In a momentous week for Middle Eastern diplomacy, two events have signaled a dramatic reshaping of the region’s alliances and priorities. On Monday, November 10, 2025, President Ahmed al-Sharaa of Syria will become the first Syrian leader ever to set foot in the White House, marking a landmark in US-Syrian relations. Meanwhile, Russia’s engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has reached new heights, with expanding economic ties, direct flights, and a growing portfolio of pragmatic cooperation—all against the backdrop of a shifting global order. These developments, reported by AFP and ORF Middle East, not only underscore the fluidity of Middle Eastern geopolitics but also highlight the complex interplay of old rivalries, emerging partnerships, and the enduring influence of global powers.
President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Washington is nothing short of historic. As AFP notes, Sharaa, a former jihadist whose rebel forces ousted Bashar al-Assad in late 2024, is seeking to end Syria’s long isolation after more than a decade of brutal civil war and international sanctions. The United Nations Security Council’s decision last Thursday to lift sanctions on Sharaa—drafted by the US—cleared the way for this unprecedented trip. US ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz stated that Sharaa’s government is “working hard to fulfil its commitments on countering terrorism and narcotics,” reflecting a significant change in Washington’s stance.
Sharaa’s journey from militant leader to international statesman has been swift and, to some, surprising. Once affiliated with Al-Qaeda, his group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was only recently delisted as a terrorist organization by Washington in July 2025. Since seizing power, Syria’s new authorities have sought to distance themselves from their violent past, aiming to present a moderate image acceptable to both Syrians and the international community. In May 2025, Sharaa met President Donald Trump in Riyadh, laying the groundwork for deeper engagement.
The White House meeting is expected to focus on Syria’s potential inclusion in the US-led international coalition against the Islamic State (IS). US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack expressed optimism earlier this month, saying Sharaa will “hopefully” sign an agreement to join the alliance. In a further sign of deepening ties, the US plans to establish a military base at Mazzeh military airport near Damascus, intended to coordinate humanitarian aid and monitor developments between Syria and Israel—a move confirmed by Syrian diplomatic sources to AFP.
Sharaa’s visit is not just about security. Reconstruction looms as Syria’s most daunting challenge after 13 years of war. The World Bank, in its October 2025 assessment, placed the conservative cost of rebuilding Syria at a staggering $216 billion. According to Nick Heras of the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, “Sharaa wants Trump’s blessing to unlock billions of dollars... both to kickstart the rehabilitation of Syria and to cement his control over the country indefinitely.” For Sharaa, international legitimacy and financial support go hand in hand, as he seeks to consolidate power and rebuild a shattered nation.
Direct negotiations between Syria and Israel have also begun since Assad’s downfall. While the two countries remain technically at war, Israel has deployed troops in a UN-patrolled buffer zone since December 2024 and launched hundreds of strikes in Syria without retaliation from Damascus. Trump hopes that Syria will eventually normalize ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords, following the lead of several other Arab states. Sharaa, for his part, has expressed hope for a security deal to ease tensions, though he has played down the prospect of formal recognition.
Meanwhile, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who played a pivotal role in defeating IS, are negotiating their integration into Syria’s military—a move that could further stabilize the country and strengthen its new leadership. The majority of US troops in Syria remain in the northeast, supporting the SDF and monitoring the evolving situation.
As Syria seeks new partners and legitimacy, Russia is also recalibrating its relationships across the Middle East, particularly with the Gulf states. According to ORF Middle East, the Russia–GCC Strategic Dialogue held last month and the launch of direct flights between Saudi Arabia and Moscow are just the latest signs of a deepening partnership. Trade between Russia and the GCC has soared, increasing sevenfold from $7.6 billion in 2021 to much higher levels by 2024. Yet, as the report notes, Russia still trails far behind China, the EU, and India as a trading partner for the Gulf, with much of the recent surge driven by Gulf imports of discounted Russian oil sanctioned by the West.
This relationship is best described as pragmatic and issue-based, rather than a full-fledged strategic alignment. Russia, isolated from the West due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, needs partners. The Gulf states, for their part, are pursuing a policy of multi-alignment—balancing ties with the US, Russia, and China to maximize their own leverage in a changing global order. A 2025 Saudi poll found that 57 percent of respondents now believe it is important to maintain good relations with Russia, a notable increase from previous years.
Counterterrorism has emerged as a significant area of cooperation. With Islam as the second-largest religion in Russia—and the dominant faith in many post-Soviet Central Asian states—Moscow is acutely aware of the threat posed by Islamist extremism. Joint efforts with the Gulf have included information sharing and multilateral cooperation under the UN Joint Plan of Action, especially in the wake of the Chechen conflict and the rise of transnational terrorist networks.
Russia’s involvement in the region is not limited to the Gulf. It has established its first naval base in Africa, in Sudan, and continues to support the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. While this alliance with Iran has sometimes strained Russia’s relations with the Gulf states—who still view Tehran as a primary threat—recent rapprochements, such as the 2023 Saudi-Iran thaw, have somewhat eased tensions. The Gulf states are also expanding their influence in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa, sometimes in competition with Russia.
Diplomatically, the Gulf states have played a key mediating role in global crises. Saudi Arabia hosted the first round of US–Russia talks aimed at ending the war in Ukraine and has helped broker multiple prisoner-of-war exchanges. The UAE joined the BRICS group in 2024, and Saudi Arabia is considering membership, reflecting a broader trend toward engagement in multilateral institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Union.
Yet, for all this activity, the United States remains the dominant external power in the Gulf. Russia’s influence, while growing, is still overshadowed by America’s longstanding military, economic, and diplomatic presence. The current flurry of engagement—whether Syria’s new outreach to Washington or Russia’s pragmatic dealings with the GCC—reflects a region in motion, adapting to new realities but still anchored by old power structures.
This week’s developments offer a glimpse into the future of the Middle East: one defined less by rigid alliances and more by flexible, pragmatic partnerships. As leaders like Ahmed al-Sharaa seek new legitimacy and as Russia and the Gulf states expand their cooperation, the region edges closer to a multipolar order—one where opportunity and uncertainty go hand in hand.