After more than two decades of service, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) is set to close its doors on December 31, 2025. This moment, described by Mohammed Al Hassan, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, as "an honourable and dignified closure," marks the end of an era that began in the turbulent aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion. Yet, as Iraq turns a new page, the country finds itself at a crossroads—caught between hard-won democratic milestones and a deepening crisis of public faith in the political process.
UNAMI’s establishment in 2003 came at a time when Iraq was "grappling with the effects of decades of dictatorship, regional wars, internal conflicts, foreign occupation, and the terror of Da’esh," as Al Hassan recounted in his final briefing to the UN Security Council. The mission’s tenure has been marked by both triumph and tragedy. Among the darkest moments was the Canal Hotel bombing in August 2003, which claimed the lives of 22 UN staff—a somber reminder of the dangers faced by those working to support Iraq’s recovery.
Despite these challenges, Iraq has made significant strides. The adoption of a new Constitution and the holding of 13 electoral processes since 2003 are testaments to the country's resilience. Al Hassan praised the "resilience and steadfastness of Iraq and its people as they worked to build a more secure and prosperous future." The most recent parliamentary elections, held on November 11, 2025, were hailed as "among the most free, orderly and credible polls conducted so far," with a reported 56% turnout among registered voters. Scenes of Iraqis "from diverse backgrounds lined up in orderly queues, eager to cast their ballots," provided what Al Hassan described as a "fitting final chapter" to UNAMI’s activities.
However, beneath the surface of these democratic rituals lies a more complicated reality. As reported by The Conversation, preliminary results from the 2025 elections placed Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s coalition in the lead, but no single bloc secured anything close to a majority in the 329-seat parliament. As has become customary since 2003, Iraq’s next government will be forged through months of elite bargaining, rather than a clear voter mandate.
While officials celebrated the apparent rise in voter participation—just over 55% of registered voters, up from 36% in 2021—this figure masks deeper issues. Only 21.4 million Iraqis registered to vote in 2025, compared to 24 million in 2021, out of an eligible population of 32 million. According to The Conversation, this narrower registry "automatically inflated turnout." Furthermore, more than 1.3 million Iraqis, mostly soldiers, police, and displaced people, cast early ballots, with an impressive 82% turnout in early voting. Yet, the broader trend is clear: voter turnout has steadily declined from 79% in 2005 to 44% in 2018 and lower still in the previous election.
This decline reflects a growing sense of disillusionment. Elections, once seen as vehicles for change, have become rituals of continuity. The Conversation notes that "each election has recycled the same elite faces, the same sectarian bargains and the same patronage networks." For many Iraqis, voting feels less like participation and more like performance. The country’s oil-based economy, which funds a vast public payroll of around 4 million employees, blurs the line between voter and employee. The International Labour Organization estimates that nearly 38% of Iraq’s workforce is employed in the public sector, with hundreds of thousands more on the payrolls of state-owned enterprises. There are also 3.1 million pensioners and about 1.5 million households receiving monthly social protection stipends.
Political parties, which often control ministries as personal fiefdoms, distribute jobs and contracts to their supporters. Public servants know that their salaries, promotions, and transfers may depend on party loyalty. Former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi captured this dynamic succinctly in a pre-election interview in October, stating that Iraqi elections had become "a process of buying votes."
The consequences of this system extend beyond mere disillusionment. In 2019, Iraq witnessed its largest protest movement since 2003, with thousands of young Iraqis demanding an end to sectarianism and corruption. The government’s response was brutal—security forces killed more than 600 protesters, extinguishing hopes for meaningful change. The dangers of dissent remain acute. In October 2025, Sunni parliamentary candidate Safaa al-Mashhadani was assassinated in a car bombing after publicly criticizing Iranian-backed militias. Analysts described the killing as a targeted attempt to weaken Sunni and reformist voices ahead of the election.
For many young Iraqis, the risks associated with political participation now outweigh the potential benefits. Research cited by The Conversation shows that 46% of young people in Iraq wish to emigrate, viewing politics not as a path to opportunity but as a source of danger and frustration. The 2025 election, then, reflects what some psychologists call "learned helplessness"—a state in which repeated disappointments teach people that their actions make no difference.
Meanwhile, Iraq continues to grapple with the lingering effects of past conflicts. Approximately one million people remain internally displaced, including more than 100,000 Yazidis from Sinjar who suffered immensely under Da’esh. The government has made strides in repatriating nationals from northeast Syria—about 20,800 people have returned as of December 2, 2025, with the latest arrivals occurring just days ago. Yet, as Al Hassan emphasized, "it remains essential for adequate resources to be directed toward ensuring dignified and sustainable reintegration, including reliable access to basic services, livelihoods, and community-level support."
Iraq’s recent election to the UN Human Rights Council is a notable achievement, but it carries with it the "responsibility to uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights," as Al Hassan reminded the country’s leaders. Challenges persist, particularly regarding the protection of minorities, women, and youth, and the safeguarding of freedom of expression.
As UNAMI departs, Al Hassan stressed that this is not the end of the Iraq-UN partnership. Rather, it is "the start of a new chapter rooted in Iraq’s leadership of its own future." The UN, he assured, "will continue to stand by Iraq to build on its hard-won gains, providing technical expertise, advice and support."
Yet, as Iraq stands at this crossroads, the path forward is fraught with uncertainty. Breaking the cycle of learned helplessness and restoring faith in democracy will require more than just elections—it will demand genuine reforms, political accountability, and an economy less dependent on oil and patronage. The ballots may be counted, the oil may flow, but for Iraq’s democracy to thrive, it must reclaim the hope of its people.
