Just months after the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan rattled the region, a fresh wave of violence and military posturing has reignited fears of escalation between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Within the span of 24 hours, deadly explosions rocked the capitals of both countries, killing dozens and injuring many more, while officials traded accusations and warnings that have left South Asia on edge.
On Monday evening, November 10, 2025, a car slowed to a halt at a traffic light near the iconic Red Fort in New Delhi before erupting in a violent explosion. According to reports from the Associated Press, the blast killed at least 20 people and wounded several others, sending shockwaves through the city and drawing immediate condemnation from Indian leaders. As investigators scoured the scene, Indian authorities said they suspected Islamist groups based in Kashmir might be involved, but stopped short of publicly accusing Pakistan at this early stage.
Before the dust could settle in New Delhi, tragedy struck Islamabad. On Tuesday afternoon, November 11, a suicide bomber targeted a crowded court building in Pakistan’s capital. Denied entry by security, the attacker detonated explosives next to a police car outside the district court, killing at least 12 people and wounding 27 more. The Associated Press reported that Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a splinter faction of the Pakistani Taliban, claimed responsibility for the Islamabad attack.
The near-simultaneous nature of these assaults immediately heightened concerns across the subcontinent. Both India and Pakistan have long accused each other of supporting militant proxies, and the recent violence has only deepened mutual suspicions. In a statement shared by the Pakistani government, President Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif did not mince words, accusing India of backing Afghan Islamist groups responsible for both the Islamabad suicide bombing and a separate deadly attack on a cadet college in Wana, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. "The time has come for the world to condemn such nefarious conspiracies by India," Sharif declared. "Both attacks are the worst examples of Indian state terrorism in the region."
India, meanwhile, has not responded in kind—at least not yet. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, addressing the nation on X (formerly Twitter), promised swift action and justice for those behind the New Delhi bombing. "I assure everyone that our investigative agencies will get to the bottom of this conspiracy. Whoever is responsible for this will not be spared at any cost," Modi said, as quoted by the Associated Press.
For many in South Asia, the current crisis feels like déjà vu. Only six months ago, India and Pakistan fought a brief but intense war following a massacre of Indian tourists in Pahalgam, Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir. That conflict, which saw weeks of cross-border artillery exchanges and airstrikes, ended only after a ceasefire brokered in March by U.S. President Donald Trump. Yet, as this week’s attacks show, the underlying tensions remain dangerously unresolved.
Underlying these immediate security concerns is a major shift in Pakistan’s military doctrine that could have far-reaching consequences. On the eve of its 78th Independence Day in August 2025, Pakistan announced the formation of the Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), a move that caught many observers off guard. As reported by South Asian Voices, the ARFC institutionalizes Pakistan’s conventional missile responses and, crucially, separates its conventional and nuclear capabilities—an attempt to reduce nuclear risk while bolstering conventional deterrence.
The timing of the ARFC’s creation was no accident. The May 2025 crisis with India exposed a glaring gap in Pakistan’s ability to conduct precision strikes using conventional missiles. While the Pakistani Air Force demonstrated credible deterrent signaling during the conflict, the Army struggled to hit all its intended targets without Indian interception. With the ARFC, the Pakistani military hopes to fill this gap by giving itself more tools for rapid, precise retaliation, especially using its Fatah I and II guided rocket series. These missiles, known for their navigation, trajectory, and maneuverability, are designed to evade missile defenses and strike targets with accuracy.
Pakistan’s military leadership has not shied away from signaling its intent. During the Pakistan Military Academy’s passing out parade in October, Field Marshal Asim Munir warned that Pakistan would respond "beyond proportions" and with "retributive military and economic losses" to any Indian aggression. He even pointedly referenced large-scale Indian oil refineries as potential targets, a statement that did not go unnoticed in New Delhi. Such rhetoric underscores a new Pakistani strategy: to deter Indian planners not just by threatening military assets, but also by putting valuable economic targets in the crosshairs, thereby raising the costs of any potential Indian strike.
But as South Asian Voices notes, this increased readiness to use conventional missile capabilities comes with risks. The ARFC aims to create a firebreak between conventional and nuclear missile use, theoretically reducing the risk of nuclear escalation. However, it also makes future conflicts more destructive from the outset, as both sides may feel emboldened to use powerful conventional weapons without immediately crossing the nuclear threshold. The certainty of hundreds dying in a conventional missile conflict, even if the risk of millions dying in a nuclear exchange is reduced, is a sobering prospect for the region.
India, for its part, is not standing still. The country is investing heavily in its own air and missile defense capabilities, with the ambitious Mission Sudarshan Chakra aiming to provide integrated protection for all strategic and civilian infrastructure by 2035. Reports indicate that during the May 2025 crisis, Indian air defense systems managed to intercept some of Pakistan’s Fatah missiles, highlighting the high-stakes technological race now underway.
The ARFC’s creation also reflects shifting dynamics within Pakistan’s military. Traditionally, missile systems capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads were controlled by the National Command Authority, with operational control centralized among artillery generals. The ARFC, by focusing solely on conventional missiles, adds a new layer of flexibility and command options for the Pakistani Army, potentially changing the balance of power within the military establishment itself.
As both countries grapple with the aftermath of this week’s attacks, the specter of further escalation looms large. Pakistan’s defense minister, Khawaja Mohammad Asif, struck a grim note in his statement on X: "We are in a state of war. Anyone who thinks the Pakistan Army is only fighting this war in the Afghan-Pakistan border areas or in the remote regions of Balochistan should take today’s suicide attack at the Islamabad District Court as a wake-up call—this is a war for all of Pakistan, in which the Army is making daily sacrifices and giving the people a sense of security."
Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s government, caught in the crossfire of regional accusations, has insisted it does not seek insecurity or war, but has warned it will defend itself if conflict breaks out. Ongoing negotiations between Pakistan and the Taliban government in Kabul have stalled, raising fears that the violence could spill over into a wider conflict.
In the end, the latest attacks and the ARFC’s formation underscore just how precarious the strategic environment in South Asia has become. With little political restraint, new military tools, and a lack of effective crisis management mechanisms, the region faces the grim possibility that the next crisis could spiral even faster and deadlier than before.
