On the turbulent landscape of Eastern Europe, the war in Ukraine continues to churn, but recent developments indicate the conflict’s ramifications are rippling far beyond the immediate battlefield. As of October 2025, Russia is not only escalating its military production but is also actively preparing for contingencies that could extend well past the current war, raising alarms across NATO and Europe.
According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), is implementing an ambitious plan to increase T-90 tank production by a staggering 80% by 2028 compared to 2024 levels. The internal documents, published by Ukraine-based Frontelligence Insight and reviewed by ISW, detail that UVZ aims to produce 10 T-90M2 tanks in 2026, ramping up to a peak of 428 T-90M and T-90M2 tanks in 2028. By the close of 2029, UVZ intends to have produced a total of 1,118 new and modernized tanks. These figures, while aspirational, underscore Russia’s intent to rearm and present a significant long-term military threat to NATO, regardless of the outcome in Ukraine.
This ramp-up in production comes despite persistent labor shortages and mounting casualties on the Ukrainian front. To address these challenges, UVZ launched a program in March 2025 to train computer numerical control (CNC) machine operators, aiming to expand its manufacturing capacity. Yet, the drive for increased output is not without its hurdles. Russia has been forced to rely on sanctions evasion schemes to procure high-precision European-manufactured CNC machines, as reported by Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR). These efforts highlight the lengths to which the Russian defense industry is willing to go to modernize its armored fleet.
While Russia’s tank production targets may be difficult to achieve, the intent is clear. Frontelligence assessed that Russia’s goals to modernize its armored fleet with over 2,000 T-90M, T-90M2, and T-72B3M tanks between 2026 and 2036—on top of what’s already been produced in 2024 and 2025—could fully replenish Russia’s tank fleet for another large-scale war. Open-source tracking shows Russian tank losses have decreased through 2025, and a senior Finnish military official recently stated that Russia is sending “almost none” of its newly produced tanks to the Ukrainian front, instead stockpiling them for potential future use.
This stockpiling is part of a broader trend. Russia’s total tank reserve has dropped from 3,106 to 2,478 tanks since mid-2025, and the T-72A reserve has nearly halved. The Russian military appears to be drawing tanks from previously untouched storage bases, refurbishing them for either immediate use in Ukraine or for future conflicts. ISW observes that Russia has notably reduced its use of tanks on the battlefield in 2025 compared to the previous year, which suggests a shift toward conserving and modernizing its armored reserves for both short- and long-term contingencies—including the possibility of a direct confrontation with NATO.
The battlefield itself remains dynamic. Russian forces have continued mechanized assaults, particularly taking advantage of rainy weather that hampers Ukrainian drone operations. This tactic underscores a key vulnerability in Ukraine’s defenses: drone effectiveness is heavily dependent on favorable weather. When conditions deteriorate, Russian armored assaults become more viable, and tanks remain a relevant weapon under the right tactical circumstances. Recent company- and battalion-sized assaults in the Donetsk region demonstrate that, while less frequent, Russian armored thrusts still pose a significant challenge to Ukrainian defenders.
Meanwhile, Russia’s military posture is evolving. The country is reportedly developing concepts of operation and warfighting tactics that allow it to conduct large-scale combat operations without relying on massed armor. Instead, Russia is experimenting with ways to deny adversaries the effective use of tanks and armored vehicles, and to achieve the effects of air interdiction without necessarily achieving air superiority. ISW notes that Russia is gaining significant experience in modern, attritional warfare, with rapid innovation cycles and a high tolerance for losses—conditions not seen in Europe since the 1940s.
Beyond the front lines, Russia’s activities are raising new concerns across Europe. On October 10, the Czech military reported a spike in unidentified drone incidents near military facilities. Just two days earlier, a drone overflew the runway of a NATO air base in Geilenkirchen, Germany, home to vital AWACS surveillance aircraft. While German authorities have not attributed the incident to any specific actor, ISW assesses that Russia has entered "Phase Zero"—a campaign of covert and overt attacks aimed at setting conditions for a potential future war with NATO. The ongoing pattern of unattributed drone incursions across Europe is believed to be part of this broader strategy.
On the diplomatic front, Russian President Vladimir Putin has continued to voice support for U.S. President Donald Trump’s diplomatic efforts in Gaza and Ukraine. During a press conference in Dushanbe on October 10, Putin criticized the Nobel Committee’s decision to award the 2025 Peace Prize to Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado instead of Trump, declaring that the committee has "lost its authority" and caused "enormous damage" to the prize’s prestige. While Putin stopped short of saying Trump deserved the award, he praised the U.S. president’s active role, stating, "He really does a lot to resolve such complex crises that lasted for years, even decades," and called Trump’s 20-point plan for the Gaza Strip a potential "historic event." Putin also reaffirmed his belief that Trump is "sincerely striving" to end the war in Ukraine, now well into its fourth year.
Putin’s remarks come amid a backdrop of ongoing arms control negotiations and rising tensions. He indicated there is still time to extend the New START treaty, but stressed that progress depends on American "goodwill." Putin also confirmed that Russia would bolster its air defense systems in response to any U.S. transfer of long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine.
Ukraine, for its part, continues to receive robust support from European partners. On October 10 and 11, Ukrainian officials signed agreements with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom for joint production of deep strike drones, artillery, and air defense systems. These partnerships, including a 110 million euro investment from the Netherlands and expanded battlefield technology cooperation with the UK, are aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities and industrial base.
The war’s reach is not limited to the battlefield. On October 11, Ukrainian forces struck the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery in Ufa, Russia, damaging critical components. This was the third strike on a refinery in the Republic of Bashkortostan since mid-September, targeting facilities that supply fuel and lubricants to the Russian military. The strike, some 1,400 kilometers from Ukraine’s border, underscores the expanding range and sophistication of Ukrainian long-range operations.
As Russia doubles down on production, refurbishes its armored reserves, and signals its readiness for future conflicts, the security landscape in Europe remains fraught with uncertainty. The ongoing war in Ukraine has transformed into a crucible for new military doctrines, technological innovation, and geopolitical maneuvering, with consequences that will likely reverberate for years to come.