When U.S. President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met in the Oval Office in November 2025, the world watched for signs of a diplomatic breakthrough. Instead, the meeting delivered a mix of blunt remarks, high-stakes deals, and a reminder of the tangled web that is Middle Eastern diplomacy, according to reporting from Slate, The Washington Post, Israel Hayom, and Vox.
The session began with sweeping statements and ended with Trump’s controversial dismissal of the 2018 murder of U.S.-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi. "Things happen," Trump remarked, sitting beside the crown prince the CIA believes ordered the killing. While Mohammed bin Salman, often referred to as MbS, called the murder a "huge mistake" and appeared to show some contrition, Trump took a different tack. He disparaged Khashoggi, saying, "a lot of people didn’t like that gentleman," and exonerated MbS outright: "He knew nothing about it, and we can leave it at that." Slate’s Fred Kaplan went so far as to claim Trump may have uttered "the most appalling remark of his presidency."
Despite the controversy, the meeting produced tangible—if conditional—results. Trump announced Saudi Arabia would receive "major non-NATO ally" status, a significant upgrade in diplomatic terms. He also agreed to sell the kingdom advanced F-35 fighter jets and AI chips. In return, Saudi Arabia pledged to invest nearly $1 trillion in the United States. However, as The Washington Post noted, the Saudis gave no timeline for this "far-fetched figure," which is roughly the size of their country’s annual economic output.
Yet the deals came with caveats. According to Israel Hayom, Trump made the sale of F-35 jets subject to two key conditions. First, the vast Saudi investments previously announced had to start materializing—a nod to the fact that, in Trump’s earlier term, hundreds of billions in Saudi pledges had resulted in only a trickle of actual funds. Second, Saudi Arabia was expected to take practical steps toward normalization with Israel and entry into the Abraham Accords, the landmark set of agreements that saw several Arab nations establish formal ties with Israel.
During the meeting, Trump pressed MbS to make at least a symbolic gesture toward normalization, pointing to United Arab Emirates leader Mohammed bin Zayed as an example of the benefits of joining the Abraham Accords. Bin Salman, however, cited internal difficulties and the weight of Saudi public opinion, refusing to budge on the issue. As a result, Trump’s offer of advanced weaponry remained conditional, and the hoped-for diplomatic breakthrough with Israel stalled.
The nuclear issue was similarly fraught. Saudi Arabia sought U.S. approval to enrich uranium on its own soil—a request Washington flatly denied, largely due to Israeli objections. Instead, Trump agreed to help the Saudis establish a nuclear energy facility, but only if it was built by American companies. The United Arab Emirates, notably, has a similar arrangement for its own nuclear reactor.
Behind the diplomatic posturing lay a broader strategy. As The Washington Post’s David Ignatius observed, it makes "cold-hearted" sense for the U.S. to maintain close ties with MbS, who could rule Saudi Arabia for decades and whose modernization efforts—such as neutering the religious police and empowering women—are seen as crucial for the future security of the Middle East. MbS is even working to export this liberalizing agenda to other regions, including the West Bank and Syria.
But the relationship is not without its critics. Joshua Keating of Vox pointed out that Trump is hardly the first president to conclude that the U.S.-Saudi relationship is "too important to let human rights get in the way." In 2020, then-candidate Joe Biden promised to make Saudi Arabia a "global pariah" over the Khashoggi murder. Yet, when oil prices soared after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Biden himself traveled to Riyadh in 2022 and exchanged a now-infamous fist bump with MbS. For all the rhetoric, Saudi Arabia still sees America as its key defense partner—even as it forges closer economic ties with China and signs a defense pact with Pakistan.
Meanwhile, U.S. hopes that the recent Gaza ceasefire would serve as a springboard for expanding the Abraham Accords have run aground. Israel Hayom reported that Saudi opposition to normalization is seen in Washington as empowering Hamas, the group blocking progress toward ending the war. The Americans had hoped that Saudi participation would tip the balance, but bin Salman’s reluctance has left the process stalled.
Efforts to stabilize Gaza and plan for its future continue elsewhere. At a multinational headquarters in Kiryat Gat, Israel, representatives from 24 countries—including Bahrain, which recently joined the working teams—are collaborating on security, humanitarian aid, civilian governance, reconstruction, and long-term planning for Gaza. The headquarters is organized into three main floors: Israeli, American, and multinational. The United Arab Emirates has the largest contingent apart from Israel and the U.S., and working groups are tackling everything from monitoring security and coordinating humanitarian aid to preparing for the reconstruction of Gaza’s neighborhoods, schools, and infrastructure.
Despite the good atmosphere at the Kiryat Gat headquarters, progress remains slow. The creation of a multinational force for Gaza is still a distant prospect, and most of the plans exist only on paper. On the ground, Israeli-controlled areas in Gaza are seeing the first steps of rebuilding, with humanitarian zones, new neighborhoods, and public buildings serving as pilot projects for the future reconstruction effort.
The diplomatic deadlock is further complicated by regional actors. Turkey, which previously played a significant role in ceasefire negotiations and in persuading Hamas to release hostages, has now stepped back. According to an Arab diplomatic source cited by Israel Hayom, Turkey’s withdrawal followed Israel’s veto against including Turkish troops in a planned multinational force for Gaza. Turkey still wields influence over Hamas, whose financial hub is based in Istanbul, but is currently choosing not to use it.
For its part, Hamas is holding firm, demanding that the Rafah Crossing be opened and that more supply trucks be allowed into Gaza before talks resume. An Israeli source noted that ensuring supplies do not fall into Hamas’ hands is "nearly impossible." American officials remain hopeful that the bodies of the last two deceased hostages will be recovered soon, a small but significant step in a broader stalemate.
As the dust settles on Trump’s meeting with MbS, the core dilemma remains: the U.S.-Saudi relationship is as vital as ever, but also fraught with moral and strategic compromises. With Saudi Arabia deepening ties with China and other regional powers, and with peace in the Middle East still elusive, the world is left to wonder—not just whether the U.S. can stomach its partnership with Saudi Arabia, but whether Saudi Arabia still needs an alliance with a country as unpredictable as the United States.