As Ukraine’s war with Russia grinds on into another bitter winter, the country’s citizens are facing a host of wrenching choices about their future, security, and democracy. Recent surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) reveal just how complex—and at times, conflicted—public opinion has become on two of the most pressing issues: possible peace terms and the timing of national elections.
Between November 26 and December 13, 2025, KIIS polled 547 adults living in government-controlled parts of Ukraine. Their findings, published in mid-December, paint a portrait of a nation that remains deeply skeptical of Russian proposals for ending the war, yet not entirely enthusiastic about the alternatives on offer from the West. At the same time, most Ukrainians are in no rush to resume elections—at least, not until the guns fall silent for good.
Let’s start with the peace talks. KIIS presented respondents with two competing outlines for a negotiated end to the conflict, without initially revealing which side had authored each plan. The first, described as a conditional “European-Ukrainian” plan, would see Ukraine receive robust security guarantees from Europe and the United States. This would include ongoing weapons and financial support, as well as protection of Ukrainian airspace from Russian attacks. The current frontline would be frozen, meaning Russia would keep control of the territories it currently occupies, but Ukraine and the international community would not officially recognize this status. Ukraine could continue on its path toward European Union membership, and sanctions against Russia would remain in place until a sustainable peace took root and the threat of renewed aggression vanished.
The second, a “Russian” plan, read like a non-starter for most Ukrainians. According to KIIS, this proposal would require the United States and Europe to lift all sanctions against Russia. Russian would become an official language. Ukraine would be forced to dramatically shrink its army and permanently renounce any ambitions of joining NATO, with the West barred from supplying weapons. Russia would dictate Ukraine’s security guarantees, even serving as one of the guarantor countries. Ukraine would have to withdraw its troops from key areas of the Donetsk region, including cities like Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, and officially recognize Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk as Russian territory—permanently renouncing all claims. Russia would also keep control over occupied parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
The public’s verdict was unequivocal. “The Russian plan remains categorically unacceptable – 75% of Ukrainians consider it completely unacceptable (the same as in September 2025). Only 17% of Ukrainians are ready for the Russian version of peace (the same as before),” KIIS reported. Those numbers have barely budged in months, underscoring just how little appetite there is for what many see as a surrender of sovereignty and territory.
By contrast, the European-Ukrainian plan drew a more mixed, but still generally positive, response. According to KIIS, 72% of Ukrainians are prepared to approve this plan—though, as the sociologists noted, “mostly without enthusiasm.” Only 14% reject it outright. The lack of enthusiasm is telling; while the plan would preserve Ukraine’s Western orientation and keep up the pressure on Russia, it would also require accepting the loss of significant territory, at least for now. For a country that has sacrificed so much to defend its borders, that’s a bitter pill to swallow.
Of course, the reliability of any poll conducted in wartime is always open to question. The KIIS sample excluded residents of Russian-occupied areas, though it did include some internally displaced persons and citizens who left Ukraine after February 24, 2022. The statistical margin of error for this survey was up to 5.6% for indicators near 50%, with additional systematic deviations likely due to the realities of war. Still, the researchers are confident their results “maintain high representativeness and allow reliable analysis of public sentiment.”
Public sentiment on elections is equally nuanced. Another KIIS survey, conducted in December 2025, asked Ukrainians when they believed the next national vote should be held. The majority—57%—said elections should take place only after a final peace agreement and a complete end to the war. That number is down slightly from 63% in September, but it still shows a strong preference for waiting until the fighting stops. Just 9% of respondents favored holding elections before a ceasefire, a slight decline from the previous quarter. In the event of a ceasefire and “reliable security guarantees” (such as more weapons and peacekeepers from a European country), 25% said they would support holding elections—up marginally from 22% in September.
These findings land amid growing international debate about Ukraine’s democratic process. On December 9, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump weighed in, declaring that it was time for Ukraine to hold elections, since “they have not been held for a very long time.” The statement sparked immediate reaction in Kyiv. President Volodymyr Zelensky responded, “Always ready for elections,” but quickly added that the United States should help ensure the necessary security conditions for voting. First Deputy Speaker Oleksandr Kornienko also chimed in, noting that while parliament could prepare the necessary legislative framework, “security should be provided by foreign partners.”
The question of elections is not merely academic. Ukraine’s constitution and wartime laws make organizing a nationwide vote extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, under current conditions. Millions remain displaced, and large swaths of the country are under threat from missile strikes or occupation. Even in areas far from the front, the logistics of holding a free and fair election—complete with campaign rallies, open media, and international observers—are daunting. As a result, the debate over timing is as much about principle as practicality.
Yet, as the KIIS data shows, the Ukrainian public’s patience for deferring elections is not unlimited. The slight drop in those insisting on waiting for a final peace agreement, and the small uptick in those open to voting if a ceasefire and security guarantees are in place, suggest that attitudes could shift further if the war drags on or if Western pressure intensifies.
For now, though, the numbers speak for themselves. Most Ukrainians remain deeply wary of any peace deal that would force them to cede territory or sovereignty to Russia. They are also reluctant to resume elections until they can do so safely, with real security guarantees in place. As the war enters yet another year, the country’s leaders face the challenge of balancing these public sentiments with the demands of international partners and the hard realities of the battlefield.
In a landscape shaped by loss and resilience, Ukraine’s choices remain as difficult as ever—but, as these surveys show, the nation’s voice is clear, even if not always united.
