On December 11, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in India to a warm welcome, a scene that once again underscored the enduring legacy of India-Russia friendship—a legacy stretching back to the days of Jawaharlal Nehru. While the world has changed dramatically since the Cold War era, the threads of history, strategic calculation, and shifting alliances still tie these nations together, even as the global order moves ever closer to multipolarity.
Putin’s visit comes at a time when the international landscape is anything but static. According to Ivan U. Klyszcz, a research fellow at the International Centre for Defense and Security in Tallinn, “the political and strategic legacies of the Soviet era continue to shape Kremlin thinking” (The Times of India, December 6, 2025). It’s a sentiment that rings true in the halls of New Delhi, where policymakers balance a growing economy and global ambitions with the weight of historical relationships and new geopolitical pressures.
India’s rise as a major market and population powerhouse is undeniable, but as many observers note, it is still transitioning from lower middle-income status and has yet to reach the level where it can decisively shape global geopolitics. The world’s three major power centers—China, Russia, and the United States—command strong economies and advanced militaries, while India’s strategic influence is still on the ascent.
For decades, India has championed the cause of non-alignment. Nehru’s vision, alongside leaders like Marshal Tito and Gamal Abdel Nasser, led to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a formidable force that united newly independent nations seeking their own developmental paths. The Soviet Union, for its part, generally welcomed India’s leadership in NAM, even as Western powers bristled at its anti-colonial, anti-imperialist stance. Notably, historian Gopal Krishna Gandhi points out that after a letter from C. Rajagopalachari in March 1958, the Soviet Union imposed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing within five days—a dramatic gesture of goodwill.
Fast forward to 2025, and the echoes of those diplomatic maneuvers still reverberate. During his recent visit, President Putin reiterated Russia’s commitment to refrain from nuclear testing if the United States offered a reciprocal assurance—an announcement made on Indian soil, and one that harks back to the USSR’s support for Rajiv Gandhi’s action plan for nuclear weapons abolition.
But the India-Russia story is only one strand in a broader tapestry. In August 2025, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Putin met at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit. This gathering, reported by Insikt Group, suggested early interest in trilateral cooperation between the three states—though the formation of a resilient bloc remains unlikely, primarily due to deep-seated distrust between China and India.
US policy, particularly the imposition of sanctions and tariffs, is a key driver in this evolving dynamic. In mid-2025, the United States slapped a 50% tariff on Indian exports—a move that included a 25% reciprocal tariff and a 25% penalty tariff, the latter due to India’s continued purchase of sanctioned Russian oil. India’s Ministry of External Affairs called the move “unfair” and “unjustified,” vowing to “take all actions necessary to protect its national interests.” The tariffs forced India to look for alternative markets and deepen partnerships, including with Beijing—especially as China’s own oil imports from Russia continued to rise, reinforcing New Delhi’s sense of unjust treatment by Washington.
This period also saw a thaw in China-India relations. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited New Delhi for the first time in three years, and on August 31, 2025, Modi made his first trip to China in seven years to attend the SCO Summit in Tianjin. There, Modi emphasized the importance of “a stable relationship and cooperation” between China and India for “the growth and development of the two countries, as well as for a multipolar Asia befitting the trends of the 21st century.”
Yet, for all the diplomatic smiles and handshakes, the road to a true trilateral bloc is anything but smooth. The longstanding border dispute between China and India, economic competition, and divergent foreign policy goals remain significant hurdles. India’s doctrine of “strategic autonomy” and “multi-alignment” means New Delhi is unlikely to join any formal bloc explicitly positioned as a counterweight to the West. Instead, India prefers flexibility—maintaining ties with both Western and non-Western powers, and leveraging forums like BRICS and SCO for its own interests.
BRICS itself has evolved considerably since its inception in 2001. Once a loose grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, it now includes eleven nations—South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran among them. BRICS has become a vital political and diplomatic forum for the Global South, aimed at democratizing and balancing the international order. But as Insikt Group notes, it remains an informal coordinating body, not a treaty-based alliance, and thus ill-equipped to institutionalize a trilateral Russia-India-China bloc.
The economic ties binding these three countries are complex and sometimes fraught. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting Western sanctions have made it the world’s most sanctioned state. This has pushed Moscow to seek deeper economic cooperation with both Beijing and New Delhi. India’s imports of Russian crude oil soared from $2.3 billion in 2021 to $52.7 billion in 2024, even as the US tried to dissuade such purchases with tariffs and sanctions. By May 2025, Russia was India’s top supplier of crude oil, accounting for over 40% of its overall imports. Yet, this trade is not without its own imbalances—India’s imports from Russia account for more than 90% of their total bilateral trade, and New Delhi is eager to diversify supply chains and reduce dependency.
Meanwhile, China remains India’s top import source for electronics, telecommunications, and machinery, despite efforts by the Modi administration to boost domestic production and limit Chinese investment. India’s trade deficit with China reached a staggering $99.21 billion between 2024 and 2025. Despite these tensions, trade and investment flows have continued, and both countries have used multilateral forums like BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to foster economic cooperation.
On the military front, Russia and China have deepened their partnership, conducting frequent joint exercises and collaborating on technology and intelligence. India, meanwhile, has long relied on Russian arms—purchasing roughly $60 billion in Russian weapons over the past two decades. But recent years have seen India diversify its military suppliers, including new agreements with the US, France, and Israel. The documented underperformance of Russian weapons systems in Ukraine has only accelerated this trend.
Despite these limitations, all three countries share a desire for a multipolar world that diminishes US dominance. Their cooperation—however tentative—has implications for both public and private sectors worldwide. As trilateral coordination deepens, Western companies operating in these markets may face increased state involvement, regulatory changes, and greater scrutiny of economic transactions. The defense industries of all three countries could also see significant shifts as they adapt to new realities.
In the end, the prospect of a formal Russia-India-China bloc remains remote, hampered by historical mistrust, divergent ambitions, and unresolved disputes. Yet, the diplomatic choreography on display in 2025 signals a world in flux—one where old alliances are tested, new partnerships are explored, and the quest for balance continues unabated.
As the dust settles from Putin’s visit and the echoes of summitry fade, India, China, and Russia stand at a crossroads—each pursuing its own interests, yet bound by the realities of a changing world. The future of their cooperation remains uncertain, but the stakes for regional stability and global order have rarely been higher.