Pakistan’s troubled northwest and southwest regions have once again become flashpoints for violent confrontations and shifting alliances, as the country’s security forces ramp up operations against militants while grappling with the fallout of complex regional rivalries. On Wednesday, September 24, 2025, Pakistani security forces raided a militant hideout in Dera Ismail Khan, a district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province near the Afghan border, according to a statement released by the military and reported by the Associated Press. The operation triggered a fierce shootout that left 13 Pakistani Taliban fighters dead, with authorities describing the slain insurgents as "Khwarij," a term often used for the Pakistani Taliban, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
The military asserted that these militants were not new to violence. They had allegedly participated in previous attacks, including a devastating 2023 suicide bombing at a police station gate on the city’s outskirts, which killed 23 security personnel. After the raid, security forces recovered weapons and ammunition from the hideout, further underscoring the group’s capacity for violence. In a striking accusation, the military claimed that the killed insurgents had received support from neighboring India—a charge that Islamabad has leveled repeatedly in recent months, implicating both the Pakistani Taliban and Baloch separatists. New Delhi, for its part, has consistently denied these allegations.
The backdrop to these events is a surge in militant violence across Pakistan, much of it claimed by separatist groups and the TTP. The TTP, distinct from but allied with the Afghan Taliban, has grown bolder since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021. Many TTP leaders and fighters are believed to have found refuge across the porous border in Afghanistan, further complicating counterterrorism efforts in the region.
But the story doesn’t end in the northwest. According to an in-depth analysis from the Observer Research Foundation, Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan has become the latest theater in a dangerous game of militant musical chairs. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), once rooted in Afghanistan, has shifted its operational base to Balochistan following the Taliban’s consolidation of power in Kabul. This strategic relocation, far from accidental, appears to be a product of both necessity and opportunity. With the Taliban cracking down on ISKP within Afghanistan, the group found sanctuary in Balochistan’s vast, ungoverned spaces—regions already riven by insurgency and weak state control.
Balochistan’s security landscape is now a combustible mix of global jihadism and local ethno-nationalist rebellion. The ISKP, with its lethal Salafist ideology and global ambitions, has clashed violently with Baloch separatist groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), both of which seek independence from Pakistan. In March 2025, the BLA staged a pre-emptive raid on ISKP camps near Mastung, killing 30 terrorists. The ISKP responded in kind, releasing a 36-minute video on May 25, 2025, via its media arm Al Azaim, publicly declaring war on Baloch separatists. In the video, ISKP derided the separatists as "secular, nationalists and pro-democracy—traits the terror group sees as ‘un-Islamic’." This declaration signaled the collapse of any previous, informal non-aggression understanding between the groups.
Pakistan’s approach to these developments has drawn sharp scrutiny. The Observer Research Foundation points to a pattern of ambiguous policies and selective counterterrorism, with Islamabad allegedly tolerating ISKP’s presence in Balochistan to gain leverage over both the Taliban government in Kabul and local separatists. The logic is as risky as it is intricate: by allowing ISKP to operate, Pakistan can pressure the Afghan Taliban (often blamed for ISKP’s actions) and simultaneously harness ISKP’s violence against Baloch nationalist groups. This proxy strategy, while offering plausible deniability, comes with grave risks—both for Pakistan and for regional stability.
Such tactics are not without precedent. Pakistan’s security apparatus, particularly the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), has a long history of clandestine links with a range of jihadist organizations, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, and Al Qaeda. As noted by Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution, Pakistan has "augmented Afghanistan’s instability by providing intelligence, weapons, and protection to the […] Haqqani network." These proxy relationships have often blurred the lines between state interests and militant agendas.
In a rare public admission, Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif stated in May 2025 that Pakistan had supported such groups for over three decades. Sherry Rehman, Vice President of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), also acknowledged that "Islamabad’s past is linked to terrorism." Such acknowledgments lend credence to claims that Pakistan’s current permissiveness toward ISKP in Balochistan may be part of a broader strategy of proxy warfare aimed at managing internal dissent and external threats.
Yet, the costs of this approach are mounting. The reality of ISKP’s presence in Balochistan became undeniable after high-profile attacks such as the 2024 Kerman bombings in Iran and the Moscow concert hall massacre, both traced back to operatives in Balochistan. Following international outrage, Pakistan arrested and extradited ISKP commander Mohammad Sharifullah—the alleged co-conspirator in the 2021 Kabul airport attack—to the United States in March 2025. This move was accompanied by a media campaign portraying Islamabad as a committed counterterrorism partner. However, as the Observer Research Foundation points out, hundreds of ISKP operatives continue to function from Balochistan, with the military’s main focus remaining on Baloch separatists rather than the transnational jihadists.
This selective action is not new. Whenever international scrutiny—such as from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—intensifies, Pakistan has showcased high-profile arrests, like that of Hafiz Saeed, to project an image of robust counterterrorism efforts. However, these gestures often serve diplomatic and financial objectives more than they disrupt entrenched militant networks. The result is a dangerous equilibrium, where extremist groups are allowed to persist, undermining both regional and global security.
Critics argue that Pakistan’s policy of selectively targeting terrorists while tolerating ISKP’s presence in Balochistan is a perilous gamble. The fragile balancing act risks collapse, with the potential for catastrophic consequences not just within Pakistan, but across its borders. The international community, analysts warn, must look beyond Islamabad’s carefully curated narrative of counterterrorism and recognize the proxy conflicts at play. By instrumentalizing ISKP to suppress Baloch nationalists, Pakistan is fueling domestic unrest and enabling a potent global terrorist threat, as evidenced by recent attacks in Iran and Russia.
As Pakistan’s security forces continue their raids and the region’s militant landscape shifts, the stakes have never been higher. The selective application of counterterrorism, reliance on proxies, and enduring entanglements with extremist groups threaten to destabilize not just Pakistan, but the broader region. The world is watching, wary of the next flashpoint in this ongoing and perilous contest.