On December 18, 2025, a series of developments underscored the growing instability along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, raising alarms about the region’s security landscape and the international efforts to contain the fallout. A newly released United Nations Security Council report, diplomatic overtures between Pakistan and Qatar, and the arrest of a prominent militant media figure all converged to paint a complex, at times alarming, picture of cross-border militancy and the diplomatic maneuvers surrounding it.
The 16th report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, submitted to the UN Security Council, delivered a blunt assessment: Afghanistan, under Taliban rule since August 2021, remains a hub for militant activity with direct consequences for its neighbors. According to the report, “the de facto authorities continue to deny that any terrorist groups have a footprint in or operate from its territory. That claim is not credible.” This assertion is a direct challenge to the Taliban’s repeated promises, enshrined in the 2020 Doha Agreement, to prevent Afghan soil from being used to threaten other states.
UN member states, as cited in the report, confirm the presence in Afghanistan of a host of militant outfits, including ISIL-K (Islamic State-Khorasan), the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al Qaeda, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM/TIP), Jamaat Ansarullah, and Ittihadul Mujahideen Pakistan. Some of these groups, the report notes, continue to use Afghan territory to plan and prepare attacks abroad, undermining regional stability.
Perhaps most alarmingly for Pakistan, the TTP is singled out as the gravest threat to regional stability. The UN report describes the TTP as operating from sanctuaries in Afghanistan with “logistical and operational support from the Afghan Taliban.” Despite the Taliban’s official denials and some internal divisions over how to handle the TTP, the report finds little evidence of decisive action against the group. In fact, “sympathy and allegiance toward the group exist within Taliban ranks,” the report states, and historical ties between the two organizations make a crackdown unlikely.
Pakistan has felt the brunt of this in 2025, with TTP attacks surging to over 600 so far this year. Many of these incidents have been complex and coordinated, involving vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide attackers. Strikingly, the UN notes that a majority of suicide bombers in these attacks were reportedly Afghan nationals. The TTP’s leader, Noor Wali Mehsud, is said to reside in Kabul, while his family allegedly receives a monthly payment of three million Afghanis (about $43,000) from the Taliban. The group’s estimated 6,000 fighters are concentrated in Afghanistan’s Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktika, and Paktia provinces.
These developments have pushed Pakistan-Afghanistan relations to the breaking point. Cross-border military clashes erupted in October 2025, leaving dozens of soldiers dead on both sides and prompting the closure of major border crossings. According to the UN, each day of closure costs the Afghan economy roughly $1 million. The TTP has also broadened its target list, issuing a directive in January 2025 to attack military-owned businesses and Chinese enterprises operating in Pakistan, escalating threats to both national and foreign interests.
Amid this tense backdrop, diplomatic efforts have sought to cool tempers and find a path forward. On December 18, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif publicly praised Qatar for its role in mediating a fragile ceasefire in Gaza and for facilitating talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan after their October border clashes. As reported by the Prime Minister’s Office and covered by state media, Sharif congratulated Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani on the Gulf nation’s National Day, lauding “Qatar’s valuable role in efforts to bring peace in Gaza” and expressing “deep appreciation for Qatar’s facilitation of talks aimed at easing tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan.”
Qatar’s emergence as a regional crisis mediator has not gone unnoticed. The Gulf state played a central role in negotiations between Hamas and Israel, helping to secure ceasefires, humanitarian pauses, and prisoner exchanges, often working in concert with the United States. Its involvement in South Asia has grown, with Pakistan seeking closer ties—Sharif visited Doha after Israeli airstrikes in September 2025, and Qatar publicly supported Pakistan during a brief military conflict with India in May. The Qatari Emir, in turn, expressed “strong commitment” to further strengthening bilateral ties and accepted Sharif’s invitation to visit Pakistan at a mutually convenient date.
While diplomats talked, security forces acted. On December 18, Pakistani authorities confirmed the arrest of Sultan Aziz Azzam, a senior figure in the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), who headed its Al Azzam media outlet. According to Pakistan TV Digital, Azzam was apprehended in May 2025 while attempting to cross from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Originally from Nangarhar province and a graduate in Islamic jurisprudence from the University of Nangarhar, Azzam joined ISKP in 2016 and quickly rose to become a prominent leader and the group’s chief propagandist.
His media operations were not merely rhetorical. As noted by the UN Security Council and U.S. authorities, Azzam played an “instrumental role” in spreading ISKP’s violent ideology, glorifying and justifying terrorist acts. He claimed responsibility for the August 26, 2021, suicide attack near Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport—an attack that killed at least 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members, injuring 150 more. In November 2021, Washington designated Azzam a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), barring any American dealings with him. His arrest, according to the UN report, has contributed to the suspension of ISIL-K’s media outlet, Voice of Khorasan, and is part of a broader pattern of counterterrorism progress by Pakistan.
Despite these successes, the UN report warns that ISIL-K remains resilient, continuing to conduct attacks both inside Afghanistan and internationally, though its operational capabilities have been degraded by joint efforts from Pakistan and the Taliban. Another notable blow to ISIL-K came with the mid-2025 arrest of Ozgur Altun (Abu Yasir al-Turki) by Turkish and Pakistani authorities, further disrupting the group’s media and operational networks.
Al Qaeda, too, maintains a low-profile but persistent presence in Afghanistan, reportedly benefiting from a permissive environment for training and reorganization. In March 2025, Osama Mahmoud, from Bajaur district in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, was formally appointed as the emir of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), further underscoring the enduring threat posed by transnational militant groups operating in and from Afghanistan.
As the year draws to a close, the region faces a daunting mix of security threats, diplomatic overtures, and economic strain. The interplay between militant activity, international mediation, and local responses will shape the future of Afghanistan and its neighbors. For now, the border remains tense, the militants undeterred, and the search for lasting stability as urgent as ever.
