On December 29, 2025, the future of security in Northeast Asia took center stage as Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), addressed a packed auditorium at the 2nd ROK-US Combined Policy Forum in Seoul. His message was clear and unwavering: South Korea’s role in the region has grown far beyond simply responding to threats on the Korean Peninsula. Instead, the nation now finds itself at the heart of evolving dynamics that could shape the balance of power across the entire Indo-Pacific.
Brunson’s remarks, delivered at the War Memorial Hall in Yongsan-gu, Seoul, underscored a pivotal shift in how Washington and its allies view South Korea’s strategic value. According to Yonhap News, the general cited the recently released U.S. National Security Strategy, which places a decisive emphasis on the need for Seoul and Tokyo to build capabilities to defend the First Island Chain—a key perimeter for America’s preeminence vis-à-vis China in the Pacific. This document, notably, makes no direct mention of North Korea, signaling a broader reorientation of priorities.
“The recently published U.S. National Security Strategy reflects this reality by emphasizing the decisive importance of not only this region but of Korea herself and the vital role that capable, like-minded partners play in keeping the Indo-Pacific stable and predictable,” Brunson stated at the forum, as reported by Yonhap. He continued, “Korea is not simply responding to threats on the peninsula. Korea sits at the crossroads of broader regional dynamics that shape the balance of power across Northeast Asia.”
Brunson’s comments come at a time when the U.S.-South Korea alliance is undergoing what he calls “modernization”—a transformation designed to ensure the partnership is ready for the complexities of today’s security environment. “Alliance modernization should be more than a slogan,” Brunson declared at the forum, as cited by The Korea Times. “The allies should actively adjust how they plan and operate across multiple domains.” He described the need for faster decision-making and tighter integration across the United Nations Command (UNC), CFC, and USFK, noting, “We’re approaching scenarios here as complex, multi-domain problems that require faster decision-making and tighter integration.”
This modernization, first proposed after President Donald Trump took office in 2017, has led to discussions about revising USFK’s role and increasing Seoul’s share of defense costs. Washington is also exploring ways to expand USFK’s mission beyond deterring North Korea, with an eye toward countering China’s growing influence in the region.
Brunson stressed that South Korea’s capabilities, geography, and readiness make it a “core anchor of any effort to preserve peace in Northeast Asia.” He elaborated, “That influence is already being felt today as we look forward. The task for all of us is to continue approaching this alliance and its modernization as a dynamic, evolving process—one that reflects the region we live in, not the region we once imagined.”
According to Maeil Business Newspaper, Brunson also highlighted South Korea’s “strategic weight that goes far beyond its borders.” He pointed to the country’s geographic location, the sophistication of its military, and the maturity of the combined command structure as key factors. “The crisis in Northeast Asia can develop quickly, and the strategic choices made by the United States, South Korea, Japan and regional partners inevitably determine whether the region is headed for conflict or stability,” he said. “South Korea’s capacity, geographic location and preparedness are central to any effort to maintain peace in Northeast Asia.”
Brunson’s speech was not delivered in a vacuum. The forum also featured proposals reflecting the urgency of the current security environment. David Maxwell, vice chairman of the Asia-Pacific Strategy Center and a former U.S. Special Warfare Colonel, argued for the creation of a Northeast Asia Combat Command based in Seoul, with a “Convergence Node” in Tokyo. “It is difficult for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to respond to more than one war,” Maxwell said, emphasizing the need for new structures to ensure that appropriate forces are deployed at the right time.
But the general’s focus wasn’t solely on the future. He addressed immediate threats as well—particularly the deepening military partnership between North Korea and Russia. According to Yonhap, Brunson warned that North Korea’s exchanges of munitions for advanced technologies with Russia have “advanced the North’s missile and nuclear programs in dangerous ways.” He characterized Pyongyang’s military cooperation with Moscow as “a long-term strategic decision, not a temporary bargaining play.”
Brunson also noted, as reported by The Korea Times, that North Korea’s military threats have increased in recent years. The regime has formally rejected peaceful unification, rewritten its constitution to designate South Korea as its primary adversary, and dismantled symbols of inter-Korean dialogue. “When we talk about credible deterrence or maintaining stability across the region, the choices made in Seoul echo much farther than many recognize. This matters even more because of the DPRK which we face today,” he said, using the official name for North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Another point of contention is the role of the United Nations Command (UNC), which Brunson described as a “unique asset” in maintaining the allies’ deterrence posture. He argued that, “Far from being a historical remnant, UNC provides a living framework for multinational support … This is a unique asset, and one that strengthens deterrence when it is integrated thoughtfully into all our planning.” This statement follows a recent clash with South Korean ruling party politicians, who are pushing for legislation to transfer control of civilian access to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) from the UNC to the South Korean government—a move the UNC has publicly opposed.
Brunson’s remarks reflect a growing consensus among U.S. and allied officials that the security situation in Northeast Asia is more interconnected than ever. South Korea’s influence, once largely confined to the Korean Peninsula, now extends across multiple axes of competition—including North Korea, China, and Russia. The general’s so-called “east-up map of the Korean Peninsula,” introduced in a recent essay, rotates the traditional orientation to underscore Seoul’s ability to exert influence across these challenges.
As the forum concluded, the message was unmistakable: the stakes in Northeast Asia are high, and South Korea’s role is central to maintaining peace and stability. The modernization of the alliance, far from being just a catchphrase, is now a matter of urgent strategic necessity. With the region’s future hanging in the balance, the choices made in Seoul—and in Washington, Tokyo, and beyond—will resonate for years to come.
For those watching the shifting tides of power in Northeast Asia, one thing is clear: the coming years will demand adaptability, vigilance, and a willingness to rethink old assumptions. South Korea, once seen as a frontline state, now finds itself at the crossroads of history, shaping not only its own destiny but the security of an entire region.
