As the United States and India approach a critical juncture in their bilateral relationship, tensions over tariffs, shifting strategic doctrines, and diverging regional priorities threaten to upend more than two decades of painstakingly built cooperation. On December 9, 2025, policy expert Dhruva Jaishankar sounded the alarm in a written statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, warning that the US-India partnership now faces a “political standstill” driven by disputes over trade and Washington’s renewed engagement with Pakistan’s military leadership, according to IANS.
Jaishankar, Executive Director of the Observer Research Foundation America, emphasized that the relationship—bolstered steadily since 1998 through economic convergence and Indo-Pacific coordination—could lose momentum at a time when both nations confront China’s expanding military presence and regional instability. “The present situation risks jeopardizing mutually-beneficial cooperation on the ambitious bilateral agenda outlined by President Trump and Prime Minister Modi in February 2025… and strategic cooperation between the two countries in the Quad, in the Middle East, and on global affairs,” he wrote.
Over nearly three decades, US-India ties have advanced through milestones such as the lifting of sanctions in 1999, the 2008 civil nuclear agreement, expanded defense interoperability, and India’s integration into US-led coordination on space, critical minerals, and artificial intelligence. Yet, as Jaishankar noted, these gains are now at risk. He cited China’s increasingly assertive military posture—including incursions along the disputed land boundary with India, the 2020 Galwan clashes, and “the largest naval build-ups in history”—as a fundamental driver of strategic convergence. “China’s military capabilities now rival those of the United States,” Jaishankar warned, underscoring the urgency of deepening cooperation among regional partners through initiatives like the Quad’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness program.
But recent events have frayed the fabric of this partnership. India’s retaliatory strikes on Pakistan following a deadly terrorist attack in April 2025, and the United States’ subsequent high-profile engagement with Pakistan’s military leadership, have jolted bilateral ties. Jaishankar reminded lawmakers of Pakistan’s longstanding support for terrorist proxies, arguing that “Pakistan’s continued support for terrorism – and its contributions to conflict and instability in the broader region – still constitute a major political and security challenge.”
Trade, too, has become a flashpoint. US tariffs imposed after the collapse of Bilateral Trade Agreement talks are now “among the highest on any country,” threatening exporters, workers, and investors on both sides. Jaishankar cautioned, “The longer these duties remain in place, the more they will be seen in India as an act of political hostility.”
Despite these strains, cooperation in 2025 has not ground to a halt. The two countries have inked a new 10-year Defense Framework Agreement, expanded military exercises, completed major defense sales, and celebrated milestones such as NASA-supported human spaceflight and the co-developed NISAR satellite launch. India’s landmark $1.3-billion LNG import deal with the United States further highlights the enduring economic potential of the partnership.
Yet, as the global landscape shifts, so too does the nature of US-India engagement. In an opinion piece published on December 8, 2025, Syed Akbaruddin, former Permanent Representative of India to the UN, analyzed the latest US National Security Strategy (NSS) and its implications for India. According to NDTV, the 2025 NSS marks a significant strategic recalibration: the US is narrowing its global focus, prioritizing hemispheric security, elevating geoeconomics, and adopting a transactional approach to partnerships—all to preserve American primacy in the contest with China.
India, Akbaruddin observed, is now depicted as a functional partner in a system designed to outcompete China. The NSS positions India as a contributor to the Quad, a partner in critical minerals and infrastructure coalitions (including in Africa), and a key player in maritime security from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. US concerns over China’s coercive actions, intellectual property theft, and control over minerals and manufacturing align closely with India’s own de-risking and diversification strategies.
However, alignment does not mean equivalence. While the US NSS is focused on Taiwan and the First Island Chain, India’s China challenge remains primarily continental, involving the unresolved Line of Actual Control and Himalayan tensions. Delhi, Akbaruddin stressed, has no interest in becoming entangled in Taiwan-related conflicts or East Asian war-gaming scenarios. Another notable shift is cartographic: South Asia is recast as an Indo-Pacific theater focused on competition with China, with less emphasis on regional balance or Indo-Pakistani issues than in previous US strategy documents.
This American minimalism—where Washington engages selectively, expects alignment, but may not offer proportional political capital—presents both opportunity and risk for India. As Akbaruddin put it, “India could become a convenience partner, invoked when useful and ignored when inconvenient.” The partnership, he warned, risks devolving into a negotiation over deliverables: maritime presence, standards alignment, export-control coordination, and defense interoperability. US expectations may rise faster than its willingness to respect Indian red lines on China, Russia, or the broader Global South.
So, what’s the way forward for India? Akbaruddin advises a multi-pronged approach. First, focus on the global commons—areas like maritime domain awareness, Indian Ocean security, humanitarian assistance, and anti-piracy—where interests are aligned and entanglement is minimal. Second, elevate the economic terms of engagement: India should insist on concrete outcomes such as co-development in defense, predictable technology flows, serious investment in Indian manufacturing and digital ecosystems, and reliable access to American and allied markets.
Third, enforce separability of theaters: deterrence on the Line of Actual Control should not be used as a bargaining chip for Taiwan contingencies. “Taiwan is not India’s war,” Akbaruddin emphasized, urging quiet but firm communication of this stance to Washington. Fourth, shape coalitions in Africa and the Global South to reflect Indian priorities such as local value addition, debt sustainability, and respect for national agency. And finally, widen partnerships with Europe, Japan, Australia, and Canada, while continuing engagement with Russia, to ensure no single relationship constrains India’s sovereign choices.
Jaishankar, for his part, remains optimistic about the partnership’s potential across four pillars: trade, energy, technology, and defense. He highlighted upcoming opportunities in artificial intelligence, critical minerals, semiconductor supply chains, and defense co-production under the US-India TRUST initiative. But as both experts make clear, the days of automatic alignment are over. In a world of shifting coalitions and selective commitments, the United States is playing a new game with clarity—and India must do the same, unapologetically and on its own terms.
With the stakes higher than ever, only careful negotiation, mutual respect, and a willingness to adapt will ensure that the US-India partnership continues to thrive in a rapidly changing world.