The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has always been a subject of fascination, intrigue, and—let’s be honest—a fair bit of controversy. But as of late 2025, that storied partnership has entered a new, unmistakably transactional era, shaped by high-stakes business deals, defense agreements, and a civil nuclear pact that could reshape the balance of power in the Middle East.
On November 18, 2025, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (often known as MBS) landed in Washington for a summit with President Donald Trump. According to analysis by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Saudi leader arrived with a shopping list: advanced fighter jets, a binding defense agreement, and, perhaps most critically, a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear accord. But what did each side truly want—and what might the world be risking in the process?
The centerpiece of the visit was MBS’s dramatic pledge: Saudi Arabia would invest a staggering $1 trillion in the U.S. market, an increase of $400 billion over the already eye-popping $600 billion commitment announced during Trump’s May 2025 visit to Riyadh. As reported by Middle East Studies experts, this move wasn’t just about business—it was a signal of continued Saudi confidence in the American economy and a bid to deepen economic interdependence between the two countries.
But the deals didn’t stop at investments. Three critical agreements were inked: a Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation, a Critical Minerals Framework, and a Memorandum of Understanding on artificial intelligence cooperation. Each aligns with MBS’s vision for a post-oil Saudi Arabia, aiming to transform the Kingdom into a powerhouse of technology, business, and strategic influence.
For President Trump, the summit was a windfall. Not only did it promise to inject vast sums into the U.S. economy—potentially creating thousands of jobs—but it also reinforced America’s role as the Kingdom’s key security partner. The Trump administration announced the sale of F-35 fighter jets and nearly 300 American tanks to Saudi Arabia, and designated the Kingdom a major non-NATO ally (MNNA), underlining an enduring commitment to Saudi security. The two nations also signed the U.S.-Saudi Strategic Defence Agreement (SDA), formalizing a relationship that has endured for more than eight decades.
The roots of this partnership date back to the end of World War II, when the famous oil-for-security arrangement was struck. Over the decades, the alliance weathered Cold War tensions, oil embargoes, and even the post-9/11 fallout. According to Jawaharlal Nehru University’s Middle East faculty, the relationship has become more interdependent and transactional, shaped by shifting global realities. The U.S. shale revolution has lessened American dependence on Saudi oil, while multipolar politics have allowed Riyadh to diversify its partnerships, including with China and Russia.
Yet, despite these changes, Saudi Arabia remains deeply reliant on U.S. defense technology and support. The Trump administration’s focus on “making America great again” has leaned heavily on Gulf investment and arms sales, seeing in Saudi Arabia not just a regional actor but a business partner capable of rejuvenating American manufacturing and creating jobs for the middle class.
But the nuclear deal at the heart of the summit is where things get complicated—and potentially dangerous. The two sides continue negotiating a binding civil nuclear agreement, with Saudi Arabia pushing for U.S. approval (and possibly technical help) to enrich uranium. As reported by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, this is the critical pathway to nuclear weapons fuel, and only a handful of countries currently possess such capabilities.
Unlike the 2009 U.S.-UAE nuclear cooperation agreement—which established a “gold standard” by requiring the UAE to forgo enrichment and reprocessing, adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol, and accept permanent safeguards—Saudi Arabia has so far refused to adopt the Additional Protocol. This protocol allows for short-notice inspections of undeclared sites, a key tool in uncovering covert nuclear weapons work. The Saudis’ reluctance to accept these inspections has set off alarm bells in Washington and beyond, especially given MBS’s repeated public vow to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does.
The regional context is fraught. After decades of clandestine activity, Iran stood on the threshold of fielding up to 22 nuclear weapons in June 2025, before U.S. and Israeli strikes destroyed its enrichment capabilities. President Trump’s subsequent warning—he would “absolutely” bomb Iran again if enrichment resumed—sent a stark message about U.S. red lines. According to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the lesson is clear: break the rules of nonproliferation, and the consequences will be severe.
Within this tense environment, the details of the U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal matter enormously. Energy Secretary Chris Wright has recently insisted the deal will not permit enrichment, though earlier statements were less clear. Riyadh, for its part, is expected to keep pressing for future consent, pointing to the Trump administration’s recent decision to allow South Korea to enrich and reprocess uranium—ending decades of U.S. refusals—as evidence that “no” today could become “yes” tomorrow.
Experts warn that if the U.S. drops its “gold standard” for Saudi Arabia, other nations—Turkey, Poland, Jordan, Egypt, and even the UAE—may seek similar exemptions, potentially sparking a regional arms race. To avoid this, analysts recommend four non-negotiable conditions: Saudi Arabia must ratify and implement the IAEA’s Additional Protocol; the U.S. must retain a perpetual right of return for all U.S.-origin nuclear material and technology; the agreement must explicitly forbid Saudi enrichment and reprocessing; and all Saudi nuclear facilities must remain under permanent IAEA safeguards and real-time monitoring.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is hedging its bets. The Kingdom has sought to reduce regional tensions through diplomacy, restoring ties with Iran in a Beijing-brokered deal in March 2023 and supporting the Abraham Accords to normalize relations with Israel. These moves underscore Riyadh’s desire to maintain security and stability while diversifying its external partnerships.
The Trump-MBS summit, then, encapsulates both the promise and peril of the new U.S.-Saudi relationship. On the one hand, it offers economic opportunity, technological cooperation, and the prospect of strengthened security ties. On the other, it raises profound questions about nuclear proliferation, regional stability, and the risks of a purely transactional approach to foreign policy.
As the dust settles from this historic meeting, one thing is clear: the U.S.-Saudi partnership is evolving in real time, with consequences that will echo far beyond Washington and Riyadh. The choices made now—about nuclear standards, arms sales, and the balance of business versus security—will shape not just the future of these two nations, but the fate of the wider Middle East.
