilience of global navigation systems. Mitch Narins, a member of the GPS World Editorial Advisory Board, lamented that for more than two decades, experts have warned about the vulnerabilities of satellite-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) systems. “Despite these concerns, attempts to install and upgrade alternative or complementary PNT systems on the ground and in aircraft have failed and resulted solely in increased investment in satellites and their signals, all of which are extremely low-power by design and vulnerable to interference,” Narins explained. He argued that for the cost of building and launching a single GNSS satellite, many resilient ground-based systems could be installed and operated for years, offering a much-needed layer of redundancy.
“Resilience must be a critical part of a PNT system’s performance if it is to be considered a potential solution,” Narins emphasized. Instead of focusing solely on interoperability between GNSS constellations—which still leaves users at the mercy of inherently weak satellite signals—he advocates for a more diversified approach. “This is not a simple problem with a single, simple solution, but it is time to start thinking about resilience first and leaving the identification of solutions to a proper system engineering process.”
As the dust settles in Plovdiv and European leaders prepare for their next round of high-stakes diplomacy, the message from the runway is clear: the battle for control over critical infrastructure is no longer confined to the battlefield. It’s being waged in the invisible realm of signals and systems, where a single act of interference can have ripple effects across continents. For policymakers, pilots, and passengers alike, the call for resilience has never been more urgent.