As tensions between Russia and the West continue to escalate, Poland has found itself increasingly at the center of a dangerous geopolitical chessboard. In recent weeks, a cascade of threats, cyberattacks, and diplomatic skirmishes has underscored the vulnerability of the region and the growing stakes for European security. The latest developments, including a massive Russian assault on Ukraine’s power grid and a chilling warning from a key Kremlin adviser, have put Poland’s role—and its resilience—under the spotlight.
On January 15, 2026, Sergey Karaganov, a longtime adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin and a prominent voice in Russian international affairs, issued one of the starkest threats yet. Speaking on The Tucker Carlson Show, Karaganov warned that if Russia were to begin losing the war in Ukraine within the next year or two, it could resort to using nuclear weapons against selected European countries. He named the United Kingdom, Germany, and, pointedly, the Polish city of Poznań as initial targets. Karaganov justified the mention of Poznań by referencing the significant American military presence there, stating, “If we carried out a nuclear strike on Poznań, the Americans still would never respond.” According to the Western Institute in Poznań, this rhetoric is emblematic of a broader pattern of threats and intimidation emanating from Moscow.
The warnings did not end there. Just five days later, on January 20, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov doubled down on the Kremlin’s confrontational stance. Summarizing Russian diplomatic activity during a press conference, Lavrov declared that the principles of the Western world order “no longer exist” and that the “law of the strongest now applies.” He accused Western countries of continuing to use the Ukrainian government in Kyiv as a tool for armed confrontation with Russia. “The goal of driving us to strategic defeat is no longer invoked so often, but everything indicates that it still resides in the minds and plans, especially of European leaders,” Lavrov said, as reported by TASS. The message was clear: Russia does not intend to soften its narrative toward the West or Ukraine.
Poland, in particular, has been singled out repeatedly by Russian officials. On January 28, Dmitryi Peskov, spokesman for Vladimir Putin, criticized Poland and the Baltic states for what he described as centuries of hostility toward Russia. “Take Poland for example. We really face challenges connected with Poland,” Peskov remarked, adding that “whoever comes to power there begins to hate Russia and Russians.”
That same day, Mariya Zakharova, spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, accused Polish President Karol Nawrocki of “distorting history and shifting responsibility for the outbreak of World War II onto the USSR” during commemorations of the 81st anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. By January 31, Zakharova was demanding that Poland take action against Ukrainian national Volodymyr Zhuravlov, suspected of involvement in the Nord Stream gas pipeline explosion, after a Polish court refused his extradition to Germany. She insisted that Russia “does not uncritically accept the theory that only Ukrainians are behind the Nord Stream blasts, and the theory of involvement by Western intelligence services requires appropriate investigation.”
This intensification of rhetoric is not happening in a vacuum. Poland’s close cooperation with the United States, its support for Ukraine, and recent decisions such as the closure of Russian consulates and the judicial refusal to extradite Zhuravlov have made it a prime target for Russia’s so-called hybrid threats. These include not just propaganda and disinformation, but also cyber operations and espionage. According to the Western Institute, Russia spends between $2 billion and $4 billion annually on such cognitive operations, aiming to destabilize countries like Poland through a barrage of hostile activities.
The impact of these campaigns is palpable. A recent Levada Centre poll found that 62% of Russians view Poland and Lithuania as the most hostile countries. On the other side of the border, fear of Russian disinformation is widespread. The latest Eurobarometer study reveals that 71% of Poles are concerned about the distortion of election results by false or misleading information—a sentiment echoed across the EU’s eastern flank. Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Romania all report similar anxieties, with figures ranging from 65% to 82%.
In response, both individual EU member states and institutions have launched countermeasures, such as the European Democracy Shield program. But the threat is evolving. As Sebastian Wojciechowski, head of the Department of Strategic Studies and International Security at Adam Mickiewicz University, points out, “Statements by Russian politicians may further intensify a range of hybrid actions aimed at Poland.” These could include large-scale cyberattacks on energy, water, or communications systems, as well as acts of espionage or sabotage.
The numbers are staggering. Official data shows that in the last months of 2025 alone, Poland detained more than 50 people suspected of planning sabotage acts. Meanwhile, the country faces between 2,000 and 4,000 cyberattacks daily. According to Check Point Research, Poland’s governmental sector repelled about 2,500 attacks weekly in October 2025, a figure that jumped to 3,100 by January 2026—far outpacing neighboring countries like the Czech Republic, Austria, or Germany. In December 2025, a coordinated cyberattack, likely orchestrated by the Russian hacker group Electrum, disrupted about 30 Polish energy facilities, including district heating systems and renewable energy infrastructure. A report by Dragos confirmed that the attack targeted critical infrastructure, highlighting the seriousness of the threat despite Poland’s robust cyberdefense.
The risks are not confined to cyberspace. On February 7, 2026, Ukraine’s Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Kyiv had requested emergency assistance from Poland after a “massive attack” by Russia on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The assault targeted the Burshtynska and Dobrotvirska power plants in western Ukraine, causing widespread outages that left hundreds of thousands without power in freezing temperatures. The state grid operator Ukrenergo described the situation as dire, noting, “Due to the damage caused by the enemy, emergency outages have been applied in most regions.” Restoration work, officials said, would begin only when security conditions allowed.
The ripple effects were felt across the border. As a precaution, Polish authorities temporarily suspended operations at two airports in southeastern Poland—Rzeszow and Lublin—to ensure the free operation of military aviation. Both cities are close to the Ukraine border, with Rzeszow serving as NATO’s main hub for arms supplies to Ukraine. The episode underscored Poland’s pivotal role in supporting Kyiv and the broader security architecture of the region.
Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict have yielded limited progress. Ukraine and Russia have held two rounds of US-mediated negotiations in Abu Dhabi since January, agreeing on a major prisoner swap but failing to make headway on the contentious issue of territory. Adding to the volatility, Moscow accused Ukraine on February 6 of orchestrating the shooting of a top Russian military intelligence general in Moscow—an incident that left the general wounded. Kyiv has not commented on the allegation.
Martin Jäger, a senior German intelligence official, captured the prevailing sense of unease when he remarked, “We cannot sit idly by and assume that a possible Russian attack will occur no earlier than 2029. We are already under fire today.” For Poland, and indeed for much of Eastern Europe, the message is clear: the hybrid war is already underway, and the line between peace and open conflict is growing ever thinner.