America’s release of the long-delayed National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 17, 2025, has sent shockwaves through European capitals, exposing deep fissures in the transatlantic relationship and prompting fierce debate over the future of NATO, Europe’s economic resilience, and the nature of U.S. foreign policy under President Donald Trump. While Trump’s criticisms of Europe are nothing new—he has often lambasted allies for not paying their “fair share” and even called NATO “obsolete”—the 2025 NSS marks a dramatic departure by codifying these views in a formal policy document produced by the entire national security apparatus, not just off-the-cuff remarks.
According to The Wall Street Journal and other sources, the NSS devotes an entire section to what it calls “European problems.” The document paints a bleak picture, describing Europe as suffering from “civilizational decline,” economic weakness, cultural decadence, and an influx of migrants. It further accuses the European Union of undermining political liberty and sovereignty, suppressing opposition, and eroding national identities. These characterizations have not gone unnoticed—or unchallenged—by European leaders. European Council president Antonio Costa and Germany’s chancellor Friedrich Merz have both described parts of the NSS as “unacceptable,” highlighting what they see as blatant political interference and a one-sided diagnosis that serves American interests at Europe’s expense.
Yet, as The European Council on Foreign Relations notes, some of the NSS’s criticisms do echo debates happening within Europe itself. Issues such as declining competitiveness, dependence on China for green-tech supply chains, and questions over immigration policy are acknowledged by European policymakers. Germany, Denmark, and several other countries are already moving toward more restrictive immigration and asylum rules. But the NSS’s proposed solutions—supporting far-right European political parties aligned with U.S. views on immigration and the “radical left”—are seen by many as attempts to undermine the European Commission’s power and fragment Europe’s unified stance in future negotiations with the U.S.
One of the most controversial aspects of the NSS is its approach to Russia. The document suggests that a hasty peace in Ukraine, involving major concessions such as halting NATO enlargement, could benefit Europe. However, it notably fails to demand any reciprocal concessions from Russia—no calls for Russia to stop violating NATO airspace, withdraw from Ukraine, or comply with longstanding treaties. Instead, the NSS advocates for “peace through Russia-U.S. joint ventures,” a stance that has alarmed many European observers. As reported by The Wall Street Journal, negotiations between America and Russia in November 2025 focused on reintegrating Russia’s $2 trillion economy into global commerce, with U.S. businesses set to benefit. This transactional approach, critics argue, risks reviving Russian economic and military capacity just as Europe continues to see Russia as a major security threat.
“The NSS offers no solution to re-empower Europe,” one analyst from The European Council on Foreign Relations wrote. “America’s self-serving solutions instead favour U.S. interests and will weaken Europe.” The document’s silence on Russia’s military aggression and hybrid warfare against NATO and its allies is particularly striking. As noted in The Atlantic, the NSS omits any mention of Russia as a chief adversary, despite ongoing Russian attacks on U.S. vessels, satellites, and support for hostile regimes. Instead, the only concrete demand is that NATO allies must now meet a commitment to invest 5 percent of GDP on defense—a target agreed upon by NATO in mid-2025. There are no parallel demands on Russia to cease its aggressive activities.
The NSS also calls for “ending the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance,” a position that upends decades of U.S. policy supporting NATO’s open-door ethos. This shift has unsettled longtime observers of transatlantic relations. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, American presidents from Truman to Obama championed NATO as the linchpin of Western security and a bulwark against Russian aggression. President Reagan, for instance, famously argued for extending NATO protections to the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. President Biden’s 2022 NSS called Europe “our foundational partner in addressing the full range of global challenges” and described Russia as an “immediate and ongoing threat.”
By contrast, the 2025 NSS treats the U.S. and Europe as separate entities rather than a united transatlantic community. The document suggests that managing European relations with Russia will require significant U.S. diplomatic engagement, echoing Trump’s recent peace plan that proposes a “dialogue between Russia and NATO, moderated by the United States.” This approach, critics argue, risks positioning the U.S. as a third-party mediator rather than an integral member of the alliance.
The NSS further warns that “it is more than plausible that…certain NATO members will become majority non-European,” raising questions about their commitment to the alliance. This concern, though arguably valid, is seen by many as a distraction from the real issue: the growing divergence between American and European security priorities. As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte cautioned, “Danger is moving towards us at full speed—all of us in the transatlantic community.”
On China, the NSS takes a notably transactional approach. Whereas previous strategies cast China as the principal existential competitor, the 2025 NSS calls for a “genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” The Trump administration has already authorized Nvidia to sell advanced AI chips to China, a move that stunned U.S. allies and left European industries exposed to Chinese export restrictions. The NSS encourages Europe to confront China on issues like mercantilist overcapacity and technological theft, while the U.S. seeks to maintain its own lucrative trade ties with Beijing.
Underlying the NSS is a complex web of competing interests within the Trump administration. According to The European Council on Foreign Relations, three main factions have shaped the document: one, aligned with Vice-President J.D. Vance, advocates a pullback from Europe and a reset with Russia; another, led by Marco Rubio, seeks to preserve U.S. global leadership; and a third, associated with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, is focused on profitable investment opportunities. Despite their differences, these groups appear united in prioritizing American business interests, often at the expense of Europe’s economy, security, and sovereignty.
As tensions rise and competition across the Atlantic intensifies, European leaders face a stark choice. “The challenge now is for Europeans to disregard America’s lecturing and determine their own course of action on Russia and China,” the European Council on Foreign Relations advises. Instead of treating the NSS as the final word, Europeans are urged to see it as a starting point for negotiations—and a clarion call to defend their own interests in an increasingly transactional world order.
For now, the transatlantic alliance stands at a crossroads, its foundations shaken by a new era of American “flexible realism.” Whether Europe can chart its own path amid shifting U.S. priorities remains to be seen.
