John Noh, the Pentagon nominee for assistant secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, faced the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 7, 2025, at a moment when U.S. strategy in Asia is being tested by China’s rapid military expansion and growing tensions around Taiwan. Noh’s testimony, which echoed through the halls of Congress and into the capitals of U.S. allies, was unequivocal: China is “our most serious military threat” and is undertaking “an unprecedented and historic military buildup,” he told lawmakers, according to The Wall Street Journal.
For those watching the Indo-Pacific, Noh’s words were both a warning and a call to action. He outlined a vision in which the United States must maintain “combat-credible” forces forward-deployed in the western Pacific, specifically west of the international dateline, and invest in a new generation of military technology. “First and foremost, we need to ensure that we have combat-credible forces postured forward in the western Pacific with the right capabilities and at the right places,” Noh declared during his hearing, as reported by Defense News.
But Noh did not just focus on American capabilities. He pressed U.S. allies—Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia—to “significantly increase their own defense investments and take greater responsibility for regional security.” He argued that the era of “America Alone” is over, but “America First” does not mean the U.S. should shoulder the burden by itself. “Our allies and partners in the region are doing more, are spending more and are doing their part,” he said, but he made clear that much more is needed.
The testimony came as the Pentagon is reportedly shifting its focus toward homeland defense in the next National Defense Strategy, potentially raising alarms among Asian allies who rely on U.S. power as a counterweight to Beijing. Noh, however, pledged to be “the biggest advocate to my leadership in the department for making sure that we have all the resources we need to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.”
Central to Noh’s strategic blueprint is the modernization of U.S. force posture across the Indo-Pacific. He detailed the “right capabilities” needed to deter China: “advanced submarine forces; long-range, mobile, precision strike systems; integrated air and missile defense networks; and resilient command and control architectures that can operate effectively within contested environments.” Investments in fifth-generation aircraft and unmanned systems are also vital, he said, to counter China’s growing anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) systems.
These priorities are not just about hardware. Noh highlighted critical gaps in the U.S. defense industrial base, warning, “We face particular shortfalls in our ability to manufacture sufficient quantities of long-range precision strike and air defense munitions, maintain and repair forward-deployed naval and air assets within contested areas, and produce advanced submarines and other high-end platforms at the rate necessary to meet both our own operational requirements as well as those of regional allies and partners.”
Nowhere is this sense of urgency more acute than in Taiwan. Noh was blunt about the existential threat facing the island democracy. He strongly endorsed President Trump’s previous call for Taiwan to spend up to 10% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, a figure far above the 2.45% spent in 2025 and the 3.32% planned for 2026. “I strongly believe that Taiwan needs to do its part and to pay, and increase its defense spending,” Noh told the committee, as cited by The Washington Times. “Taiwan should spend upwards of 10% of its GDP on defense. I strongly support that.”
Taiwanese officials have pushed back, saying such an increase is financially impossible. Still, Noh insisted that Taiwan “absolutely needs to do its part and spend more and increase its defense spending and acquire the kind of asymmetric capabilities that would be most relevant for an invasion scenario.” He urged reforms in training, force mobilization, civil-military integration, infrastructure hardening, and cybersecurity to prepare for a potential Chinese invasion.
The stakes could not be higher. U.S. military commanders have warned that China’s armed forces have been ordered to prepare for military action to seize Taiwan by 2027. Meanwhile, China’s aggressive posture in the South China Sea, particularly against the Philippines—a U.S. treaty ally—continues to raise the risk of unintended escalation. Noh described China’s military expansion as “the most rapid military buildup and the largest since World War II,” encompassing not just conventional and nuclear forces, but also cyber and space warfare capabilities.
From 2015 to 2025, Congress has been notified of more than $28 billion in foreign military sales to Taiwan, but much of this equipment has been delayed by slow production and delivery timelines. Noh acknowledged the frustration, stating that if confirmed, he would “provide my best advice and recommendations for finding creative ways to speed up weapons deliveries to Taiwan.”
Operationally, Noh supports increased cooperation with U.S. allies in the South China Sea, including air and maritime patrols and information sharing with the Philippines, Australia, and Japan. He also pointed to the ongoing Pentagon review of the AUKUS security initiative—a trilateral partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom focused on nuclear-powered submarines—as a “brass tacks, common sense” assessment of whether the project is sustainable and aligned with current U.S. defense priorities. The review, he said, is expected to be completed this fall.
These efforts align with the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific policy, itself an evolution of the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy, which shifted the U.S. military’s primary focus away from counterterrorism and toward great power competition. Ely Ratner, the Pentagon’s current top Indo-Pacific official, testified that “China seeks to seize Taiwan, control the South China Sea, weaken U.S. alliances, and ultimately dominate the region,” aiming to relegate the United States to a “diminished continental power.”
Yet, as Ratner noted, America’s network of allies and partners is a key advantage. “China aims to maximize its coercive pressure by individually isolating regional countries,” he said. “China’s leaders rightly recognize that different combinations of the United States and its partners can garner sufficient collective power to stymie Beijing’s revisionist aims.”
For Noh, the path forward is clear but challenging. The U.S. must modernize its forces, close industrial gaps, and work closely with allies who are willing to invest more in their own security. Taiwan, in particular, must make hard choices to ensure its survival. The United States, Noh concluded, faces a “perilous moment in which peace cannot be assumed.”
As the Indo-Pacific’s security landscape shifts rapidly, Noh’s testimony underscores how much is at stake—not just for the United States and its allies, but for the entire balance of power in Asia.