In a region where alliances can shift as quickly as the desert winds, the latest developments in Syria are nothing short of remarkable. The last few weeks have seen a former jihadist leader received at the White House, the first public joint anti-ISIS operation between the United States and Damascus, and a flurry of diplomatic recalibrations that are redrawing the map of Middle Eastern politics—at least for now.
On December 3, 2025, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, in a televised interview with an Omani channel, reiterated what has become a familiar refrain from Tehran: Iran is in no rush to restore diplomatic ties with Syria. "We are closely watching developments in Syria without rushing into a step toward normalizing relations," Araghchi stated, according to Shafaq News. He emphasized that Iran feels no pressure to move quickly, preferring to study both the political and on-the-ground situation before making any decisions.
But beneath this diplomatic caution lies a web of unresolved debts and shifting loyalties. Iranian officials have been increasingly vocal about Syria repaying the debts racked up during the long and bloody war—debts the new Syrian government flatly rejects. Meanwhile, Damascus has been busy rekindling ties with Moscow, as evidenced by transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s high-profile visit to Russia. The obstacles blocking Syrian-Iranian rapprochement remain stubbornly in place, complicated further by the new government’s overtures to the United States and a changing regional balance.
Indeed, it’s those overtures to Washington that have truly shaken up the status quo. In late November, US Central Command announced a joint operation with Syria’s Ministry of Interior that destroyed 15 ISIS weapons caches in the Rif Dimashq Governorate, the region surrounding Damascus. This was no ordinary anti-terror raid. It was, according to The Media Line, "the first acknowledgment of US–Syrian cooperation in the counter-ISIS mission." And it came hot on the heels of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to the White House—a moment that would have seemed unthinkable only a year ago.
"It was a little bit amazing to see a former al-Qaida leader and jihadist running Syria, who, after visiting the White House, joined a cooperation with the Americans in targeting ISIS," remarked Prof. Joseph Young, director of the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky, speaking to The Media Line. For Washington, the move is both an opportunity and a gamble: a chance to work directly with Damascus on counterterrorism while keeping a wary eye on Iran’s influence and managing a delicate balance with Israel and Kurdish allies.
The shift began in earnest when the United States lifted sanctions on Syria earlier in 2025, paving the way for al-Sharaa’s White House reception and formal recognition of his government. Prof. Jean Marcou of Sciences Po Grenoble described the lifting of sanctions as the turning point. "The visit to the US, and especially the reception by Donald Trump in the White House, was very important to confirm him in power," Marcou told The Media Line. This symbolism wasn’t lost on Syrians, who saw the visit as a point of national pride, regardless of political allegiance.
Yet, the US has hardly abandoned its other partners in the region. American forces continue to operate in northern Syria, backing Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against ISIS and maintaining a military presence in Rojava. As Marcou put it, "The Kurds can permit the Americans to stay in the region, to have leverage. It is quite a cheap intervention, because they have only a few troops, but it permits them to be efficient in the region." The US has even tried to mediate between al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, hoping to stitch together a workable balance between the new Syrian regime, the Kurds, and regional power brokers like Turkey.
But it’s not just the Americans playing mediator. According to Shafaq News, indirect contacts between Syria and Iran have begun under Turkish sponsorship, driven by Turkish-Israeli tensions, a recent rapprochement between Ankara and Tehran, and shared concerns about Israeli expansion in Syria. While outright hostility between Syria and Iran has faded with Assad’s departure, the relationship is now described as "cool relations"—a period marked by caution, indirect contacts, and a readiness to redraw ties according to mutual interests. Regional mediators like Turkey and Iraq loom large, though the pace of change remains too rapid for any firm predictions.
Meanwhile, the US is trying to thread a needle between its new relationship with Damascus and longstanding support for the Kurds. The March 10 agreement between al-Sharaa and Abdi, meant to integrate Kurdish political and military structures into the Syrian state, has so far yielded little on the ground. "The core of that agreement is the integration of the Syrian Kurdish political and military forces into the new Syrian state," Marcou explained. But persistent fighting, mistrust, and differing visions—decentralization and federalism for the Kurds, centralized rule for al-Sharaa—have left the deal teetering on the edge.
The integration of SDF units, including women fighters, into the Syrian army is particularly contentious. "The deadline of the integration agreement is at the end of this month, and it is still uncertain what might happen if the SDF does not integrate," said Ahmed Sharawi, a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Clashes between SDF units and Syrian government forces since August have already signaled just how fragile the situation is. "The integration agreement is on the verge of collapse. The US is trying to revive it, because it does not want to see its counterterrorism partner, the SDF, dragged into a conflict with the Syrian government," Sharawi added.
On the broader regional stage, President Trump has linked Syria to his vision for expanding the Abraham Accords, though both sides admit that formal peace with Israel is a distant prospect. Trump has reportedly urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to scale back operations inside Syria, fearing that aggressive Israeli action could push Damascus closer to Iran and Hezbollah—precisely the opposite of what Washington wants. For its part, Damascus is expected to avoid direct involvement in any future Israel-Hezbollah conflict, both due to limited capacity and prevailing public sentiment.
Despite the fanfare around the joint anti-ISIS operation, analysts caution against overstating its immediate impact. "This cooperation is quite soft; it is not really a large military operation. But it comes at a critical time, trying to showcase Syria’s intent in becoming a counterterrorism partner for the US," Sharawi noted. The goal, as Young put it, is less about eradicating ISIS outright and more about "destroying weapons caches and trying to remove their capabilities to reconstitute and come back." ISIS, he argues, is now more an ideology than an army—a threat that will take "maybe a generation" to fully contain.
As the dust settles, the future of Syria’s alliances—and its internal stability—remains uncertain. The rapid pace of regional developments, the fragility of new agreements, and the ever-present risk of escalation mean that today’s breakthroughs could quickly become tomorrow’s crises. For now, though, the world is witnessing a rare moment of recalibration in the Middle East, one that could reshape the region’s security landscape for years to come—if it can hold.
