On August 11, 2025, President Donald Trump announced a 90-day extension on the introduction of extensive tariffs against China, just as the previous agreement between the world’s two largest economies was set to expire. This last-minute move, reported by multiple outlets, signals yet another twist in the ongoing saga of US–China trade relations—a saga that’s left many global allies, especially Taiwan, watching with growing anxiety. As the United States and China circle each other in a high-stakes negotiation, the fate of smaller players hangs in the balance, their interests sometimes cast aside in pursuit of larger deals.
Trump’s approach to international negotiations is, at its core, transactional. According to analysis from the Financial Times and other sources, he sees allies as partners only as long as they deliver returns, and adversaries as both dangerous and valuable—holding concessions that can be traded for American gains. For Taiwan, this worldview introduces a serious risk: its interests could be bartered away if Beijing offers Trump something he values more.
The Trump–Putin summit earlier this year provided a telling case study. As reported by Financial Times, Trump demonstrated a willingness to engage directly with adversaries, treating negotiations not as a matter of principle, but as opportunities for high-profile engagement and, potentially, major concessions. This approach was not lost on Beijing, nor on Taipei. For Taiwan, the lesson was clear: Washington, under Trump, is prepared to make decisions that might disadvantage even its closest partners if it means securing a deal that can be touted as a domestic win.
Recent events have underscored just how quickly Taiwan’s interests can be deprioritized. In June, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te planned a transit through New York en route to Latin America. However, the Trump administration blocked the stopover, forcing Taipei to cancel the trip. According to the Financial Times, the decision followed Chinese protests and was motivated primarily by ongoing US–China trade talks. In the same context, Washington also canceled planned military discussions with Taiwan, fearing that Defense Minister Wellington Koo’s visit could jeopardize delicate negotiations with Beijing. These decisions highlight a troubling pattern: when Beijing raises objections over Taiwan, Trump doesn’t automatically reject them. Instead, he weighs whether accommodating China could unlock broader gains elsewhere.
For Taiwan, this is a dangerous precedent. If Chinese leader Xi Jinping presents Trump with concrete demands—such as halting arms sales, reducing high-level contacts, or softening Washington’s language on Taiwan—Trump may not dismiss them out of hand. Instead, he may see them as bargaining chips, useful for extracting concessions from Beijing that serve his domestic or economic agenda. The recent canceled trip and military talks serve as early signals of how easily Taiwan’s interests can be sacrificed for the sake of a “bigger deal.”
Yet, Trump’s bargaining logic doesn’t exist in a vacuum. The world’s overreliance on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry places a real constraint on how far the US president can go in trading away Taiwan’s interests. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) alone controls more than two-thirds of the global semiconductor foundry market in 2025, according to industry data. Its chips are not just in US consumer electronics—they power the defense systems Washington depends on. In parallel, Taiwan is embedding itself deeper into the artificial intelligence revolution, building what some experts describe as an "AI shield." Each advance in chipmaking translates into leaps in AI capability, making Taipei a central player in the technological competition between Washington and Beijing.
As much as Washington talks about “de-risking” supply chains and reducing dependence on Taiwan, Taipei’s technological lead remains formidable. This dependence restricts Trump’s freedom to use Taiwan as a mere bargaining chip. Doing so would undermine the very technological base that underpins US economic competitiveness and national security. As the worlds of semiconductors and AI become ever more intertwined, the costs of coercion rise. Taiwan’s strategic leverage, then, lies in ensuring Washington understands that bargaining Taiwan away would mean sacrificing technological foundations the US cannot afford to lose.
Meanwhile, the lead-up to a potential fall summit between Trump and Xi Jinping is marked by a conciliatory stance from Washington—one that illustrates how swiftly Taiwan can be placed on the negotiating table, often without warning. Decisions taken in Washington to accommodate Beijing leave Taipei confronted with a fait accompli, narrowing its ability to respond. Taiwan’s security and political space risk being eroded not through dramatic announcements, but through incremental trade-offs that add up over time.
China’s leverage only compounds the danger. Its dominance in rare earth minerals, magnets, and other critical supply chains gives Beijing tools to entice Trump into concessions over Taiwan. If framed as part of a broader economic package, even symbolic US steps could be exchanged for promises on trade or market access. The precedent would be devastating: Taiwan could be reduced to a bargaining chip, its interests subordinated to Trump’s pursuit of short-term gains.
However, the structural weight of Taiwan’s technology sector complicates this scenario. Any attempt to downgrade support for Taipei would risk undermining American supply chains at a moment when Washington is competing fiercely with Beijing for high-tech leadership. In this sense, Taiwan’s technological role limits how far Trump can realistically go in trading it away.
At the same time, domestic US politics offer mixed signals. Anti-China sentiment remains one of the few bipartisan issues in Washington as of 2025, but Trump’s decisions are guided more by calculations of leverage, trade benefits, and regional influence than by any principled commitment to Taiwan’s democracy. The Republican Party’s hawkish voices and Congress’s bipartisan rhetoric provide Taiwan with some visibility, but they don’t define the administration’s policy. Trump’s decisions are more likely to be shaped by what he sees as opportunities for leverage and domestic wins.
This leaves Taipei in a difficult position. To sustain dialogue with Washington, Taiwan may feel compelled to appease Trump—raising defense spending, highlighting its economic value, and demonstrating that it’s paying its "fair share." But appeasement offers no guarantee against abrupt shifts. Trump’s mindset is not only transactional but also unpredictable. Discarding the possibility that a trade dispute could be reignited—or that Taiwan could be pushed to the center of bargaining—would be naïve.
Elsewhere in Asia, the ripple effects of US–China tensions are just as evident. On September 7, 2025, India and China engaged in talks despite ongoing border tensions, according to recent reports. China’s export-led economy is suffering from US tariffs, with growth rates plummeting from 10% a decade ago to less than 3% today. Desperate for new markets, Beijing needs access to India, but has yet to initiate any meaningful de-escalation on the border. The dance continues, but the music is tense and uncertain.
Ultimately, Trump’s approach to international negotiations leaves Taiwan—and other regional players—living under the shadow of being treated as leverage in his pursuit of legacy-defining deals. For Taipei, the challenge is to reduce that vulnerability by broadening partnerships, expanding into emerging markets, and ensuring its technological competitiveness remains its strongest shield against being bargained away.