On October 13, 2025, the far-right Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) once again found itself at the center of a storm, clashing with law enforcement agencies in Muridke as the Pakistani state moved to halt the group’s planned march on Islamabad. The TLP’s stated aim was to protest in front of the US embassy, standing in what they called ‘solidarity’ with Gaza. But the confrontation in Muridke marked more than just another episode in the party’s turbulent history—it signaled a new, more forceful chapter in the Pakistani state’s approach to religious extremism.
According to Dawn, the government’s response was swift and sweeping. In the days following the Muridke clashes, TLP leaders reportedly went underground, thousands of supporters were rounded up, and the state seized control of the group’s mosques and madressahs. By October 17, 2025, the Punjab information minister announced that a formal summary to ban the TLP had been dispatched to the federal government. Several federal ministers echoed the resolve, insisting that the crackdown would not relent. This would be the second time in just over a decade that the TLP faced an official ban.
The TLP’s rise is emblematic of a broader trend in Pakistan’s religious politics. While many of the country’s previous sectarian and jihadi groups have hailed from the Deobandi or Ahle Hadith traditions, the TLP draws its strength from the Barelvi school. The party has repeatedly mobilized public sentiment around highly emotive issues such as blasphemy, often resulting in confrontations with authorities. Its track record is fraught with legal troubles and its role in organizing mobs—sometimes violent—has frequently raised alarms among rights groups and minority communities.
Indeed, as Dawn reports, the TLP has been linked to campaigns targeting minorities, particularly Christians and Ahmadis, with attacks on places of worship in Punjab. Despite these controversies, the group commands significant political clout, having garnered millions of votes in the last general elections. This dual identity—as both a protest movement and a political force—has made the TLP a particularly thorny challenge for successive governments.
Yet, history offers sobering lessons about the effectiveness of outright bans. The Musharraf regime, for instance, introduced the first major bans on extremist groups more than two decades ago. However, many of these organizations simply resurfaced under new names, continuing their activities with little hindrance. As Dawn cautions, “simply publishing a notification in the official gazette may not be enough to deal effectively with the TLP phenomenon.”
The editorial goes further, arguing that the state’s tendency to issue bans without sustained enforcement has allowed violent groups to regain their footing. “If the state ‘bans’ groups, then loses interest and starts looking away, these outfits will re-emerge, and the cycle of violence and confrontation will continue in perpetuity,” Dawn warns. Instead, the paper advocates for robust legal action: prosecuting leaders and activists who incite violence or engage in hate speech, rather than relying solely on blanket prohibitions.
This latest crackdown comes against a backdrop of heightened sensitivities in the region, particularly regarding the situation in Gaza. On October 18, 2025, Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, addressed these concerns during a passing out parade at the Pakistan Military Academy Kakul in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. As reported by Anadolu, General Munir expressed Islamabad’s hope that the “Gaza peace initiative would lead to an enduring peace in the region.” He underscored Pakistan’s expectation that the current ceasefire would hold, paving the way for humanitarian relief and reconstruction in Gaza.
General Munir’s remarks followed a significant diplomatic development: on October 13, 2025, US President Donald Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi hosted a summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, culminating in an agreement that ended a two-year war in Gaza. The toll of that conflict has been staggering. According to Anadolu, “since October 2023, Israeli attacks have killed nearly 68,000 Palestinians in Gaza, most of them women and children, and rendered it largely uninhabitable.”
Pakistan’s stance on the Palestinian issue remains resolute. General Munir reiterated the country’s commitment to the “indispensability of the two-state solution and the need for an independent, sovereign, and viable state of Palestine, based on pre-1967 war borders with Al Quds Al Sharif as its capital.” His comments reflect a longstanding policy consensus in Islamabad, one that resonates deeply with many Pakistanis—including, notably, groups like the TLP, who have often mobilized around the Palestinian cause.
But General Munir did not confine his remarks to Gaza. He also drew a parallel with the Kashmir conflict, describing both the suffering of Palestinians and the “Kashmiri subjugation” as “festering wounds on the conscience of humanity.” Addressing India directly, he cautioned that “there is no space for war in a nuclearized environment,” and urged New Delhi to “settle the core issues with Pakistan, as per the international norms, on the basis of equality and mutual respect.” There was no immediate response from Indian officials to these comments.
The convergence of these events—a domestic crackdown on a powerful religious party and renewed diplomatic engagement on the Gaza crisis—highlights the complex interplay between Pakistan’s internal politics and its foreign policy. The TLP’s attempted march on Islamabad in solidarity with Gaza illustrates how international issues can become flashpoints for domestic unrest, especially when they tap into deeply held religious and political sentiments.
At the same time, the state’s response to the TLP raises important questions about the limits of legal and administrative measures in curbing extremism. As Dawn notes, “groups must be free to organise, but no one can be allowed to advocate violence against any community, or endorse hate speech.” The challenge, then, is to strike a balance between upholding civil liberties and ensuring public safety—a task that has eluded many governments in Pakistan’s history.
For now, the crackdown on the TLP appears determined and comprehensive. But as past experience shows, the true test will be whether the state can sustain its efforts and address the root causes of extremism, rather than merely suppressing its symptoms. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s leaders continue to project solidarity with the Palestinian people on the world stage, even as they grapple with the domestic fallout of groups who seek to turn that solidarity into political action at home.
Whether this moment marks a turning point in Pakistan’s struggle with religious extremism remains to be seen. But with regional tensions simmering and domestic pressures mounting, the stakes could hardly be higher.