On December 8, 2025, Syrians from Damascus to Idlib, and from the streets of Gaziantep to Berlin and Stockholm, poured into public squares to mark the first anniversary of Bashar al-Assad’s fall. The scenes, as reported by Alhurra and The Economist, were strikingly similar: large marches, revolutionary chants, and the green-white-black flags of the new Syria held aloft. Faces worn down by over a decade of war now showed glimmers of hope, if only for a moment. Yet, beneath the jubilant noise, a somber truth lingered—one year is hardly enough to mend the wounds of more than 13 years of conflict. The work of rebuilding, both physical and psychological, has only just begun.
The fall of Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, was a seismic event for Syria and the broader region. The interim authority quickly established a transitional government, adopted a constitutional declaration, and organized indirect parliamentary elections. These early steps, however, have drawn mixed reviews. Human Rights Watch criticized what it called “centralized decision-making” within the new authority, warning that the political transition remains superficial and does not guarantee real institutional independence.
Supporters of the interim government point to meaningful gains, including external engagement, sanctions relief, and the removal of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from the list of terrorist organizations. Wael Alwan, executive director of the Jusoor Center for Studies, told Alhurra that Assad’s fall “marked a decisive shift that moved Syria, after long years of suffering, into a new phase in terms of its regional and international positioning.” Alwan emphasized that reshaping foreign relations is now a top priority for the new authority, a goal the former regime failed to achieve despite repeated opportunities. He argued that the transitional phase “cannot be judged by ideal standards,” given the complex internal and external challenges, especially Israeli interventions and ongoing security crises. Centralization, he admitted, is a shortcoming but a necessary tool for managing sensitive files during the transition.
Some analysts have called for a more inclusive, parliamentary system, but authorities argue that temporary centralization is needed before any move toward decentralization. Nawar Shaban, a researcher at the Arab Center for the Study of Contemporary Syria, described the first year as “good,” noting that “the process has made significant progress, but still has much more to achieve on all fronts.” No country emerging from a long conflict, he argued, “can stand on its feet immediately,” citing Bosnia, Congo, and Iraq as cautionary tales.
Yet not all assessments are positive. Abdullah Amin al-Hallak, a writer and researcher, took a harsher view. He told Alhurra, “We are dealing with Islamist groups, most prominently Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, whose history is well known to Syrians—and Iraqis—and one that goes back to a time when it was part of ISIS before rebranding. A jihadist Salafi group ruling a diverse country like Syria, with its sects and ethnicities, under a rigid Islamist model, cannot bring progress—not for the country and not even for Assad’s victims.”
The transitional period remains fragile, especially in the face of sporadic sectarian violence in the south and coastal regions. The U.N. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria has warned of this fragility. Hallak pointed to “the horrific massacres” against Alawites and Druze in March and July 2024, which killed, injured, and displaced thousands. He accused the authorities of responsibility and cover-up, citing the outcomes of investigative committees and the leadership’s rhetoric. “There is an ongoing cycle of violence, particularly against minorities, often with the authorities’ involvement,” Hallak said, echoing Human Rights Watch’s conclusion that the government’s inability—or unwillingness—to stop such abuses undermines confidence in its ability to maintain peace and safeguard rights.
Alwan, on the other hand, argued that the government must send clear assurances to rival factions, shifting competition from armed confrontation to politics. “Once real elections and genuine power rotation are established, reverting to weapons becomes socially unacceptable—and the social contract takes over.” Shaban noted that efforts to reform security are ongoing, particularly within the Interior Ministry, and that a “unified Syrian national narrative has emerged,” despite persistent challenges.
Justice, however, remains elusive. In August, the head of Syria’s National Agency for Absentees estimated that more than 300,000 people disappeared over the decades of Assad family rule, including during the post-revolution war. The agency, formed in May 2025, has faced criticism from rights groups for limiting its mandate to crimes of the previous regime and excluding abuses by other factions. Zeina Shahla, the agency’s media adviser, told Reuters that the mandate “covers any missing Syrian, regardless of the circumstances,” but acknowledged that exhuming mass graves may not begin before 2027. Hallak argued, “There is no serious pursuit of justice in this country,” pointing to former regime-linked businessmen and militia leaders accused of war crimes who have now “rehabilitated themselves and now preach about ‘societal peace,’ while selectively targeting other former regime figures for arrest.”
Ahmed al-Sharaa, the transitional president, has become a figure of intense scrutiny and debate. During the Liberation Day festivities, he stood on an improvised podium in Damascus, promising to build a “Syria for all Syrians.” In his speech, he declared, “The Assad regime sowed discord and doubt, erecting walls that divided Syrians. We declare a complete break with this legacy, an end to that era, and the beginning of a new chapter—a chapter of nation-building.”
Al-Sharaa’s rise is nothing if not remarkable. According to The Economist, he built an independent regime in Idlib by skillfully exploiting ISIS and al-Qaeda, then distancing himself from both. He organized governance in the province so effectively that it became the envy of the country. Reports of his outreach to Ismailis and Christians, and his policies of religious tolerance—allowing alcohol sales, women to walk without head coverings, and guards to protect Christian churches—suggest a pragmatic, not a jihadist, approach. Yet skeptics in the West, Russia, and Israel view his transformation as little more than a change of costume, dubbing him “a chameleon” and “the great pretender.”
Despite these doubts, al-Sharaa has achieved a level of international engagement unprecedented in Syrian history. In October 2025, he visited Moscow and received a congratulatory telegram from Vladimir Putin. In November, he became the first Syrian head of state to visit the White House, where President Donald Trump called him a “great guy.” Al-Sharaa claimed that Syria had achieved “unprecedented regional and international balance not seen for a century,” with good relations with the U.S., Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE. The United States canceled a $10 million bounty on his head, and Western sanctions have begun to ease. Even so, his cooperation with Russia, whose military had bombed Sunni areas during the war, remains a sore point for many Syrians.
Yet, not all is well on the home front. The new government’s control does not extend to the entire country. The Kurds in the northeast maintain near-complete autonomy, and the Druze in the south are deeply divided, with some seeking secession and support from Israel. The economy lies in ruins, most Syrians still live in poverty, and the humanitarian crisis is far from over. According to the UNHCR, more than 3 million Syrians have returned home since Assad’s fall, including 1.2 million from abroad, but 4.5 million remain refugees in neighboring countries. The UN’s 2025 humanitarian appeal for Syria, totaling $1.5 billion, has been funded at only 33 percent, leaving millions without adequate shelter or basic services.
Alwan summed up the situation: Syria is moving along the path of a successful transition, but progress depends on “lifting sanctions, halting interventions that fuel chaos, and giving the transition the space it needs to achieve its goals.” For now, Syrians celebrate the end of an era, but the road ahead remains long and uncertain, with the promise of a new Syria still hanging in the balance.
