As the Russo-Ukrainian war grinds into yet another year, the search for a path to peace and stability in Eastern Europe remains as complex and fraught as ever. On September 3, 2025, Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson made headlines by announcing that Sweden is open to selling advanced Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine—but only once the conflict with Russia ends. According to Breaking Defense, Jonson clarified, "We have a dialogue also with Ukraine, and since they certainly expressed an interest for the Gripen system … predominantly Gripen Echo, the new version that Sweden, Brazil are operating as well," adding that such a sale would be a "long-term endeavor or building a common air force capability as well." Any possible deal, he emphasized, "depends" on the war ending and must be part of a long-term development plan for Ukraine's air force.
Ukraine's interest in acquiring the Gripen platform is no secret. For years, Kyiv has sought deliveries of older Gripen C/D combat aircraft to bolster its defenses against Moscow. However, those efforts have been stymied in part by NATO allies, who requested Sweden hold back on sending the jets so Ukrainian pilots could focus on mastering the F-16s already promised by Western partners. The idea was to avoid overwhelming Ukraine's air force with too many different aircraft types at once—a practical concern, given the steep learning curves and logistical challenges involved in integrating new systems during wartime.
Despite these hurdles, Sweden has not abandoned its support for Ukraine. In September 2024, Stockholm approved the donation of Gripen spare parts valued at 2.3 billion SEK (about $214 million), providing critical support to Ukraine's embattled air force. Jonson, who met with his Ukrainian counterpart in Kyiv the week prior to his September 2025 statement, acknowledged ongoing discussions about possibly gifting Gripen C/D aircraft in the future. "We stand open to discuss" such a move, he told Breaking Defense.
Saab, the Swedish aerospace giant behind the Gripen, is also on board. In February 2025, Saab CEO Micael Johansson remarked that Gripen E aircraft should be sent to Kyiv "over time," but stressed, "it's purely a political decision" to begin with deliveries of the C/D models. On September 2, 2025, Saab's head of media relations Mattias Rådström stated, "Saab would of course fully support Sweden in such an endeavour with Ukraine and in the suitability of Gripen E for Ukrainian needs. We believe there is no better fighter for the role."
While Sweden's long-term commitment to Ukraine's future air force is clear, the present moment is marked by uncertainty and shifting geopolitical winds. According to an analysis published on September 3, 2025, in New Eastern Europe, Western support for Ukraine is beginning to wane. The United States, once Kyiv's most steadfast ally, is now pursuing a more unpredictable policy, and the global debate is shifting from talk of "Victory Plans" to "Peace Negotiations" and "Concessions." Yet, even as diplomats search for a diplomatic off-ramp, Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian cities continue unabated, with civilians—including children—bearing the brunt.
The article draws historical parallels between the current conflict and the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, particularly the decisive role played by the United States in ending the Bosnian War through the Dayton Agreement. Back then, American military intervention—specifically, NATO airstrikes—forced the aggressors to the negotiating table. In 1995, NATO conducted 3,515 sorties and dropped 1,026 bombs on Serbian positions over 15 days, with the US responsible for 2,318 airstrikes, or nearly 66% of all operations. The subsequent peace deal was hammered out in Dayton, Ohio, and ended the bloodshed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
But can the Dayton model be replicated in Ukraine? The analysts at New Eastern Europe are skeptical. The differences between the two conflicts are stark. Serbia, in the 1990s, was a regional power, whereas Russia is a global player with nuclear weapons and a veto at the United Nations Security Council. These factors, the article notes, make Western military intervention far more complicated—and dangerous. "One should not expect a similar conclusion to the war, at least in the near future," the authors write. A 'Dayton-2' peace process for Ukraine would require a confluence of favorable conditions: significant Ukrainian territorial gains, internal instability in Russia, visible fatigue over the war within Russia, and decisive action by the United States. At present, none of these seem likely.
Meanwhile, Sweden continues to deepen its defense ties in the region. On September 2, 2025, Jonson signed a Letter of Intent with Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz at the MSPO 2025 defense expo, pledging closer bilateral cooperation on defense materiel, development, innovation, and the defense industry. This new pact fits within a broader "umbrella agreement" between Stockholm and Warsaw, which is laser-focused on implementation, including NATO-enhanced air policing deployments by Swedish Gripens to Poland. Sweden has also made a "competitive and attractive" offer of the Saab Kockums A26 submarine design to Poland's Orka program, though the final decision rests with Warsaw.
Further strengthening regional defense cooperation, Saab and Poland's largest defense contractor, PGZ Group, signed a Memorandum of Understanding at MSPO 2025 to explore joint projects in multi-domain defense solutions. Saab also launched strategic cooperation with Polish firm WB Group on UAV systems, naval solutions, and border protection systems. These moves underscore Sweden's commitment to collective security in the face of Russian aggression, even as the larger question of peace in Ukraine remains unresolved.
Looking back, the Yugoslav experience offers both inspiration and caution. The Dayton Agreement succeeded because American diplomacy was backed by overwhelming military force. In the current conflict, the United States remains a potential global referee, but its position is less decisive and less active than it was three decades ago. Without a comprehensive strategy that combines diplomacy with real military and economic support, achieving a just peace in Ukraine appears unlikely. As New Eastern Europe concludes, "The lessons of Yugoslavia should be studied as an example of an effective combination of force and diplomacy, but we should not try to transfer them literally to the largest war of the 21st century."
In the end, Sweden's willingness to provide advanced military technology to Ukraine—once the guns fall silent—signals a long-term commitment to rebuilding and securing Eastern Europe. But for now, the path to peace remains as elusive as ever, shaped by the hard realities of geopolitics, shifting alliances, and the enduring shadow of war.