Thousands of troops from Indonesia, the United States, and a host of other nations wrapped up the largest-ever Super Garuda Shield military exercise on September 3, 2025, marking a significant moment for regional defense cooperation amid a tense Indo-Pacific climate. The annual drills, which began on August 24 in Jakarta and extended to Baturaja and Dabo Singkep on Sumatra island, brought together 6,500 soldiers from 13 countries, including first-time participants and observers from across Asia and beyond. This year’s exercise was notable not just for its scale, but for the deepening web of military partnerships it showcased—including a newly formalized defense pact between Canada and Indonesia.
As reported by the Associated Press, the closing live-fire demonstration saw long-range artillery, rocket barrages, integrated airstrikes, and coordinated ground maneuvers. Indonesia’s Military Chief Gen. Agus Subiyanto and Minister of Defense Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin oversaw the finale, lauding the troops for their “interoperability with strategic partners in addressing various threats.” The drills were anything but routine: for the first time, U.S. soldiers from the 11th Airborne Division fired two FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles on Indonesian soil, a milestone Army Capt. Kaden Cox called “a first for the whole eleventh (Airborne Division)” and “the first time that we are utilizing this capability in Indonesia,” according to a statement from the U.S. Department of Defense.
The Super Garuda Shield exercise, launched as a bilateral U.S.-Indonesia event in 2006, has swelled into a multinational show of force since 2022. This year, troops from Australia, Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Brazil, and South Korea joined the U.S. and Indonesia. Several Asian nations—among them Cambodia, India, and Papua New Guinea—sent observers, further highlighting the event’s growing diplomatic reach. The exercise’s 2025 iteration placed special emphasis on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and joint crisis operations, providing a real-world testbed for coordination among diverse military partners.
Canada’s role in this year’s drills was particularly significant. On August 25, 2025, the Canadian Armed Forces and the Indonesian National Armed Forces signed a Military Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Jakarta. As detailed by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, the agreement establishes structured collaboration in joint training, maritime security, defense capacity-building, and professional exchanges. The timing of the MoU—coinciding with Canada’s participation in Super Garuda Shield—signals Ottawa’s intent to anchor its security presence in Southeast Asia and to complement U.S., Australian, and Japanese initiatives without competing for influence.
Indonesia, as Southeast Asia’s largest economy and a pivotal maritime hub, is home to crucial sea lanes like the Strait of Malacca and the Sunda Strait. The former alone handles about 30 percent of global trade, making Indonesian stability and security a matter of international economic concern. Canada’s engagement, which includes participation in 35 joint exercises in the region during 2023-24 and involvement in regional security forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus, reflects a broader strategy to integrate defense and economic interests. The Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, expected to be signed later in 2025, is set to further intertwine these priorities.
For Indonesia, which maintains a non-aligned foreign policy and regularly conducts exercises with both Western and non-Western powers, the value of Canadian partnership lies in its ability to support regional initiatives without demanding strategic alignment. As the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada notes, “Canada’s value lies in complementing U.S., Australian, and Japanese initiatives while delivering focused contributions in areas such as maritime domain awareness and capacity-building.” This approach fits Jakarta’s preference for flexible, pragmatic relationships in a crowded and competitive regional landscape.
Yet, the expanding scope of military cooperation in Southeast Asia has not gone unnoticed by major regional powers. China, in particular, has criticized the Super Garuda Shield drills, accusing the U.S. of trying to build an “Asian NATO” to contain its influence. In a recent speech in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth responded to such concerns, affirming that Washington is “strengthening military alliances in the Indo-Pacific to reassure allies alarmed by Beijing’s increasing military and economic pressure and provocative actions in the disputed South China Sea.” The U.S. remains the region’s top defense partner, responsible for around 40 percent of all bilateral and multilateral exercises in 2023-24, especially with maritime Southeast Asian states.
Japan and Australia also play leading roles, with 134 and 104 regional exercises respectively, often underpinned by agreements that deliver tangible benefits such as logistics support, intelligence sharing, and defense technology transfers. By contrast, China’s defense agreements in the region are typically more symbolic, focusing on dialogue and goodwill rather than the deep interoperability and technology sharing seen in Western-led exercises. Its influence is most pronounced in mainland Southeast Asia, where it remains the top partner for countries like Laos and Cambodia.
Against this backdrop of intensifying military engagement, Indonesia’s internal dynamics are also in flux. In March 2025, President Prabowo Subianto’s government amended the country’s defense policy to expand the military’s role in civilian affairs, reviving elements of the controversial “dwifungsi” doctrine that had been formally abolished in 1998. This move—seen by critics as a step back toward military entrenchment in politics and civil administration—has sparked concern about the erosion of democratic institutions. The issue has become even more urgent in recent weeks, as protests over legislative perks and cost-of-living issues escalated into violent clashes in Jakarta and Makassar following the death of a delivery driver. The government’s aggressive response has raised fresh questions about the militarization of civilian life and the balance between security and democracy.
As Indonesia updates its National Defence Policy for 2025-29, the challenge will be to strengthen security partnerships while protecting civil liberties and democratic norms. For Canada and other Western partners, this means integrating defense cooperation with support for transparency, accountability, and a healthy civil-military balance—without overstepping or undermining Indonesia’s sovereignty.
The 2025 Super Garuda Shield exercise, and the broader defense agreements it has helped foster, reflect the fast-evolving security architecture of Southeast Asia. With new partnerships, expanded drills, and a shifting political landscape, the region is becoming ever more central to the world’s strategic balance. The coming years will test whether these multinational efforts can deliver not just military readiness, but also stability, prosperity, and respect for democratic values in one of the planet’s busiest crossroads.