In a week marked by pivotal developments in security and economic policy, South Korea finds itself at the crossroads of history and strategy. On February 8, 2026, Army Brigadier General Moon Han-ok officially took office as the South Korean deputy commanding general at the Korea-U.S. Combined Division, a move that not only breaks new ground for gender representation but also comes at a time of shifting regional dynamics and growing economic pressures from China.
Moon’s appointment, reported by Yonhap News Agency, marks the first time a female South Korean general has assumed this critical post. She stepped into the role in early January, following her promotion to one-star general during the military’s annual reshuffle. Having been commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1997, Moon brings nearly three decades of military experience to the table, earning widespread recognition as an expert in combined defense and operations.
Her expertise is not just theoretical. During her tenure as a lieutenant colonel, Moon played a central role in Seoul’s efforts to regain wartime operational control (OPCON) from Washington—a longstanding ambition for South Korean defense planners. The push for OPCON transfer is more than a bureaucratic milestone; it embodies South Korea’s aspiration for a self-reliant national defense, a goal that President Lee Jae Myung has pledged to achieve within his five-year term, ending in 2030.
"At a critical juncture of Seoul’s efforts to retake wartime operational control (OPCON) from Washington, I would like to contribute to improving operational interoperability between the allies," Moon stated, as reported by Yonhap. Her words reflect both the gravity of the moment and the intricate dance of alliance management that underpins the Korea-U.S. security relationship.
This year, the allies have agreed to seek certification of "full operational capability," the second phase in a three-step process to assess Seoul’s readiness to lead the combined forces. The process, while technical, is laden with symbolism: it signals Seoul’s growing confidence and Washington’s willingness to share responsibility in the face of evolving threats on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.
Yet, as South Korea pursues greater autonomy in defense, it must also navigate the increasingly complex web of economic and security challenges posed by neighboring China. Just two days before Moon’s appointment was reported, Victor Cha, Senior Vice President for Geopolitics and Foreign Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a distinguished professor at Georgetown University, delivered a pointed lecture at Seoul’s Chey Institute for Advanced Studies. The topic: China’s growing use of economic coercion as a tool of statecraft.
Cha, who introduced his new book, The Weaponization of Trade by China, argued that Beijing’s tactics have evolved from sporadic incidents to a structural threat to the international order. "In China’s case, economic pressure has the effect of discouraging even public expression on issues such as democracy, human rights, and territorial sovereignty," Cha warned, as quoted by The Korea Times. He highlighted that since 1997, China has wielded economic coercion in at least 600 documented cases, targeting 18 countries and roughly 470 companies. U.S. firms have borne the brunt, with 278 affected, but Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have also found themselves in the crosshairs.
The frequency of such incidents has surged since President Xi Jinping assumed power, according to Cha. What sets China’s approach apart, he said, is its informality and opacity: "China rarely acknowledges sanctions publicly or leaves written records. Instructions are often delivered verbally, leaving no paper trail." This makes it exceedingly difficult for targeted countries to challenge Beijing’s actions through established mechanisms like the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Cha cited several emblematic cases, including restrictions on Norwegian salmon imports, curbs on rare earth exports to Japan, and limits on Chinese group tourism to South Korea. Each episode, he argued, is designed to send a clear message: defy Beijing’s preferences, and economic pain will follow. The chilling effect, he noted, extends beyond economics to the very core of national sovereignty, narrowing the range of policy options available to governments.
But the story doesn’t end there. Drawing on 2024 data from the UN Comtrade database, Cha pointed out that China itself is not invulnerable: it depends on imports for more than 70 percent of supply in 589 product categories, including 259 where import reliance exceeds 90 percent. OLED display panels, with a 94 percent import dependence—much of it supplied by South Korea—are a prime example. Other critical imports include U.S.-produced acyclic hydrocarbons and Japanese industrial robots and silver powder, vital for solar panel production.
"Individually, countries may be vulnerable, but collectively they possess real leverage," Cha asserted, as reported by The Korea Times. He called for coordinated action among allies, arguing that only by working together can nations create effective deterrence against the weaponization of trade. For the United States, this means prioritizing alliance coordination over unilateral trade measures. "What the United States should be doing is not imposing tariffs on allies, but bringing them together to respond collectively to China’s economic coercion. Collective resilience not only deters Beijing, but also helps restore America’s strategic credibility," he emphasized.
Cha’s insights resonate deeply in Seoul, where debates over defense autonomy and economic security are increasingly intertwined. China’s responses to Japan’s evolving defense posture and South Korea’s own discussions about nuclear-powered submarines, Cha noted, have followed a familiar pattern of economic retaliation. The implication is clear: unless allies and partners are confident they will not face retaliation alone, their autonomy in making critical national security decisions will be compromised.
The dual challenges of asserting military autonomy and safeguarding economic sovereignty are not lost on policymakers in Seoul. As South Korea edges closer to regaining wartime operational control and deepens its role in the U.S. alliance, it must also prepare for the realities of economic statecraft in a region where interdependence is both a strength and a vulnerability.
For Brig. Gen. Moon Han-ok, the path ahead is as demanding as it is historic. Her leadership at the Korea-U.S. Combined Division comes at a moment when operational interoperability and alliance solidarity are more crucial than ever. Meanwhile, the lessons from Victor Cha’s lecture serve as a timely reminder: in an era of great power competition, resilience—both military and economic—depends on unity, strategy, and the willingness to face challenges together.
With new faces at the helm and old challenges taking on new forms, South Korea’s journey toward greater autonomy and security continues—one careful step at a time.