One year after the dramatic collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s decades-long rule, Syria stands at a crossroads, its future shaped by a whirlwind of diplomatic breakthroughs, internal challenges, and persistent regional tensions. Under the transitional leadership of President Ahmad al-Sharaa, the war-torn nation is attempting to rebuild not just its shattered cities, but also its very identity—both at home and on the world stage.
The shift is nothing short of remarkable. According to Shafaq News and Anadolu Agency, Syria’s new government has achieved more diplomatic engagements in a single year than the Assad regime managed in more than half a century. Omer Ozkizilcik, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project, put it plainly: “The new Syrian government had more diplomatic engagements with the international community in a year than the Assad regime had in 54 years. This is quite incredible.”
This burst of activity follows the final days of Assad’s rule, when, in December 2024, he fled to Russia as rebel forces toppled the Baath Party’s grip. Sharaa’s transitional administration, formed in January 2025, inherited a country battered by fourteen years of conflict, with at least 580,000 dead and 13 million displaced, as reported by Anadolu Agency. Syria’s pariah status, cemented by some of the world’s toughest sanctions, left it isolated and impoverished.
Yet, in a twist few would have predicted only a year ago, the new leadership has managed to partially break that isolation. Western and Arab capitals have reopened channels, and Washington now holds the key to the most consequential file: sanctions relief and access to global finance. “This reflects growing institutional capacity and a more coherent foreign-policy approach,” Dr. Eliyan Masaad, a Syrian politician and coordinator of the Secular Democratic Front, told Shafaq News. He called it “a breakthrough in undoing Syria’s isolation and rebuilding balanced relations with the United States, Russia, the European Union, and Arab states.”
Indeed, the symbolism has been powerful. In a move that stunned many observers, US President Donald Trump hosted President Al-Sharaa at the White House prior to December 8, 2025—a clear signal that the era of total isolation had ended. The meeting was seen in Western capitals as a shift to conditional engagement with Syria’s new leadership. Ozkizilcik explained, “Him visiting the White House was a message from the Trump administration that the US is encouraging this new Syrian government and is normalizing relations with Syria.”
Russia, too, has wasted no time redefining its ties with Damascus, after years of backing the old regime. Sharaa’s international outreach has made him a figure in whom many external actors now invest hope, though as Heiko Wimmen of the International Crisis Group cautioned, “Washington’s support appears limited when it comes to restraining Israel in southern Syria.”
On the economic front, the diplomatic thaw has already yielded tangible results. The European Union lifted all economic restrictions not tied to security concerns, and the World Bank restored Syria’s eligibility for financing after decades. The European Commission pledged €175 million for recovery efforts, and President Sharaa announced that Syria attracted $28 billion in the first six months after amendments to investment laws. Still, as Ozkizilcik warned, US sanctions—especially the far-reaching Caesar Act—remain a major barrier. Trump has twice waived these sanctions for six months at a time, but investors remain wary. “These sanctions need to be lifted altogether so that investors can feel safe. Syria needs investments because 90% of the people there live under the poverty line and the country is destroyed,” Ozkizilcik told Anadolu Agency.
Meanwhile, the internal picture is far from settled. The new government faces daunting challenges in mending the country’s social contract and managing its restive peripheries. The March 10 Agreement between Al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi, intended as a roadmap for unifying command structures and administrative authority in the Kurdish-led northeast, remains stalled due to disputes over governance and decentralization. Dr. Farid Saadoun, a Kurdish academic and political analyst, told Shafaq News that “any real settlement requires a long process involving national dialogue on the structure of the state, the formation of a unity government, parliamentary and presidential elections, and drafting a new constitution.”
In the Druze-majority province of Suwayda, the situation is equally complex. Protests that erupted in August 2023 over fuel prices quickly transformed into a movement demanding the implementation of UN Resolution 2254, the release of detainees, and—eventually—the regime’s fall. Even after Assad’s ouster, Suwayda remains restive. Since mid-August 2025, demonstrations have carried explicit autonomy slogans, with some locals calling for independence or special administrative status. The community is split between those who seek broad decentralization within a united Syria and others who advocate more far-reaching forms of self-government.
Adding to the volatility, Israel has expanded into the demilitarized zone established by the 1974 Disengagement Agreement since Assad’s collapse, now controlling a broad strip of Syrian territory as a self-declared buffer. The United Nations has documented hundreds of ceasefire violations and repeated Israeli airstrikes targeting suspected weapons depots, Iranian-linked groups, or Syrian army positions. President Al-Sharaa has accused Israel of “fighting ghosts” and exporting its post-Gaza crisis into Syrian territory, calling the buffer-zone expansion an “actual occupation.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, insists that any future arrangement must include a deep buffer extending from the outskirts of Damascus to Mount Hermon.
This dynamic has complicated Druze grievances, with Israel hinting at the need to protect minorities while Damascus claims to be the guardian of territorial unity. Many in Suwayda view outside protection with suspicion, fearing it could make the province a bargaining chip between regional powers.
All the while, Syria’s economy remains fragile. Fourteen years of war have devastated infrastructure, industry, and agriculture. The currency is weak, inflation rampant, and unemployment widespread. Hundreds of thousands rely on assistance or remittances. Experts anticipate a partial easing of the Caesar Act by year-end, which could open the door to limited foreign investment. But as Wimmen observed, “Sanctions lifting may not be sufficient to build trust towards foreign investment as long as the internal situation remains volatile.”
For all the progress, the fate of Syria’s minorities remains a critical test. Syrian Christians, long marginalized, are seeking a more visible role in the army, security forces, and political institutions. Dr. Eliyan Masaad has called for temporary transitional quotas to correct deep imbalances, warning that failure to do so risks deepening sectarian insecurity. The Alawite community, once the backbone of the security apparatus, now faces an uncertain future, with lingering tensions on the coast and questions about their integration into new security structures.
President Sharaa’s participation in global forums—including a historic address at the UN General Assembly and attendance at COP30 in Brazil—signals Syria’s intent to rejoin multilateral diplomacy. “It was a first for the Syrian nation, and his message was basically that there is a new Syria … that this Syria wants not to be a source of threats and security risks, but a source of stability,” Ozkizilcik explained.
Looking ahead, analysts expect Sharaa’s diplomacy to expand into Europe, with negotiations likely to focus on refugees, reconstruction, and institutional reform. But the unresolved issue of Israel looms large. Damascus has pushed for a new security mechanism to restore the 1974 disengagement line, but Israel has shown no willingness to engage. Since Assad’s fall, Israel has carried out more than 1,000 airstrikes in Syria and occupied new territory in the south. Despite these provocations, Damascus has refrained from retaliation, hoping to preserve diplomatic momentum.
The coming year will test whether Syria can turn external openness into tangible reforms and build a state that is both inclusive and stable. If it succeeds, the country may finally begin to emerge from its long, dark tunnel. If not, Syrians may look back at this moment as another missed opportunity—one that promised a new republic, but delivered only a rearranged version of the old.