As winter approaches in Eurasia, the region’s energy landscape is shifting in ways that could have long-term consequences for both suppliers and consumers. Negotiations and new deals are underway, with countries like Türkiye and Germany seeking to balance energy security, geopolitical pressures, and economic realities—often under the watchful eyes of global powers.
According to Bloomberg, Türkiye and Russia’s Gazprom are currently in the thick of talks to extend two major pipeline gas supply agreements. These contracts, which together provide up to 21.75 billion cubic meters of gas annually, are set to expire on December 31, 2025. The stakes are high: the parties are reportedly looking to keep the annual supply volume at about 22 billion cubic meters, a figure that underscores Türkiye’s status as one of Gazprom’s most important remaining customers after the loss of much of its European market due to the war in Ukraine.
But these negotiations aren’t happening in a vacuum. The United States has ramped up its efforts to curtail energy imports from Russia, a campaign that’s included slapping sanctions on some of Russia’s biggest oil firms. Last month, the U.S. imposed restrictions on Rosneft and Lukoil, moves that have reverberated through international energy markets. In response, Turkish refineries began scaling back imports of Russian oil, even as Ankara has generally resisted Western calls to cut back on Russian gas purchases. Most of Türkiye’s gas still arrives under long-term contracts, funneled through an extensive pipeline network built over decades.
Yet, change is afoot. In September 2025, Türkiye inked several new deals for liquefied natural gas (LNG), including agreements with U.S. suppliers. This diversification comes as the country ramps up production from its own Black Sea fields, raising the possibility that it could soon have surplus gas volumes on its hands. The potential for excess supply gives Ankara extra leverage at the negotiating table with Gazprom, especially as it seeks to lock in lower prices for future contracts.
Numbers tell part of the story. In 2024, Gazprom shipped approximately 21.6 billion cubic meters of gas to Türkiye, making the country the second-largest buyer of Russian pipeline gas after China. Türkiye’s role as the fourth-largest gas market in Europe is also significant, especially considering its near-total reliance on imports—a dependence that’s only partially offset by supplies from Iran and Azerbaijan. According to Reuters, Türkiye has also started to diversify its oil sources, with the SOCAR Türkiye Aegean Refinery (STAR), owned by an Azerbaijani company, recently purchasing four batches of crude from Iraq, Kazakhstan, and other producers. Such moves are meant to reduce exposure to the risks associated with buying energy from Russia, whose revenues help finance its ongoing war in Ukraine.
This diversification isn’t without cost. Western sanctions have led to higher prices for diesel fuel in Türkiye, as suppliers pass on the increased risk and logistical challenges to consumers. For ordinary Turks, that means feeling the pinch at the pump, even as their government navigates a complex web of energy diplomacy.
Meanwhile, Germany offers a revealing counterpoint. According to Deutsche Welle, Berlin has significantly ramped up its imports of Kazakh oil, receiving 225,000 tons via the Druzhba pipeline in October 2025—a 25% jump from the previous month. This uptick is part of a broader trend that began in 2023, when Germany halted Russian oil imports in response to the war in Ukraine and European Union sanctions. In 2024 alone, Germany imported 1.5 million tons of oil from Kazakhstan, and it aims to push that figure up to 1.7 million tons by the end of 2025, with the possibility of reaching 2.5 million tons annually in the near future.
The mechanics of this shift are detailed and deliberate. In October 2025, KazMunayGas Chairman Askhat Hasenov and Johannes Bremer, CEO of Rosneft Deutschland GmbH, signed an agreement extending the existing oil supply arrangement through the end of 2026. The updated deal bumps up monthly deliveries from 100,000 to 130,000 tons, with the extra crude coming from Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak field. Looking ahead, Germany is set to begin receiving oil from the Kashagan field in 2024 and the Tengiz field in 2025, further expanding its portfolio of non-Russian suppliers.
From January to September 2025, about 1.5 million tons of Kazakh oil made its way to Germany’s Schwedt refinery. Notably, Rosneft Deutschland GmbH, which manages a stake in the Schwedt facility and is Germany’s third-largest oil refiner, is currently under German government control. This move is part of Berlin’s broader strategy to cut its reliance on Russian energy—a policy shift that’s as much about national security as it is about economics.
The Druzhba pipeline, which plays a central role in these supply chains, has its own geopolitical complexities. Originating in Samara, Russia, the pipeline splits after Bryansk and Mozyr: its northern branch snakes through Belarus to Poland and Germany, while the southern branch runs through Ukraine to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Even as Germany seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian oil, it remains physically connected to Russia’s energy infrastructure, a reality that complicates efforts to fully disentangle itself from Moscow’s influence.
What’s driving these shifts? For Türkiye, the answer is a mix of pragmatism and necessity. As one of Gazprom’s last major customers in Europe, Ankara has leverage—but also vulnerability. Its near-total reliance on imports makes energy security a perennial concern, especially as global prices fluctuate and political winds shift. By diversifying its suppliers and investing in domestic production, Türkiye is hedging its bets, seeking to ensure that it won’t be left out in the cold if geopolitical tensions escalate further.
For Germany, the calculus is somewhat different but equally urgent. The decision to cut Russian oil imports was driven by both moral outrage over the war in Ukraine and a sober assessment of national interest. By deepening ties with Kazakhstan and bringing key refineries under state control, Berlin is betting that it can weather future disruptions—be they political, economic, or military—without sacrificing energy security.
Yet, the transition is anything but smooth. Both countries face higher costs and new logistical headaches as they rewire their energy networks. For consumers, this often translates into higher prices at the pump or on their utility bills. For policymakers, it means making tough choices between affordability, security, and principle.
In the end, the stories of Türkiye and Germany highlight a broader truth: in today’s interconnected world, energy policy is inseparable from geopolitics. As nations scramble to secure reliable supplies and insulate themselves from external shocks, the old certainties of the energy market are giving way to a new era of competition, cooperation, and—sometimes—conflict. How these dynamics play out in the months and years ahead will shape not only the fortunes of individual countries but the stability of entire regions.
As the energy chessboard is redrawn, the only certainty is that the next move will matter—not just for governments and corporations, but for millions of ordinary people whose daily lives depend on the steady flow of oil and gas.