On December 4, 2025, a high-profile peace accord signing ceremony unfolded at the Donald J. Trump Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. The event brought together African leaders including Angolan President Joao Lourenco, Kenyan President William Ruto, Burundi President Evariste Ndayishimiye, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, and Democratic Republic of Congo President Felix Tshisekedi. Though the gathering was presented as a milestone for African diplomacy, the context surrounding U.S.-Africa relations and broader international dynamics told a more complicated story.
According to reporting by The African and analysis from global policy experts, the peace pact was less a diplomatic breakthrough and more an example of the U.S. leveraging its influence for strategic gain. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), released in November, made clear that Africa is viewed by the Trump administration primarily as a geopolitical battleground in its rivalry with China and Russia, rather than as a partner in development or stability. The NSS, a thirty-two-page document, devoted less than a single page to Africa, underscoring the continent’s peripheral status in U.S. global strategy. Instead, the focus was on securing privileged access to critical minerals—resources vital to American technology, defense, and energy industries.
This transactional approach was evident in the so-called "Washington Accords" between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Rather than a sustainable peace plan, the agreement has been criticized as an extractive contract, trading U.S. security assistance for access to mineral supply chains. Kim Heller, a political analyst writing for The African, summed up the prevailing mood: "Peace pacts are no longer moral or diplomatic achievements; they are profitable ventures, rather than being critical steps towards conflict resolution and peacekeeping."
The NSS does not shy away from this reality. U.S. security endeavors in Africa are explicitly described as transactional, with the sweet talk of partnership and mutual benefit replaced by a stark focus on advancing American interests. The document itself is candid: U.S. policy is not about "spreading ideology," but about partnerships that promote American priorities. This marks a shift from the rhetoric of development and democracy to a more calculated pursuit of power and resources, with Africa’s mineral wealth seen as a means to bolster American dominance.
According to The African, the U.S. has largely sidestepped the African Union (AU) and key regional bodies, instead favoring a selective, bilateral approach that fragments Africa’s collective bargaining power. This division is not accidental; it weakens the continent’s ability to negotiate on equal terms and makes it easier for external powers to control and exploit African resources. The NSS’s approach, as described by Heller, is “contoured on division,” rewarding compliant African states and punishing those that pursue independent foreign policies. Recent examples include the U.S. boycott of the G20 Summit in Johannesburg and the exclusion of South Africa from the December G20 Sherpas meeting in Washington—moves widely interpreted as coercive foreign policy tactics.
The G20 Summit itself, held in November 2025 in Johannesburg, was a landmark—the first time the event was hosted on African soil. South Africa, as host, set an ambitious agenda focused on solidarity, equality, and sustainability, with a particular emphasis on the needs of Africa and other developing countries. However, as reported by the Council of Councils and South African Institute of International Affairs, the summit was overshadowed by the United States’ absence. President Donald Trump’s administration not only boycotted the summit but also openly opposed South Africa’s agenda, which it saw as antithetical to its "America First" policy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, reflecting the administration’s views, skipped the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting, dismissing the summit’s theme as "a euphemism for DEI and climate change" and labeling it "anti-Americanism."
The U.S. stance at the G20 was not an isolated incident. The Trump administration has consistently expressed skepticism toward multilateral institutions, blaming them for what it calls "sovereignty-sapping intrusions." The administration’s actions culminated in the disinvitation of South Africa from the upcoming 2026 G20 Summit, which will be hosted at the Trump National Doral Miami resort. President Trump has already announced that South Africa will not be welcome, and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent has criticized the expansion of the G20, arguing that "the G20 has become the G100." Poland, now the world’s twentieth-largest economy, will be an exception, having already received an invitation from Trump.
The 2026 G20 Summit is set to break with tradition in other ways as well. The Trump administration plans to narrow the agenda, focusing almost exclusively on "removing regulatory burdens, unlocking affordable and secure energy supply chains, and pioneering new technologies and innovation." Topics like climate change, debt, development, inequality, and sustainability—longstanding priorities for many G20 members—will be left out. As James M Lindsay of the Council on Foreign Relations noted, "the Trump administration argues that focusing on the sort of core economic issues that prompted the G20’s creation nearly two decades ago is the only way to ensure that the group remains relevant." Yet this approach has sparked concerns that it will heighten inequality and reduce global cooperation, especially for the Global South.
The G20@20 review, conducted in 2025, found that the group’s expanded agenda has made it less focused and less effective at tackling major global challenges. When not faced with an immediate crisis, the G20 struggles with consensus and execution. The review suggested that a more streamlined agenda could help, but warned that limiting the group’s scope to economic issues risks undermining efforts to address development, climate, and health—areas where the G20 can have real impact.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has continued to recalibrate its military and economic engagement in Africa. In the Sahel region, countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have expelled Western military forces and shifted toward Russian security partnerships. The NSS identifies the Sahel as a critical battleground in the contest against Russian influence, prompting Washington to expand military partnerships in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire and consider new bases. In East Africa, the U.S. is deepening security alliances with Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, aiming to counter China and Gulf state influence. These moves are justified as safeguards against insurgency, but decades of U.S. militarization have often exacerbated cycles of violence rather than delivering lasting security.
Analysts warn that the U.S. tactical exclusion of continental and regional institutions poses a direct threat to Africa’s sovereignty. The Pan-Africanist vision, once a beacon for self-sufficiency and prosperity, is now under pressure. As Heller argues, "Africa must recognize its own strength and stop serving as a willing partner in its exploitation." Revitalizing Agenda 2063—the African Union’s blueprint for a self-sufficient continent—and strengthening the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are seen as urgent priorities for reclaiming sovereignty and resisting neocolonial influences.
The road ahead for Africa and the global order is fraught with challenges. Whether the continent can unite to assert its interests, or whether it will remain a pawn in larger geopolitical games, remains to be seen. But as the events of 2025 have shown, the stakes could not be higher.