As the war in Ukraine continues to evolve, Russia is scrambling to fend off a new and persistent threat: drones. On November 7, 2025, Russian authorities announced sweeping changes to mobile communications regulations and revealed ongoing struggles with protecting their armored vehicles from these unmanned aerial weapons, according to reports from Meduza and Defence Blog. Both measures highlight the mounting pressure faced by Moscow as Ukraine’s drone tactics repeatedly expose weaknesses in Russian defenses.
The latest move from Russian officials involves a significant shift in how mobile operators manage SIM cards for subscribers who have used roaming or have not activated their SIM cards for more than three days after re-entering Russia. Under the new rules, these subscribers will have their mobile internet and SMS services disabled for a full day upon returning to the country. The stated aim, as reported by Meduza, is to prevent Ukrainian forces from exploiting 'ownerless' SIM cards—unregistered or inactive cards that could be used to remotely control drones or conduct cyberattacks.
To minimize inconvenience, users can shorten the one-day block by completing a verification process. They’ll receive an SMS with a link and, after entering a CAPTCHA to confirm their identity, service will be restored. But for many, this is little comfort. The measure has already sparked confusion and frustration: earlier iterations of the policy, introduced in October 2025, led to widespread service disruptions. Many operators struggled to lift restrictions on time, and the limitations extended to both mobile internet and SMS, affecting not just foreign tourists but also Russians coming home from abroad. According to Meduza, the initial system malfunctioned within two weeks, revealing the complexities of balancing security with everyday connectivity.
The urgency behind these changes is rooted in the battlefield. Drones have become a defining feature of modern warfare in Ukraine, with both sides rapidly adapting their tactics. In June 2025, reports surfaced that new batches of Russian Shahed-136 attack drones were being equipped with technology to connect to Ukrainian mobile networks and transmit data. This technological leap underscored how cellular networks can be harnessed for military purposes—whether to guide drones, gather intelligence, or launch cyberattacks.
Russian authorities hope that stricter SIM card monitoring will help close this vulnerability. As one source told Meduza, the main goal is to combat 'ownerless' SIM cards that might be used to control drones or carry out cyberattacks. Yet, as the experience of the past month shows, implementing such a system without disrupting civilian life is no easy task.
While mobile network security is one front in Russia’s war against drones, the more visible—and arguably more pressing—challenge lies on the battlefield itself. According to Defence Blog, Russia’s much-touted Arena-M active protection system (APS) for tanks and armored vehicles has failed to live up to decades of promises. Despite more than 30 years in development, the Arena-M remains plagued by fundamental radar and software flaws that prevent it from reliably detecting and neutralizing small aerial threats like first-person view (FPV) drones and loitering munitions.
Russian military analyst Viktor Murakhovsky pulled no punches in his assessment. He explained that the Arena-M’s radar lacks the precision needed to spot mini or micro drones, especially those built from radio-transparent materials such as plastic. The system struggles to distinguish low-visibility targets from ground clutter at close range—a fatal flaw on battlefields now saturated with small, slow-moving drones. "The necessary algorithmic solutions have not yet been created," Murakhovsky wrote, according to Defence Blog. Traditional air-defense techniques, such as Doppler filtering and moving-target indication, simply don’t work against drones with tiny radar signatures and low velocity, particularly when they fly close to the terrain or treetops.
The result? Despite repeated announcements of mass production, no frontline Russian units have received the Arena-M in operational numbers. Instead, troops are forced to rely on improvised defenses—welded cages, metal screens, and even makeshift 'anti-drone sheds' mounted on tanks. These field adaptations, while inventive, are a far cry from the high-tech solutions the Kremlin has long promised. As Defence Blog notes, these stopgap measures underscore how far industrial development lags behind the realities of the battlefield.
Murakhovsky’s analysis points to a broader problem: Russia’s defense-industrial base is struggling to keep pace with the rapid evolution of unmanned warfare. Without reliable, automated counter-drone systems, Russian armored units remain vulnerable to cheap FPV drones that can attack from multiple directions and at low altitude. This vulnerability is not just theoretical—Ukrainian forces have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to strike Russian armor with small, inexpensive drones, sometimes with devastating effect.
Earlier in 2025, there were reports that Russian engineers had modified the Arena-M system to intercept top-attack anti-tank missiles like the US-made Javelin. A video released by Russia’s state arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, purportedly showed the system neutralizing threats, including a projectile attacking from above. However, analysts quickly pointed out that the missile in the demonstration approached the tank at a relatively shallow angle. In real combat, Javelins fired from long range strike their targets in a steep dive, raising doubts about whether Arena-M can reliably intercept third-generation anti-tank guided missiles in the chaos of battle.
These technical shortcomings have forced Russian troops to get creative. Images of tanks with makeshift armor—ranging from welded cages to wooden planks—have become symbols of the improvisational spirit (and dire necessity) gripping Russian units. According to Defence Blog, these adaptations are a testament to the gap between official rhetoric and the realities faced by soldiers on the ground.
Yet, despite these setbacks, Russian officials remain determined to find solutions. The new SIM card restrictions, for all their flaws, reflect a broader effort to adapt to the changing nature of warfare. Whether these measures will succeed in blunting Ukraine’s drone advantage remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the conflict in Ukraine has become a proving ground for the future of military technology—and that both sides are learning, sometimes painfully, as they go.
As Russian authorities press forward with new regulations and engineers race to fix long-standing problems with armored protection, the struggle to counter drones is shaping not just tactics on the battlefield, but the daily lives of ordinary citizens. With every new adaptation—whether in the form of a CAPTCHA verification or a welded metal cage—the war’s technological arms race grows more intense, and its consequences more far-reaching.
From the frontlines to the home front, Russia’s battle against drones is exposing the limits of old systems and the urgent need for innovation. The coming months will reveal whether these latest measures can tip the balance—or if the drone revolution will continue to outpace the defenders.