On April 27, 2026, Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR) and the Ministry of Defense’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) pulled back the curtain on one of Russia’s newest weapons: the S-71K “Kovyor” (Carpet) air-launched cruise missile. With the release of an interactive 3D model and an intricate breakdown of the missile’s components, Ukrainian officials sought to shed light on the evolving dynamics of the aerial battlefield—and to highlight the persistent reliance of Russian arms manufacturers on foreign technology.
The S-71K is no ordinary missile. Developed by Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), it was crafted specifically for the cutting-edge Su-57 Felon fighter jet platform, according to both HUR and GUR reports cited by Kyiv Post and The War Zone. First deployed in combat in late 2025, the missile’s arrival signals a shift in Russian strategy: a move toward cheaper, easier-to-manufacture air-launched weapons that can be produced in greater numbers, as Moscow’s stockpiles of legacy cruise missiles dwindle under the strain of ongoing conflict.
At the heart of the S-71K is a formidable warhead—a 551-pound (250-kilogram) OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb. This bomb, originally designed during the Cold War as a free-fall weapon, is now integrated into the missile’s airframe. The missile’s body is crafted from multi-layer fiberglass with reinforced sections, while some internal elements are made of aluminum alloys. This construction gives the S-71K a low-observable, or stealthy, profile, with a trapezoidal cross-section, a chined nose, pop-out swept wings, and an inverted V-tail. However, as The War Zone notes, there’s no evidence of advanced radar-absorbent coatings—likely a cost-saving measure.
One of the more intriguing aspects of the S-71K is its basic flight control and guidance system. The missile relies on an inertial navigation system (INS) based on simple sensors rather than advanced guidance technologies like the US Tomahawk’s Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM). According to HUR, this may reflect UAC’s relative inexperience with missile manufacturing, as the S-71K marks its first foray into this field. The guidance system may be supplemented by satellite navigation, but the lack of sophisticated targeting means the missile is less precise than some Western analogues.
Despite its Russian origins, the S-71K is something of a technological patchwork. HUR and GUR both emphasize that the “vast majority” of its electronic components are imported, sourced from countries including the United States, China, Switzerland, Japan, Germany, Taiwan, and Ireland. This reliance on foreign technology is not unique to the S-71K: Ukrainian intelligence previously discovered similar patterns in other Russian weapons, such as the Shahed-136 drone and the S-70 Okhotnik-B uncrewed combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). As HUR bluntly puts it, “Continued access to foreign technologies and components allows the aggressor state to develop new weapons and scale their use in the war against Ukraine.”
Powering the S-71K is a compact R500 turbojet engine, also produced by UAC. With three internal fuel tanks, the missile boasts an operational range of up to 186 miles (300 kilometers), can reach speeds of Mach 0.6, and operates at altitudes up to 27,000 feet. These capabilities make it a versatile addition to Russia’s arsenal, especially as the country seeks to stretch its resources amid wartime production constraints. In 2024, Sukhoi—another major Russian defense contractor—received approval from the Russian Defense Ministry to begin producing the S-71 after a round of significant design changes. These revisions, informed by lessons from the Ukraine conflict, included extending the missile’s range and reducing its radar cross-section to bolster survivability against air defenses.
The S-71K’s operational history is already marked by drama. In October 2024, a malfunctioning S-70 Okhotnik drone (which may one day serve as a launch platform for the S-71K) was shot down by an escorting Su-57 over Ukraine’s Donetsk region. Ukrainian forces later turned fragments of the downed drone into souvenirs, using the proceeds to support frontline troops. As of April 2026, it remains unclear whether the S-70 has entered serial production, but the potential for pairing these advanced systems is a concern for Ukrainian planners.
Testing of the S-71K has included captive-carry trials on the Su-57 at Russia’s Zhukovsky flight research center. While the missile was developed with the Su-57 in mind, it could theoretically be carried by other Russian tactical jets, which would be necessary if Russia aims for large-scale deployment. GUR officials also suggest that integration with the S-70 Okhotnik UCAV is in the works, potentially allowing for remote, uncrewed launch operations in the future.
The S-71K is not the only new missile in Russia’s pipeline. Ukrainian intelligence has also tracked the development of the S-71M Monokhrom, a more advanced variant described as a “kamikaze drone” with human-in-the-loop targeting and electro-optical sensors for day and night operations. The S-71M offers multiple warhead options and can be carried in the internal weapons bays of the Su-57 or S-70 UCAV. While unconfirmed, there have been reports that the S-71M was used in an attack on a Ukrainian HIMARS launcher in the Chernihiv region earlier this year. Another missile, the Izdeliye 30, has also been unveiled, boasting a range of at least 930 miles and intended as a cheaper alternative for Russia’s strategic bombers.
From a strategic perspective, the S-71K’s introduction highlights the shifting priorities of Russia’s military-industrial complex. As The War Zone points out, Russia, like the United States, faces the challenge of maintaining sufficient munitions stocks for a protracted conflict. The S-71K, with its cost-effective design and reliance on off-the-shelf foreign components, is tailored for mass production—a pragmatic response to the realities of modern warfare.
For Ukraine, however, the deployment of the S-71K poses fresh challenges. The missile’s low-observable features and operational flexibility put additional strain on Ukraine’s already stretched air defense network, which continues to suffer from a shortage of Western-supplied systems. Ukrainian officials are adamant that the international community must act. As HUR urges, “Stronger sanctions are needed to limit Russia’s ability to produce such systems.” The continued flow of foreign technology, they argue, only prolongs the conflict and endangers lives on the front lines.
As the war grinds on, the story of the S-71K serves as a stark reminder: in today’s conflicts, the line between domestic innovation and global supply chains is increasingly blurred. The battle for technological supremacy is as much about access and adaptation as it is about invention. For now, the skies over Ukraine remain a proving ground for the weapons of tomorrow—and for the persistent questions of how, and where, those weapons are made.