It has been a tumultuous year for South Korea—a nation that has seen its domestic politics upended, only to emerge with a surprisingly steady hand in foreign policy. The events set in motion last December, when then-President Yoon Suk Yeol declared emergency martial law, triggered a political crisis that ultimately led to his impeachment and the election of opposition leader Lee Jae Myung in June 2025. Many expected a dramatic pivot in South Korea’s foreign policy, but the reality has been one of pragmatic continuity, even as the world around Seoul grows ever more unpredictable.
According to The Korea Times, Lee Jae Myung’s ascent to the presidency was marked by speculation—and no small amount of anxiety—over how his administration would handle relations with the United States, Japan, China, and North Korea. Yoon’s government had championed a “value-based diplomacy,” aligning closely with the U.S. and Japan while taking a hard line against North Korea and Russia. By contrast, Lee was thought likely to pursue a “pragmatic, national interest-based” approach, potentially seeking greater distance from Washington and Tokyo and a softer touch with Pyongyang and Moscow.
Yet, as Lee Jong-eun, Assistant Professor of Political Science at North Greenville University, observed in his analysis for The Korea Times, the first year of Lee’s government has largely maintained the previous administration’s foreign policy trajectory. Shuttle diplomacy with Japan has continued, with Lee reaffirming bilateral agreements—including the controversial 2015 "comfort women" deal—at a summit with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Even after Ishiba’s replacement by the more hardline Sanae Takaichi, Lee kept up a cordial approach.
Perhaps more crucially, Lee has reaffirmed South Korea’s enduring alliance with the United States. During a state visit to Washington, he worked to allay fears that Seoul might hedge between the U.S. and China. Instead, Lee emphasized that the U.S. alliance would take precedence over economic ties with Beijing. After months of negotiation with the Trump administration, Lee’s team secured a bilateral trade deal that included increased Korean investment in the U.S. and lower tariffs—a notable achievement, given the Trump White House’s generally tough stance on trade.
Joseph Yun, former acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, elaborated on the evolving alliance in an interview with Hawaii News Now. "The relationship between the United States and South Korea is fundamentally based on alliance," Yun stated. "The U.S. guarantees South Korean security, especially vis-à-vis North Korea." With 28,000 American troops still stationed in South Korea, the U.S. security commitment remains robust. But Yun also pointed out a critical shift: "We have obviously gone into strategic competition with China. So it is crucially important for Washington that our allies and our friends view the world in a like-minded manner, especially regarding China."
Indeed, economic security has become as central as military deterrence. As Yun explained, "Rare Earth is an example. So is competition over things like semiconductors. So it’s competition over energy, the competition over AI. So because those are all becoming very much integrated with our security side." South Korea’s technological prowess and economic growth have made it a vital player in the secure supply chains that the U.S. and its allies are trying to build, alongside Japan.
Yet the U.S. also recognizes the complexity of South Korea’s position. As Yun acknowledged, "China is Korea’s largest trading partner, and we cannot just say cut off all trade. So how do we manage that in a way that the alliance remains secure, but we are strategically in a similar position?" This balancing act has defined Lee’s approach. During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Gyeongju, Lee met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and reaffirmed the importance of bilateral economic ties, even as he prioritized trilateral strategic partnerships with the U.S. and Japan.
On the North Korean front, Lee’s administration has adopted a more conciliatory tone than its predecessor. He suspended loudspeaker broadcasts into the North and proposed a multistage “END” (engage, normalize, denuclearize) framework for denuclearization. However, North Korea has rebuffed these overtures, prolonging the suspension of bilateral talks. Despite this, Lee has declined to recognize North Korea as a “nuclear weapons state” and has worked closely with the U.S. and Japan to deter Pyongyang’s threats.
In a move to strengthen South Korea’s military deterrence, Lee secured U.S. approval to construct a nuclear-powered submarine—a decision that risks drawing protests from both North Korea and China. This step underscores the delicate balance Seoul must maintain: pursuing advanced defense capabilities without triggering escalation in an already tense region.
Relations with Russia, meanwhile, have cooled considerably since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Lee’s government has described ties with Moscow as important but fraught with “serious limitations,” and has openly criticized the growing strategic partnership between Russia and North Korea. Upon taking office, Lee notably did not call Russian President Vladimir Putin, a symbolic gesture that signaled a new chill in bilateral relations.
Despite the leadership change in Seoul, the continuity in foreign policy stands out as unusual. As The Korea Times notes, South Korea’s foreign policy has often shifted dramatically with each new president. This time, however, pragmatic calculations appear to have prevailed, with Lee seeking to avoid risky changes amid what has become a volatile geopolitical environment—one made even more uncertain by the return of Donald Trump to the White House.
Still, as 2026 approaches, uncertainty looms. The Trump administration may yet impose new demands on Seoul, such as restructuring or reducing the U.S. military presence. Tensions with Japan could flare again over historical disputes, and the ongoing freeze in inter-Korean dialogue risks deepening the divide between North and South. There are also concerns that, should China’s tensions with Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S. escalate, South Korea could find itself caught in the crossfire.
Tariffs remain a sticking point. As Yun put it, "There’s no question tariffs are a big headache for our allies and friends. But I think at the same time, they must understand tariff is a very, very important tool to control trade, to control flows, and to deal with China." For the U.S., tariffs are not just about China—they’re also about addressing America’s persistent trade deficits.
For now, Lee’s government has managed to avoid the pitfalls of abrupt change. The hope, as Lee Jong-eun writes, is that South Korea’s diplomatic partners will continue to support this careful balancing act. But in a world where, as one commentator quipped, America’s new security doctrine "reads like a spell cast in the hope that disorder will politely disappear," there is little room for magical thinking. For South Korea, as for many nations, the next year promises more hard choices—and few easy answers.
