In a move that has rattled policymakers in Seoul and drawn notice from security experts worldwide, both the United States and China have released major defense policy documents in recent weeks that conspicuously omit any reference to North Korea’s denuclearization—a shift that could have lasting consequences for regional stability and the global nonproliferation regime.
On December 4, 2025, the Trump administration unveiled its new 33-page National Security Strategy (NSS). Unlike its predecessors, including Trump’s own 2017 strategy and those of the Biden era, the latest NSS makes no mention of North Korea or Washington’s long-standing commitment to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. This silence is particularly striking given that North Korea, as of 2025, is believed to possess 60 or more nuclear weapons—a dramatic increase from the one to two dozen it held when Trump first took office, according to reporting from The Korea Times and The New York Times.
For South Korea, where the threat from Pyongyang remains existential, the omission has set off alarm bells. "North Korea’s nuclear weapons are an existential threat to South Korea, but they are not considered a direct threat to the U.S. mainland," Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, told The Korea Times. "It means our government will have to work even harder to keep the North Korean nuclear issue on the radar in both Washington and Beijing."
The new U.S. strategy document instead pivots to other priorities. It emphasizes deterring conflict with China over the Taiwan Strait, bolstering military capabilities, and urging greater cost-sharing by allies. The Western Hemisphere, migration, and drug trafficking feature prominently, with the NSS updating the Monroe Doctrine through a new "Trump corollary." Russia, though mentioned four times, is discussed in terms of restoring "strategic stability" rather than condemning its nearly four-year invasion of Ukraine—a war that has resulted in over 1.5 million casualties, according to The New York Times. Notably, the document portrays the United States as a neutral negotiator rather than a direct adversary of Moscow.
China, meanwhile, is referenced extensively in the context of economic competition, but not as a military threat. Its nuclear expansion and increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks on American infrastructure are only briefly acknowledged or omitted altogether. "When discussing economic competition, China is mentioned explicitly and in granular detail. But when discussing military threats in the Indo-Pacific, the language becomes very vague," Peter D. Feaver, a Duke University professor and director of its American Grand Strategy program, told The New York Times. He added, "Unlike Trump’s first security strategy, China is not identified by name as a country that poses a military threat, which may be the loudest omission in the entire document."
This shift is not limited to Washington. China’s latest white paper on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, released in late November 2025, also steers clear of any explicit commitment to North Korean denuclearization. Instead, it states that "China adopts an impartial stance and adheres to the right approach of always working for the peace, stability and prosperity of the peninsula and the resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue through political means." This marks a clear departure from previous Chinese policy documents—in 2005 and 2017, Beijing explicitly supported denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Cho Han-bum, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, noted, "China has increasingly avoided directly addressing North Korea’s nuclear weapons, and that stance has become more entrenched. With the U.S. now less vocal on the issue, Beijing has even less reason to speak out on it. In both Washington and Beijing, there is a growing recognition that complete denuclearization is no longer a realistic goal."
The ramifications for South Korea are significant. With both Washington and Beijing appearing to deprioritize the North Korean nuclear threat, Seoul’s diplomatic strategy faces a stern test. South Korea’s National Security Adviser, Wi Sung-lac, sought to downplay the omission, attributing it to the NSS’s focus on broad policy directions rather than specific regional disputes. "Such matters are expected to be handled in subsequent subordinate documents. It would be premature to interpret the omission as a sign that Washington has lost interest in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue or in resuming dialogue," Wi told reporters during a briefing on December 7, 2025, as reported by The Korea Times.
Yet the broader context suggests a recalibration of American and Chinese foreign policy priorities. The Trump administration’s approach, shaped by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and acting national security adviser Rubio, reflects a worldview that differs sharply from the strategy authored by Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster in 2017. The current NSS, according to The New York Times, puts "America First" at its core, with the opening paragraphs stating, "Not every country, region, issue or cause—however worthy—can be the focus of American strategy." The document’s authors argue that the goal is "to ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful and most successful country for decades to come."
The move away from explicit discussion of superpower competition and nuclear threats is jarring for many longtime observers. R. Nicholas Burns, former U.S. ambassador to China and NATO, commented, "Think about the list of challenges where China presents the greatest threat to the U.S. in the next few decades. It’s who will emerge most powerful in technology—A.I., quantum computing, biotechnology, cyber. They are linked to the intense military competition we have with China every day throughout the Indo-Pacific." Yet, according to Burns, these topics are mentioned only in passing in the new NSS.
Meanwhile, the U.S. is urging allies to contribute more to regional security. The defense paper calls for regional allies, including South Korea, to step up their role in safeguarding maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. Seoul has responded by committing to raise its defense spending to 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product, in line with domestic legal requirements, a move formalized in a joint fact sheet released in November 2025.
As for North Korea, the new NSS’s silence comes after years of failed diplomacy and mounting nuclear capabilities in Pyongyang. The 2017 NSS described North Korea’s weapons program as a major threat, noting that the country "seeks the capability to kill millions of Americans with nuclear weapons," and detailed its chemical, biological, and cyber capabilities. Today, those threats are arguably greater, yet the issue has receded from the forefront of U.S. and Chinese policy documents.
Some analysts caution against reading the NSS as a direct reflection of President Trump’s personal diplomatic ambitions. "The NSS is the national strategy, not the president's personal approach. Separately from the document, Trump could still consider reaching out to (North Korean leader) Kim Jong-un for renewed nuclear negotiations to address what he sees as unfinished business," said Cho Han-bum.
For now, South Korea finds itself in a more precarious position, forced to navigate a shifting geopolitical landscape in which its two most powerful allies seem less inclined to prioritize the North Korean nuclear issue. The challenge for Seoul will be to ensure that the threat from Pyongyang does not slip entirely off the international agenda, even as the world’s superpowers look elsewhere.
The evolving priorities of Washington and Beijing have left South Korea at a crossroads, underscoring the complexities of alliance politics and the enduring dangers posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea.
