In recent years, Europe has found itself grappling with a complex and evolving challenge: the dual threat of Russian military aggression and a sophisticated campaign of disinformation. From tanks rolling into Georgia in 2008, to the seizure of Crimea in 2014, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s assertive foreign policy has repeatedly tested European security and unity. Yet, as The Conversation reports, these visible acts of force are only one part of a broader strategy—one that increasingly relies on hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks, drone incursions, and, crucially, the spread of propaganda and disinformation across the continent.
Nowhere is this information war more evident than in Slovenia, where a cluster of pro-Russian websites has emerged as a powerful conduit for Kremlin narratives. According to a recent study highlighted by Espreso, sites such as Insajder.com, Thesaker.si, and Triglav Media have become central players in amplifying Russian disinformation, recycling falsehoods, and undermining trust in Western institutions.
Insajder.com, for instance, boasts an audience of one million and presents itself as a neutral news outlet. In reality, it frequently cites banned Russian media like RIA Novosti and TASS, and relies on quotes from pro-Russian propagandists such as Scott Ritter. The site’s content is replete with anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian narratives, often justifying Russian aggression and demonizing the European Union. Its coverage includes headlines like “Russians getting closer to goal: Another city liberated in the Donetsk People's Republic,” echoing the Russian Defense Ministry’s language and framing territorial occupation as liberation.
Thesaker.si, meanwhile, operates as an analytical portal but systematically spreads conspiracy theories about NATO, the EU, and Western elites. Its articles frequently employ Kremlin propaganda terminology such as “Ukronazis,” and justify Russian military actions while portraying Ukraine’s leadership and European allies in a negative light. According to Espreso, Thesaker.si also amplifies antisemitic and extremist rhetoric, drawing on commentary from well-known pro-Kremlin figures like Dimitry Orlov and Andrew Korybko.
Triglav Media, established in 2021, completes this trio of Slovenian outlets. While it claims to offer alternative geopolitical analysis, its content consistently promotes pro-Russian narratives, criticizes NATO and the EU, and supports Russia’s war in Ukraine. The site often highlights BRICS as a fairer alternative to the Western order, blending disinformation, anti-Western rhetoric, and revisionist history to reinforce skepticism toward democratic institutions.
What unites these Slovenian portals is not only their content, but their methods. As Espreso’s research reveals, they recycle Kremlin propaganda, often relaying the same claims under different headlines and laundering authority through so-called “experts.” These include Scott Ritter, a frequent source for Insajder.com, and Viktor Medvedchuk, a Putin ally wanted for treason in Ukraine. By presenting these voices as independent analysts, the sites mask propaganda as legitimate commentary—a tactic known as authority laundering.
The narratives pushed by these outlets are strikingly consistent. They justify Russian military aggression, delegitimize Ukraine’s government, and paint the West as morally and politically corrupt. For example, Insajder.com has spread the debunked claim that Ukrainian missiles, not Russian ones, struck their own children’s hospital in Kyiv. Thesaker.si regularly refers to Ukrainian officials as “Nazis,” and Triglav Media frames the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories as the “reunification” of historically Russian lands, citing fabricated voting data to legitimize annexation.
This information warfare is not limited to Slovenia. As The Conversation outlines, it forms part of a broader Russian strategy that blends military escalation with “grey-zone” tactics—drone and jet incursions over Germany, Estonia, Denmark, and Norway; cyberattacks and energy disruptions in EU states; and domestic propaganda designed to reinforce the Kremlin’s narrative of Western weakness. Each of these actions, whether a drone sighting or a cyberattack, serves a diagnostic purpose: probing Europe’s ability to detect, coordinate, and respond to threats.
According to Belgian officials cited by The Conversation, the recent wave of drone sightings across Europe has exposed gaps in continental air-defense systems. “Europe needs to act faster,” they admitted, acknowledging that every such delay emboldens Moscow’s conviction that Europe is unprepared and divided.
At home, these moments are curated into propaganda clips for Russian state television, where pundits mock European “weakness” and frame the continent’s disarray as validation for the Kremlin’s confrontational stance. As Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, recently claimed, “Europe fears its own war.” This fear, in turn, is used to reinforce the narrative that Russia is the assertive power, and that the West is indecisive.
Russia’s strategy, as The Conversation notes, is not reactive but structural. Moscow’s aim is to force the West to accept a redrawn security order through a blend of coercion, probing, and perpetual testing. The tools may vary—from tanks to drones, from overt invasion to a hybrid war of attrition—but the objective remains the same: to undermine European unity and restore the sphere of influence lost by Russia in 1991.
For Europe, the imperative is resilience. The answer, experts argue, lies in building integrated air and missile defense systems, treating cyberattacks and drone incursions as alliance-wide challenges, and investing in technological and political autonomy. Security now begins with self-sufficiency, especially in the face of wavering support from the United States. At the same time, Europe must combine credible military deterrence with pragmatic engagement, ensuring that channels of communication remain open to prevent escalation.
Countering the information war requires transparency, fact-checking partnerships, and active exposure of disinformation channels. By identifying and categorizing these narratives, European institutions and independent researchers can better counter the ongoing threats undermining democratic discourse. Monitoring cross-posting patterns, flagging authority laundering, and pre-bunking recurring narratives are essential steps in building media resilience.
Ultimately, the challenge facing Europe is clear: to resist the fatigue of endless crisis and demonstrate that resilience, not fear, defines the continent’s future. Moscow’s provocations—whether on the battlefield or in the information space—will continue until the costs become prohibitive. Only a unified, prepared, and vigilant Europe can rise to meet this “permanent test.”