In a series of dramatic developments that have reignited global debate over nuclear weapons testing and control, former President Donald Trump’s recent statements have cast a fresh spotlight on the nuclear ambitions and anxieties of the United States, Pakistan, and India. The world, still grappling with the aftershocks of past nuclear crises, now finds itself facing new uncertainties as leaders revisit old doctrines and raise provocative claims.
On November 4, 2025, Trump appeared on CBS News’ 60 Minutes and made a bold assertion: South Asia, he claimed, had been “on the brink of nuclear conflict” during the May 2025 military flare-up between India and Pakistan. According to Kashmir Media Service, Trump recounted how his threat to suspend U.S. trade access forced both countries to step back from confrontation and negotiate. “It did work with India and it did work with Pakistan. I can tell you if it wasn’t for tariffs and trade, I wouldn’t have been able to make the deals,” Trump said. “India does a lot of business with us. They were going to have a nuclear war with Pakistan. I told both of them — if you guys don’t work out a deal fast, you’re not going to do any business with the United States.”
Trump’s intervention, he insisted, helped “stop a bad war” after both nations engaged in cross-border aerial strikes. He described the situation as “dangerously close to nuclear escalation,” referencing India’s “Operation Sindoor” and Pakistan’s measured retaliation, which Islamabad labeled “reckless and provocative.” Trump expanded his claims beyond South Asia, boasting that his approach worked “in 60 percent of cases,” and cited conflicts such as Cambodia-Thailand, Kosovo-Serbia, Congo-Rwanda, Israel-Iran, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. Observers, according to Kashmir Media Service, note that Trump’s repeated references to the India-Pakistan standoff underscore Washington’s persistent strategic interest in South Asia, especially given the ever-present risk of escalation between these nuclear-armed rivals.
But Trump’s statements didn’t stop at diplomatic brinkmanship. He also reignited a long-simmering mystery: the question of whether Pakistan has been conducting secret nuclear tests. As The Economic Times reports, Trump’s claim has breathed new life into old suspicions about Pakistan’s opaque nuclear program, despite the country’s adherence to a testing moratorium and the absence of verifiable evidence.
Between April 30 and May 12, 2025, at least four tremors with magnitudes between 4.0 and 4.7 rattled regions in Pakistan—eerily similar to the seismic readings from Pakistan’s six confirmed underground nuclear detonations in May 1998, which registered near 4.8. At the time, experts dismissed rumors of fresh nuclear tests, pointing instead to the region’s location atop one of the world’s most active fault lines. The official global monitoring system reported no anomalies consistent with nuclear explosions, and geological experts attributed the tremors to natural seismic activity. Still, whispers of clandestine testing persist, fueled by social media speculation and uncorroborated claims—such as rumors of Indian missile strikes on Pakistan’s Kirana Hills and sightings of a U.S. “Nuclear Emergency Response” aircraft over Pakistan. None of these stories have been verified by official sources.
Analysts, as cited by The Economic Times, largely dismiss these tales as misinformation amplified during the tense days of Operation Sindoor, when India and Pakistan exchanged limited military blows. Yet, the puzzle remains: while small underground nuclear tests are technically feasible, there is no public evidence that Pakistan has resumed them. The contradiction between ongoing modernization—highlighted by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2025 threat assessment, which notes Pakistan’s development of short-range “battlefield” nuclear weapons—and the absence of visible testing leaves experts scratching their heads.
Who, then, truly controls Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? Trump’s suggestion that Pakistan might be conducting secret tests independently revives a perennial question about the chain of command. Officially, Pakistan insists its arsenal is managed through the National Command Authority, ensuring strict military oversight and preventing unauthorized use. Nevertheless, claims persist—most notably from former CIA officer John Kiriakou, who alleged that during General Pervez Musharraf’s presidency, the Pentagon effectively took operational control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Islamabad has repeatedly denied any such handover, maintaining that full sovereignty has always been with its military and civilian leadership.
The ambiguity is only deepened by America’s own longstanding anxieties. According to NBC News, U.S. officials have, for decades, maintained contingency plans—so-called “snatch-and-grab” operations—to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons should they ever be perceived as a threat to American interests. Technical assistance to enhance Pakistan’s command-and-control safety has been provided since 9/11, but the scope of U.S. oversight remains shrouded in secrecy. The contrast between Trump’s assertion of Pakistani autonomy and persistent rumors of U.S. control underscores just how little outsiders know about the real balance of authority.
Meanwhile, the United States itself is at the center of renewed nuclear testing debate. Just before Halloween 2025, President Trump announced that the U.S. military would “immediately resume testing its nuclear weapons,” ending a 33-year hiatus. As Straight Arrow News reported, Trump’s announcement was made aboard Air Force One, minutes before meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping. When pressed for details, Trump was cryptic: “You’ll find out very soon. But we’re going to do some testing. Other countries do it. If they’re going to do it, we’re going to do it.”
Energy Secretary Chris Wright later clarified to Fox News that the new testing would not involve live nuclear detonations. The United States, he explained, already tests its launch and delivery systems, but not the warheads themselves. Thanks to the Partial Test Ban Treaty signed in 1963, underground tests remain technically legal, though the U.S. has not conducted a nuclear detonation since 1992. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by the U.S. in 1996 but never ratified, would outlaw all nuclear testing. Russia revoked its ratification in 2023, aligning its stance with that of Washington.
Retired Air Force Lieutenant General Mark Weatherington, speaking to Straight Arrow News, noted that the U.S. has “an exquisite set of data” from over a thousand tests conducted between the 1940s and 1992. Advanced modeling and simulation techniques now allow experts to assess the reliability of the nuclear stockpile without detonations. Still, Weatherington acknowledged, “If there’s concern with the reliability of the stockpile or if there’s concern that we’re redesigning the weapons to a degree that might require some additional data...then it may warrant conducting a test.” If such tests were to occur, they would likely take place in the deserts of New Mexico or Nevada.
Resuming underground nuclear tests could provide valuable data and bolster deterrence, but the risks—political, environmental, and strategic—are significant. As Daniel Schaub, a political science instructor at the University of Nebraska, told Straight Arrow News: “Maybe the administration is turning to that to, sort of, mitigate the uncertainty in international politics right now.” But Schaub also warned, “If Russia takes this as a signal, ‘well, now it’s time to build up our stockpile since the United States is,’ that could be problematic.” China, too, urged Washington to maintain the global moratorium, while the Kremlin responded with caution, emphasizing that Russia’s recent missile tests were not nuclear detonations.
The world’s nuclear landscape remains fraught with uncertainty and mistrust. Trump’s recent remarks have stirred old ghosts and new fears, exposing the fragility of deterrence and the shadowy complexities of nuclear command. As modernization and rumors swirl, the question isn’t just who holds the button—but who’s willing to push it, and at what cost.